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SOCIAL ASPECTS
OF
CHRISTIAN MORALITY

CROALL LECTURES, 1903-4

SOCIAL ASPECTS
OF
CHRISTIAN MORALITY

BY THE REV.


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"THE ETHICS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT"; "THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIAN CHARACTER";
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PREFATORY NOTE

THESE Lectures were delivered in Edinburgh in the winter of 1903-4. Only portions of them were then read, under the conditions of time and place imposed.

It will be noticed that the subjects of Wealth and Poverty are not discussed. They are so vast and wide in their range that the author felt it would be impossible to do justice to them in this volume. If time and health be given, he hopes in the future to treat these subjects in a manner and on a scale worthy of their great importance.

The author is very conscious of the value of the kindness bestowed, not only by an audience larger than he had ventured to anticipate, but also by the number of students of the University of Edinburgh who regularly attended the delivery of these Lectures.

To the Trustees of the Croall Mortification he begs to tender his most sincere thanks for the honour they conferred upon him by appointing him Lecturer, and for the confidence manifested in that appointment.

His special thanks are due to Rev. Dr. Flint, ex-Professor of Edinburgh University, for much counsel, readily given, during the composition of these Lectures. His indebtedness is also very great to a friend who will not permit his name to be mentioned, but who, amid many heavy duties, found time for reading proofs and making various suggestions of much value.

BANFF, *2nd October, 1905.*

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CHAPTER I.

SCOPE AND METHOD OF SOCIAL ETHICS.

THE problem that weighs on men's minds to-day is the Social Problem. It is a question that is of interest not only to economist and statistician, but to all. It touches alike the head-worker and the hand-worker; it concerns both the artist and the artisan. That so many are alive to its urgency is a hopeful sign. It were well that they were no less alive to the necessity of solving it in accordance with the principles of justice and equity. For it deals not only with economic changes, market prices and workmen's wages, but also with the relations of man to man. The problem is essentially one of ethics.

We have sought to apply the principles of Ethical Science to modern questions because *all the difficult political and economical problems are found to have ethical factors at their root.* The franchise, for example, to a large extent is a question of intelligence and of moral character. Given citizens who can read and write, and who are sober, industrious people, then most of us will admit that they are entitled to have a vote in the management of the affairs of the nation. In

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the same way the problems of the housing of the poor, of the feeding of starving children at school, and the whole matter of Slumland are very largely problems of character. Could we only introduce into the slums the virtues of thrift, cleanliness, temperance and industry, how soon should we see these moral wildernesses blossoming like the rose! In looking for a remedy for pauperism, in like manner, we shall find that we cannot ignore the pauper's moral needs and deal only with his physical wants. For the pauper too has the rights attaching to personality. And not a few of the methods proposed for the cure of this social disease begin by infringing these most sacred rights.

It is not otherwise with such a question as that of divorce. Divorce means the disruption of the home, which is the best school of morals. It springs out of sins that destroy the ethical foundation of the family. The logic of the Socialist is unimpeachable when he aims his deadliest blows at the domesticities of home. The social disease which eats away the vitals of the nations to-day can be treated only by moral remedies. All other methods are but external: they only cover up the cancerous disease. The internal malignancy demands a moral cure.

Many writers on social questions have affirmed that co-operation will prove the wisest solution of our economic problems. It may or may not. But if it do contribute to the solution, it will be only when we have found "the right co-operative individual". Wherever limited liability companies

have been able to secure honest workmen and competent and trustworthy managers, they have succeeded. Where these are not found, the majority of co-operative societies have been financial failures. Behind the failure we always find an ethical factor—the careless manager, the fraudulent treasurer, or the lazy labourer. In all economic questions character is an element that has to be considered.

We say “all men are equal,” and that at the start of life’s race there ought to be educational equality, and as nearly as possible equality of opportunity. This claim is being pressed into prominence by the people, and we do not wonder that they should assert its urgency on our legislators. But it is a problem that cannot be solved by education or by politics alone. The solution depends largely on the mental and moral qualities of those who are commencing the race of life. The very idea of equality rests on the fundamental truth that every man has spiritual worth which entitles him to our respect. It is closely connected with the continuous advance in the appreciation of human life apart from its accessories. It is bound up with an apprehension of the transcendent worth of the human personality. In short, *it is mainly a question of Ethics.*

May we not make the same assertion regarding the modern claim of the female voter? When we turn for information to those who advocate Woman’s Rights, we find that the claim is supported by a strange medley of opinions, in many of which evidently sentiment predominates. Every

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one may be said to admit the fundamental equality of men and women. But along with this equality there co-exist vast inequalities both physical and psychical. It is diversity of personality that causes diversity of rights and of those duties which are the correlatives of rights. All of these are simply aspects of one great inalienable right which every woman has—the right to be true to herself, the right to develop her character and to realise her personality along the lines which heredity indicates, and which circumstances and environment permit. So that this question also comes to be one of justice and of morality. So far as the exercise of these rights will help to the realisation of true womanhood, the claim must be conceded. So far as their exercise might injure distinctive womanhood, the claim must be refused. To grant it would be not to add to woman's rights but to add to woman's wrongs. The injury would prove not a political but a moral one. The purpose of sex and the grace of sex are not the product of a generation, but the outcome of the evolution of æons. "What was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament."¹ Through all historic times woman has ever been a moral agent and has created for herself a moral record. She was made to be a mother. And whatever movement of to-day weakens the social obligations to marriage is to be deplored as

¹ *The Evolution of Sex*, by P. Geddes and J. A. Thompson, p. 267.

hurtful to social welfare, and still more injurious to social morality.

It is evident, then, that nearly all political problems have ethical factors, which it is of the utmost importance to bring out into clear light. We may trace many economic errors to moral mistakes. A vast amount of suffering and misery among the poor springs out of a moral root: it is as closely connected with a weak will or a ruined character, as is the effect with the cause or the consequent with the antecedent. We sympathise with those who suffer so much from over-population, from destitution, from want of sanitary surroundings. Yet much of these evils is attributable to intemperance, to passion, to lack of energy, to want of self-control. Remedies that do not reach this moral cancer will bring only a temporary cure. They will be merely palliatives, not restoratives. So, while we make use of the economic teaching, we must accentuate the need of an ethical remedy. The problem of to-day is an ethical problem, and it will not be solved without the knowledge of the principles of ethical science. Any induction of the laws of social well-being which omits the presence of moral motives can produce only fallacious results. Every student of economics ought to be an ardent pupil in the school of ethics. The moral precedes the economical as certainly as the economical must precede the legislative embodiment. Modern social questions are concentric circles, at the centre of which lies the ethical principle.

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It is not simply Ethics, however, that we are to discuss, but Social Ethics. It is a truth of far-reaching importance that no man can live a wholly independent life. He comes into the world a dependent being ; and for many years he owes his education and happiness to his parents or guardians. As soon as he enters commercial or professional life, he finds that again of necessity he is a member of society. And his relation to it is not that of a mere external bond, which he can break through when he chooses, and terminate at his pleasure. The relation is internal. It bears a resemblance to the relation between the members of his body—foot, hand, and head—which possess a unity at once organic and abiding.

It is true that every new-born child has the stamp of a common humanity upon him. Yet different children reflect different sides of this common image or mark. We are all partialisms ; none of us represents the whole of humanity. We see in part ; we reflect in part. And these very limitations and partialisms constitute a strong social bond, making it necessary for the accomplishment of our life-purpose that we help one another. Our gifts are intended by nature to be supplemental. To one man is given the gift of healing ; to another the gift of husbandry ; to a third the gift of government. The purpose of a wise Providence is evident. These endowments are intended to supplement our deficiencies, and to maintain the social organism in health.

We live in a social world. Our largest in-

heritance is the social heritage, which the poorest child, no less than the wealthiest baron's heir, enters upon. Even "the great man," who is supposed by many to be an exception to the rule, and to rise solely by force of his own merits, is far more dependent than we think on his social environment. In fact, his greatness is constituted by the fact that he of all men best expresses the spirit of his age and lies most open to its influence. He is the very child of the *Zeitgeist*. His nature is the harp on whose strings its air-currents strike and give themselves a voice.

All morality is social. The Moral Law is a law of society, and exists only in the character of those who are members of society. No man liveth unto himself, and no man dieth unto himself. Morality first exists in persons, and without society we may say there are no persons and no rights.¹ We can therefore realise our true self

¹ We must remember that only in society does the subject or the object of rights exist. All these political rights presuppose a polity as their basis. It is possible mentally to abstract the individual from the social organism, and to endow him with supposed privileges. Indeed this has to be done before one can attain to any clear conception of individual rights. Unless they signify his rights over against the rights of another, the claim is meaningless. It exists only in that society or political arena which reconciles might with right. The error of all Rousseau's speculations was that his unit—the man in an extra social condition—never existed in reality. Had he been a real person and not a mere creature of Jean Jacques' imagination, no civil rights of any kind could have been predicated of him. The true type of man is not the solitary savage of an unpeopled island, or the Robinson Crusoe of Defoe's story,

only by realising social ends. The whims of the individual self must be subdued that the true self may live.

To many this teaching may seem strange, because for so long a time we have been accustomed to lay the emphasis on the importance of the individual. Protestant Christianity, which taught man the infinite value of the human soul, may have somewhat contributed to this over-valuation. It asserted the claims of the individual in the interests of freedom of thought and of worship, and the fight has been continued in the interests of science. But the protest against the claims of ecclesiastical authority went too far when it threw the whole of its weight on the simple relation of the individual soul to God. The claims of society are not less to be heeded than the rights of the individual conscience. A dissent from authority is in itself a mere negation. When that against which the protest is made ceases to have influence the protest is dead, being deprived of its *raison d'être*. If Catholicism tends to suppress the individual and to become therefore stationary, Protestantism has helped to undermine the idea of the Church and to that extent has been anti-social. What we need is a synthesis that shall embrace the truth that resides in both of them.

We need not wonder that Protestantism has

but the ideal man developed to the utmost by education, science, and religion, with all his powers and faculties thoroughly disciplined into fitness for social service.

exhibited such a strong tendency to degenerate into small sects. It has hitherto concentrated men's minds on their individual salvation. No doubt it has produced many noble men and women, who have risen to a lofty spiritual culture and made great attainments in holiness of life. This, however, has only helped to emphasise the inner side of religion, and has turned attention away from the other aspect of service. But the conviction has grown that religion is necessarily bound up with social not less than with individual good, and that it manifests its surest results in seeking the well-being of our fellow-creatures.

The evil consequences that have resulted from an excess of moral and spiritual individualism are patent to all. We need not stay to point them out at length. Every excess in subjective religion is a precious force of emotion which has escaped from ethical restraint, and very probably will end in some moral catastrophe. In the history of the Church it has been found that fanaticism usually roots itself in this soil. It is the cause of much of the bitter sectarianism so prevalent in Great Britain and in America.

Yet surely the Church of Christ, when we consider its origin and end, should form the very best training ground of social morality. Few men in these days can stand apart from the great body of Christian believers without paying a severe penalty in the loss of spiritual symmetry. It is only "with all saints" that we are able to comprehend what is the length and breadth, the depth

and height, of the love of God. But when a man has wilfully broken his sense of oneness with the communion of saints, he cannot escape the nemesis which attaches to the exaggeration of his individualism. We have all met with some unamiable specimens of this class, whose incompleteness is made only the more manifest by their self-chosen isolation. We must seek to share in the Christian consciousness of the whole Body of Christ if we would carry our individual conscience to the point of completeness.

While speaking thus of the exaggerated individualism which has appeared in both political and religious circles, we do not ignore the valuable truth that underlies the Christian individuality. Every soul that is born into the world is an expression of the mind and intention of the Creator. It is gifted with powers and aptitudes by which it is fitted to occupy that place which it alone can fill. We are all born originals, and it is a mistake if we should die mere copies. Our individuality is that original gift of Providence through which it is intended we should be useful in the world. Further, it must never be forgotten that in all great crises of the spiritual life we are solitary souls. Alone we meet with God in the hour of penitence, in the battle with an evil habit, in the closet of communion, and in the hush of the chamber of death. And it is as individuals that we shall at last have to render our account unto God of the use we have made of our gifts and opportunities.

But while as individuals we receive the call to enter the Kingdom of God, it must not be forgotten that what we enter *is a kingdom of Christian social bonds*, that we serve under one rule, and are bound by one tie of obligation. Are then the individual and social aspects of life opposed to each other? Certainly not. Many facts point to the independence of each human being, and to his individual worth. All knowledge is individual, for no man possesses it who has not assimilated it by his intellect. The student must for the time being become a solitary soul: he must test the ideas he has acquired by reading or lectures, and must make them his own only as they commend themselves to his private judgment and take root in the soil of his own mind.

So, too, a man's conduct must not be the course of life forced upon him by society. Duty sometimes conceals the spontaneity of moral conduct: yet behind all the imperatives of conscience there lies the self-chosen life which is the result of the convictions of independent reason. He who acts rightly only because he is compelled to do so is in reality unrighteous, as he who is honest only because "honesty is the best policy" is at heart a thief.

But, on the other hand, there are as many facts no less prominent which go to prove the organic connection of the individual with the race.¹ We

¹That society is an organism scarcely needs to be proved. For all purposes it has been found better to place the State and the Church under the term organic than under any lower

must all acquire by individual effort the truths which we possess. Yet truth has a positive existence entirely irrespective of the mind that grasps

category. Only extreme anarchists hold that society could exist without the principle of organisation. On the other hand, it must be frankly admitted that the word Organism is not unambiguous, and is used simply for want of any more correct term. In his *Principles of Sociology*, part ii., chap. ii. *seq.*, Mr. Spencer at great length gives us the detailed analogies between the growth and functions of society and those of animals. But the comparison cannot be carried far on all fours, and indeed is best discovered only in the lowest forms of the animal kingdom. Suggestions of these analogies between the State and the functions of animal bodies are found both in Plato and Aristotle. Bluntschli in his *Theory of the State* amusingly speaks of the State as a male, and of the Church as a female organism. St. Paul in memorable words expounds the idea in 1 Cor. xii.: "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ. For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; it is not therefore not of the body. If the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; it is not therefore not of the body" (Rev. Vn.). The language of the Apostle is really the Christianising of the Republic of Plato, with which he had doubtless been familiar.

Mr. J. S. Mackenzie (*Introduction to Social Philosophy*) distinguishes between a monadistic, a monistic, a mechanical, a chemical, and an organic view of the relation of the world to God (p. 148). In these five ways the parts may be related to the whole. It is clear that the point of comparison in the *organic* theory of society is that *the parts are intrinsically related to the whole, and that the end of the whole is the same as the end of each part.* Perhaps one could not find a better analogy of the organic constitution of society than in a good orchestra, in which there is the most perfect unity of thought and sound under one leader and all to one end. Socialists have

it. In all knowledge there is a common element which is transmitted from sire to son, from teacher to pupil, from author to reader, from mind to mind—an element which is the capital with which we all trade.

been very guilty of straining the analogy and making it run upon all fours for the purpose of caricaturing individual effort and supporting their own one-sided theory. They have too often conceived of society as a huge machine in which one wheel has no independence, but must work entirely for the benefit of the whole.

The better view, however, which embraces all that is true in the organic view, is that which is known as the psychological theory. It will be referred to afterwards in the chapter upon the State. Of course all sociology has been influenced by the special sciences. As Professor Bosanquet says, it is to an extraordinary degree "the playground of analogies". It has borrowed analogies from mathematics, from economics, from jurisprudence, from anthropology, biology and psychology. Sociology has now become a psychological science. Psychology, in its widest sense, is the science of all mental phenomena; and it certainly includes social conduct and relations. It is usually, in actual scientific research, restricted to a narrower field. But it is now clear that one cannot study any section of society, any social custom or legal enactment, without discovering how instantly it attaches itself to underlying mental relations. Every fact of sociology is seen to have psychological bearings. Mind is the only unity which will explain the various states and conditions that contribute to social evolution. When the instinct of association has been developed, then the cohesion of the population is maintained, not by physical, but by psychical, bonds. These produce a true organic unity. Society becomes one; it possesses a personality of its own, with tides of feeling, with habits of will, with a social mind, which constitute the phenomena of its life and blend together in a conscious and organic whole. Cf. Dewey, *Psychology*, p. 242. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, chaps. ii. and vii.

We open a book and read a few pages of an original mind; we say to ourselves—"This is what I myself have often thought, yet never could express so well in words or give it a local habitation". We find a large body of truth ready-made for every learner, and no man, not even the most original genius, creates anew the whole substance of his own thought. The solidarity of our knowledge is a fact patent to all.

Nor is the solidarity of our conduct less evident. We inherit traditions from the family, the Church, the nation. We are taught to speak in a language which is already the possession of others and holds in its words a whole world of association. Language, like society, is a social medium connecting us with other races who have expressed their ideas by similar sounds. Further, from parents, brothers, sisters and teachers we begin to acquire our notions of propriety, of kindness, of duty. The nursery and the playground fill us with sentiments of honour and justice. School and college, shop and office are all institutions that contribute to our fitness for acting well our part, and shape our characters into the men we are to be. So powerful is the influence of this whole social environment that it is with difficulty we can afterwards escape from its influence and assert our independent judgment.

The old familiar simile of the new-born child being like a sheet of white paper, which in the past was used to point the moral of parental responsi-

bility, is now sent to the limbo of forgotten things. Psychology has exploded the theory. Heredity has asserted the truth that there are no absolute beginnings since the Creation. So far from the mind being a blank sheet of paper, it may rather be compared to an old palimpsest on whose faded characters have been superimposed more recent writing. The little babe, though born but yesterday, is already old in proclivities which it may take many years to develop, and whose existence cannot be known until that development proves them to be already there. Sometimes only in the later years of a man's life do inherited tastes and tendencies—towards art, literature, travel, or scientific pursuits—break through the crust of custom by which for half a lifetime they have been inhibited. Every wise man will endeavour to know the history of his stock and parentage in order to know himself and his congenital endowments. We are bound to past generations by ten thousand ties, any one of whose traits may suddenly emerge with a masterful influence upon ourselves.

The dependence of the individual upon others is corroborated by history. Never once has man been found existing apart from society. He has always been gregarious. The story of the evolution of the village, of the city, and of the nation, is the history of the solidarity of humanity. The rise of government, the growth of the tribe and clan, the modern drift of population to towns where a higher and more differentiated social life

is possible, all go to prove that society is a necessity of human life.¹

The same result is arrived at if we analyse our judgments and discover on what they are based. Even without accepting Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, who of us can fail to perceive that sympathy is a natural quality, and that our judgment approves every act of beneficence which helps the needy and gives courage to the despondent? No good man can afford to despise the approbation of the good men around him. And none of our actions can be called good which injure the powers of the action of our neighbours or in any way are destructive of social and moral order.

These facts will help us to understand the social nature of our moral life. *All our duties are duties that knit us to our fellow-creatures.* This is so plain when we speak of the other-regarding virtues that we need only mention them. Every act of generosity springs out of a kindly regard for our neighbours. But even in the case of the self-regarding virtues our life is ours, not to make

¹ Vide Gidding's *Principles of Sociology*, book iii., chap. ii.; Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, vol. ii., p. 360; Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*, chap. i.; Tylor, *Anthropology*, p. 30; Darwin, *Descent of Man*, p. 155; *Revue d'Anthropologie*, vol. vii., Sér. 2, p. 358; H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, part iv., chap. iv.; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, band iii., p. 383. During the rise of Comparative Philology it was guilty of a very uncritical assumption of the identity of race with language. But the same race has not always spoken the same tongue. Cf. Darmesteter, "Race and Tradition," in his *Selected Essays*; and also Sayce, *The Races of the Old Testament*, p. 12.

any use of it that we choose, but, when we realise our true self, we are to work for the social well-being. Suicide is not only an infringement of the law of self-preservation, but an unauthorised breach of the social order. Among the Stoics it was permitted and even commended when the reason seemed sufficient to the individual mind. But although it has been lately defended by some pessimistic writers, yet the Christian conscience has more and more in these days recognised the interests of society in the individual life. A man's life is a personal trust which he dares not spend according to the dictates of his own pleasure and wilfulness. The suicide is a "truant from the school of life". "I will no longer live" means—"I will no longer do my duty". Suicide cannot be justified, because our highest good requires the continuance of life for its realisation. "The self to be realised by us is the social self." And although, in exceptional circumstances, the individual may rightly sacrifice his life for the sake of society, he can never be justified in an act of suicide. The All-Wise alone knows the true limits of our life, and the best time and mode of our final discharge. The issues of that life are very complex, and reach so far beyond the present stage of existence that we dare not take them into our own hand. He who attempts suicide violates his duty to society and forfeits his right of freedom. The State justly steps in and deprives him of his liberty.

Perhaps in nothing is the influence of society

upon the individual more manifest than in the case of what we call "great men". These have so often been spoken of as cases of self-made men that they are supposed to be totally independent of the society of their time. We speak of them as towering head and shoulders above their fellows, and we are inclined to think of them as being as solitary and independent as some gigantic cedars standing in a forest of young saplings. But so far is it from being true that our Platos, our Mahomets, our Cæsars or our Napoleons were independent of their surroundings, that it was owing to their very insight into the spirit of their age and their oneness with the deepest longing of the men of their times, that they became such powerful moral forces in their day. They voiced the very spirit of the age. Very far from being isolated from their social environment, they more truly understood its meaning and trend, and gave direction to its impulses. They brought all its forces to a focus. They were not independent of social influence; they were the very embodiment of it. Socrates was the incarnation of the Athenian age; Luther was the embodiment of the Reformation in Germany; and John Knox was its incarnation in Scotland. Had those men failed to identify themselves with the tendency of the times, they would never have accomplished the work they did.

Some men, possessed of a strong individuality, have claimed to be entirely self-educated. If this means that they have received their education from books without the direct aid of oral teaching,

it may be granted. But if it signify that their education has been totally independent of their social environment, the claim is meaningless. The man who makes it is one who has been moving in a social sphere, and from parents and friends has received traditions, customs and opinions which he has unconsciously imbibed, and which have formed part of the stock in trade on which he bases the title of a self-made man. Besides, he who is constantly in the company of the great masters of the English tongue is in the very best of society, and is continually appropriating a mass of knowledge and thoughts which may be called his literary heritage.¹ In like manner, his moral and religious education is carried on in the family, in the Church, and in business. Most men owe as much to the tales of the nursery, to the code of honour in the cricket field, and to the ethics of commercial life, as to anything else in their moral education. All that the self-educated man has done has been to buy up the opportunities and to appropriate the advantages offered by his social environment. "Others have laboured, and he has entered into their labours."

It is clearly, then, man's nature to be social. He may justly be defined in the language of Aristotle as the "social animal". Only through the nature and discipline which society provides

¹ Cf. Wright, *Outline of Practical Sociology*, part i.; B. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, chap. xi.; Muirhead's *Elements of Ethics on "Great Men"*; and the Author's *Our Heritage, Individual, Social and Religious*, chap. ii.

can he develop his powers. From the moment he crosses the threshold of life he comes under social influences and enters on a racial heritage. He owes all he possesses to family or national privileges, none of which he had any hand in gaining. If it is not yet proved that he inherits transmitted qualities that have been acquired and stored up in the stock of parentage, at least it cannot be denied that he is the heir to-day to a magnificent social heritage of civilisation, embracing the rich results of Art and Science, of Literature and Christian progress. All these make up the present-day environment into which our boys are born. Whatever difficulties there may be as to transmitted qualities, here there is none.¹ The farther our examination goes the more evidence is produced to show that every young life is fed and sustained on this inheritance. Indeed, a great deal of what was once supposed to be due to heredity is now seen to be the gift of our environment. If we fully realised this, we should count less on our congenital endowments, and be more anxious to make the most of our social heritage.

While these two aspects of the moral life, the

¹This subject is fully discussed by Weismann and Wallace, the leaders of the Neo-Darwinian school. See also Leslie Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, chap. iii.; Edward Caird, *The Social Philosophy of Comte*, p. 45 *seq.*; J. Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, part ii., chap. ii.; Theo. Ziegler, *Sittliches Sein und Sittliches Werden*, who holds morality to be a product of society developed in the individual by custom, habit and imitation, while he also recognises the authority of conscience.

individual and the social, have been emphasised, yet their unity is best seen when they are both subsumed under the title of the personal life. It is in this way that we are able to co-ordinate the different elements, not only in the individual life, but in the lives of others. *Each man is not merely an individual being, but a person and an end.*

No man therefore can be true to his own personality without at the same time being helpful to the personality of his neighbour. He will be at once an egoist and an altruist, and will in this way reconcile his own interests with the interests of others. The best way to help our neighbours to realise themselves is to endeavour to realise our own true self, that better or higher self which springs out of the death of the lower self, the life of the "Spirit" which follows the crucifixion of the "flesh". It is when we lose our lower life and find the higher, and stand in a right relation to ourselves, that we get into right relations with our fellow-citizens. Here we find the reconciliation of individual and social ethics.

CHAPTER II.

I.

SUPERIORITY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

IN discussing the Social Ethics of Christianity, we are met *in limine* with the objection that there is only one possible kind of morality, and that therefore the subject-matter must be the same in Social Ethics as in Christian Social Ethics. The objection is a well-known one. "Strip off the form from your Christian Ethics, and it is simply Natural Ethics with a few religious phrases added. Break the shell of each and the same kernel remains. The only difference is that Philosophical Ethics adheres more strictly to scientific form."

It is our conviction, however, that Christian Ethics may be treated quite as scientifically as Natural Ethics.¹ Of course the form is historical and cannot be altered, since it includes the facts of sin and of salvation through a Divine Redeemer. On the other hand, the former possesses greater ethical significance because it carries with it the great dynamic of duty, and the one principle that makes morality operative in man's contest with evil. If hitherto Natural Ethics alone has given

¹ This is shown with convincing logic in Rothe's *Theologische Ethik*.

attention to social duties, it is to be commended for so doing. It has been greatly to the loss of the Christian Church that it has so long ignored the social problems that have arisen from the many maladjustments of commercial and political life. It need be so no longer. There is no reason why Christian Ethics should occupy itself only with individual needs and duties. Christianity lays its hand on all ethical facts and claims them as its own possession. It is our contention that unless Philosophical Ethics ascend to the lofty level of Christian Ethics, our rational nature will fail to reach its highest enrichment and to bring forth the fruit of its most enduring virtues.

We desire, therefore, to emphasise the superiority of Christian Ethics in relation both to individual and social needs.

1. It is superior to the old Greek Ethics in its setting before men the *great end of moral perfection*. Aristotle's Wise Man was content if he could live in the Golden Mean, found somewhere between the vice of the spendthrift's liberality and the vice of the miser's stinginess, or between a foolish ostentation and a selfish meanness. In Aristotle's Ethics we find many illustrations of this golden mean. It is one which has been much praised and commended for its stability; but the way of prudence is not the path to perfection. The moment the calculation of what is safe and politic enters into morality, that moment the virtue is extinguished. Such calculation of consequences undermines all lofty con-

ceptions of duty. The safe and sure way which prudence dictates is far below the lofty road along which Christ calls us to walk. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." The superlative virtues of Christianity can be embodied only by such as "in their faith supply virtue, and in their virtue supply knowledge, and in their knowledge supply . . . love". They who are citizens of the kingdom of God are such as live in the heavenly places with Christ, and strive "to attain unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a full-grown man". This goal lies far outside the limits of the Greek ethical teachers, and its lofty graces are not found within their cardinal virtues.

2. Not less did Christianity purify and extend the Stoical doctrine of the *inward motive* in all moral action. The Stoics had taught long before Christ's time that the value of the *outward* act was to be gauged by the inward motive; but this *inwardness or internal worth is still more accentuated in Christianity*. How often did Christ remind His disciples that out of the heart proceed all evil thoughts which defile a man. Even the lustful look is sin. A man is no better than the motives that actuate him. To be moral we must get the new heart and the right spirit.

3. The principle of Christian conduct is faith in God, which appropriates the new relationship of grace. Herein Christian Ethics makes a distinct advance upon the Ethics of Jewish Nomism as exhibited in the Old Testament. In the Ethics of

Legalism faith is only a mental exercise, exhibiting its operation, however, in good works. Both the Psalms and the Wisdom Literature look for the reward of goodness from God, and do not hesitate to express that expectation. "Man is thus put into activity, God into passivity. But God's deed is the primary and fundamental thing in the New Testament representation, and man is relegated to acceptance and reception of the Divine performance in faith."¹ Such faith in God is not merely the intellectual operation inculcated by the Jewish Legalists, but is a very intense personal relationship to God, resulting in communion with Him through prayer and in the active service of His kingdom. It brings about a reception of saving grace, and that oneness with God in heart and will which creates true Christian fellowship.

4. Christianity lays emphasis upon the efficiency of the passive or milder virtues, which in the old classical lands were despised and underestimated. These are nowhere more accentuated than in the opening words of the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of God". This would have been a very doubtful word to the Greeks. Meekness did not enter into their conception of manhood. Humility was a word of bad odour among the Latins of the Roman Empire. The man who was *humilis* was unfit to be a soldier citizen in the time of the Cæsars; and he who was unfit for a military campaign was less than a man, and fit only for

¹ Luthardt, *History of Christian Ethics*, p. 21.

the company of serfs and slaves. Faith, hope, and love had no place in the classification of virtues among the classical authors. They summed up their commandments not in love but in hatred of the barbarian, and denied him all the rights of equality and citizenship.

5. Christianity may be said to have been the first to teach men the great doctrine of *Christian brotherhood under a common Father*. If it impressed on men the value of the *individual* soul, it also taught that the Christian self is *social* not less than individual; that these attracting and correlating forces of personality can reach out to others and bind the believer to the brotherhood of grace by a bond not external and mechanical, but internal and organic. If the theology of the eighteenth century failed to apprehend this fact, it was because it was the outcome of a psychology which was not Biblical, and ignored the social instincts of the believer. But Holy Scripture represents the Church as being one in Christ Jesus. This oneness in Him unites the members with each other. Through Him they are one Church. He who is one with Christ will soon seek to win others to Christ. Andrew found Him and at once went after his brother Peter, and brought him to the Master. The Home Mission of the Church is the outcome of its social instincts. We can realise our true Christian self only by realising the great social ends of the kingdom of God. That kingdom is to embrace the whole world of mankind. A false individualism cares only for self, the salva-

tion of one's own soul, or the good of one's own household. But the true conception of the kingdom of God is that which makes it embrace the whole world and seek to evangelise all nations. The whims of the private individual must be negated and sacrificed in order that the true Christian self may grow. Egoism must give place to Christian altruism. We die to live. We realise ourselves by sacrificing ourselves. When the spirit of Christ fills a man the antithesis between egoism and altruism vanishes.¹

In so far as Christianity has inculcated *brotherhood* and elevated it above the ideas of equality and liberty, it presents the principle which fires the heart of modern democracy. The democracy of to-day does not place *Equality* in the front of its social programme, but only equality of opportunity. It knows that men are not born equal. Equality is negative, and therefore destructive, pulling down the wrong but not upholding the right. A generation ago *Liberty* was the paramount element in the democratic ideal. But liberty is very far from being the glory of the modern democratic state. There is everywhere an increasing distrust of freedom amongst working men, and an intense desire to multiply legislative restrictions. They believe that the liberty which their forefathers fought for has accomplished its purpose in giving free scope to individual enterprise and invention.

¹ Cf. S. Mathews, *Social Teaching of Jesus*, chap. iii.; Bey-schlag, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, i., p. 41; Weiss, *Biblical Theology* (Eng. Trans.), i., p. 63.

What democracy now fears is that the inventor and the plutocrat shall exploit the working man. Hence its determination to capture the Legislature in order that it may restrict industry and regulate production with the utmost stringency. So far from favouring Free Trade, the working-class leaders of the United States of America and of the Colonies are determined Protectionists, and their trade unions would introduce legal compulsion into every branch of industry.¹

But democracy enthusiastically desires Brotherhood. It is pervaded by a deeper appreciation of humanity. It has got a broader conception of social justice. The help to the poor which used to be deemed an act of beneficence presents itself now to the social conscience as *a simple act of justice.* *The ideal of social brotherhood,* even more, we believe, than religious convictions, inspires the great movement in all Christian Churches in favour of Foreign Missions. The democracy have transcended the thought of liberty, and to-day they are stretching forth their hands to welcome a human brotherhood, an organic union of which Christianity is the only soul.

If any other proof of this be needed, it is found in the modern ideas of chivalry and honour. Jesus Christ has for ever overturned the ancient concep-

¹ Cf. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i., chap. iii., and vol. ii., p. 439; H. Spencer, *The Man v. the State*, p. 14—in which Spencer shows how democratic measures have narrowed the liberties of individuals by restrictions on trade and by the heavy public burdens of a paternal Government.

tion of heroism. Democracy to-day accepts only the hero who is clothed in the Christian virtues. Very seldom is he found in the tent of Achilles or amongst noble knights or dynastic rulers. The captain standing on the bridge of his burning steamer, the fireman on his ladder saving children from the flames, Grace Darling in her lifeboat off the wild Northumbrian coast, Florence Nightingale in the hospital wards at Scutari—these are types of modern heroism, which are felt to be more inspiring than knights clad in armour, or crusaders fighting for an empty Sepulchre. The democratic ideal is thoroughly at one with the principle of Christianity: "One is your Master, even Christ". "Honour all men, love the brotherhood." This is but another proof of the abiding excellence of the Social Ethics of Christianity.

6. Above all other marks of superiority Christianity reveals a new *dynamic of duty*. Here was the weakness of the Greek Ethics. Aristotle could only say: "Begin to form good habits, and you will end by becoming a good man". But how could the poor penitent and the broken-down degenerate make a beginning in the formation of the new habit? To this question Aristotle had no answer. His rule was one useful only for the high-souled man: he called the righteous, not the sinful, to repentance.

The Christian Ethic without Christ Himself would be a powerless and ineffective thing, a mere idea of perfection. It is only by the elevating and renewing effect of Christ's Spirit, received

into the inner life, that any progress can be made. The spiritual force that comes from the Holy Spirit is the grand *dynamic of duty*.¹

7. In nothing is the superiority of Christianity more evidenced than in making *love the law of the kingdom*. This was a law that knew no distinction of caste or country, and herein consisted its superiority to the Ethics of Greece and Rome. They never would have thought of creating a religion without attaching it to some particular State with a basis of national customs and sanctions. Rome taught her laws throughout the whole of the Empire, but she never sought to extend her religion beyond the bounds of the Roman nation. She requested no other State to accept her Deities or comply with her religious rites. But the Christian law was a universal law for barbarian and Greek, for bond and free. It was essentially a law of moral progress that never turned its face backward. In this way it transcended all limitations of caste, and became a force of social evolution. Further, it was a law which made each member of the kingdom a centre of moral energy and an active missionary of the truth. Best of all, this ethical principle of love has developed into a variety of special laws as expounded in the Gospels.

(1) It has grown into the law of *self-sacrifice*,

¹ Cf. Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*, p. 275. Const. Franz (*Die Wiederherstellung Deutschlands*, p. 443) says a religious renovation through Christian morals is the most pressing need of the nations of to-day.

which is of the very essence of Christian morality, and under which a man feels that being bought with the price of a great redemption he belongs not to himself, but to Christ. This is one of the great ethical energies of the Christian religion. It came from Christ, and without decrease or loss of momentum it took shape in the Apostles, and appeared in sub-apostolic men, in Fathers and Apologists and Martyrs. Lapse of time has not lessened its force, and expenditure of effort has only increased its capacity for conversion into still more varied forms. It has created the pity that seeks out the degraded to save them from their sin. It has banished national hatreds and over-ridden racial jealousies. It has overstepped constitutional antipathies, and taught men that to love Christ is to love all mankind. This law of self-sacrifice has made Christian love essentially ameliorative and missionary, and has illustrated anew in this twentieth century the energy and superiority of Christian Ethics.

(2) It has developed also into the Golden Rule of Reciprocity, of doing to others as we would have others do to us.

(3) It has shown its inexhaustible energies by becoming a great law of *charitable judgment*. Just because judgment belongs to God, therefore we are to judge not, lest we ourselves be judged. We do not know the weakness, the temptations, the inherited tendencies of our brother man, and therefore we are to give him the benefit of every doubt, and put the best construction on his motives.

(4) It was further developed by Christ into a law of forgiveness extending to seventy times seven.

(5) Best of all it developed into a great law of loyalty to the Person of Christ, which penetrates to motives and embraces ends, and makes devotion to Christ both easy and inevitable. It links all ethical teaching and maxims round the Person of the Master, who is both the model of conduct and the inspiration of character. In short, it has emphasised all the ethical elements in God and in man, and has helped to create the new enthusiasm of humanity which lies behind all the activities of the Christian Church.

These are but the outstanding laws of the kingdom of Christ, but they are sufficient to show that Christian morals quickened Natural Ethics, illumined it with a new meaning, and enriched its maxims with ethical contents.¹ The mission of Christianity has been not to destroy Ethics, but to fulfil it. In one sense, no doubt, fulfilment is destruction; but in the other and better sense it is only completion. When an acorn bursts its sheath and develops into a young oak tree, and then into the great umbrageous monarch of the forest, the completion of the growth has been the destruction of the acorn. But it has also been the fulfilment of its predestined purpose. Christianity has fulfilled and completed Natural Ethics, and has given to all its principles far richer contents. Since Plato's time

¹ W. L. Davidson, *Christian Ethics*, p. 10.

the four cardinal virtues—justice, wisdom, prudence, temperance—have really changed their character. They have assumed a more intensive meaning, and have under Christian teaching become wider in their scope. Temperance is not now limited to the control of the appetite. It means the control of a man's whole self, of appetites, thoughts, emotions, motives and intents of the heart. Jesus Christ has fulfilled and completed that virtue until it has come to embrace the beautiful grace of chastity, the fine principle of moderation in meats and drinks, Christian reasonableness in all methods of business, of fashion, of pleasure and amusements. All these are now among the primary obligations of a healthy Christian conscience. The virtue which to the Greek mind simply meant restraint from Epicurean indulgence has been broadened out into one which covers the larger part of the moral contents of Christian character.¹

Thus Jesus Christ has given to our life both a deeper meaning and a higher value. He has

¹This subject has not received that full treatment from ethical writers which its importance warrants. Dorner and Martensen in their *Christian Ethics* treat of it generally and briefly. Oettingen discusses some bearings of it admirably in his *Die Moralstatistik*. The recent writers of the Ritschlian School have much to say about it in their own way, especially Professor Herrmann of Marburg. *Vide* his *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit*, and also his *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott* (now translated into English). It is unfortunate that Herrman's *Ethik* (1901) still remains untranslated.

taught us that we are born for great and noble ends, that a man's highest glory is to do his duty, doing it all the time as unto God, and ever as under the great Taskmaster's eye. We have learned that every individual Christian is at the same time bound to be the careful conservator of the interests of society not less than of the interests of his own soul; and that if he does not rightly value these social utilities, he has misapprehended the mission of the kingdom of God. The purpose of Christian Ethics is not, as too many have construed it, merely to discover a philosophy of virtue. It has a far higher and grander purpose. Its aim is to show how the creative power of Jesus Christ has worked in individual life and in society, in all the spheres of business and trade, towards one grand goal—nothing less than the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth. It is the careful study of our growth in goodness under the formative principle of the Christian ideal. When we see how under this law life has acquired a higher value and duty has found a new dynamic, how social relations have been sweetened, and social obligations strengthened, we have amply justified the earnest study of the social side of Christian morality.

II.

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF SOCIAL STUDIES.

A BRIEF survey of the efforts made to gain some knowledge of society and of social laws may here be given. For, excepting the mystery of human life itself, nothing can be more interesting than the study of the laws under which men have come to unite themselves in social bonds and to promote social welfare. Is society an organic whole? Is social activity continuous? Have men always understood the causes or laws in society which have all along been in operation and which underlie the more special forms? The history of scientific observation will show us how recent is the conception of society in its integrity, and how the general science of social phenomena may be truly said to be only in its infancy.

The first attempt at the classification of these phenomena is that made in a book with which every student of social science ought to be familiar—the *Republic* of Plato. It is the first attempt at the intellectual creation of an ideal State, and stands on the same level in the world of social Science as the Parthenon does in the world of Art. Plato sought to make his State a model of the noblest social and political life. Both in the *Republic* and in *The Laws* he dwells on the justice that should underlie the perfect State and on the education required to bring about this end.

Here we have the earliest attempt to explain the origin and describe the laws of a model society. In his *Politics* Aristotle sought to advance upon the foundations of Plato, telling us much about the dangers of Democracy and the possible abuses of Oligarchy.

Among the Latin writers of the Empire little was done to promote the study of social principles. They were content to borrow from the great thinkers of Athens, and devoted their energies mainly to the study of civil law. It is true that the Latin Stoical writers did inculcate the association of the whole human race. They held that the vast universe is a unity, that man, nature, and God are one, and that the end of life is attained "when men live according to nature". This universal formula of Stoicism applies to all men without respect to social position or place. The later Stoics, breathing the moral atmosphere that had been created by Christianity, affirmed that all men are of one blood; but they were not able to reconcile their maxim of self-sufficiency with that of universal social interests. What they deserve credit for is their affirmation of the principle that moral obligations extend beyond the limits of the State, and that Political Ethics must be merged into the Ethics of humanity. They perceived that the universal bond of common blood makes for a large human brotherhood, in which class distinctions have no value.

In the Middle Ages there seems to have been no attempt whatever to consider society collec-

tively, to explain its organisation, or to give any account of the enduring forms of the association of individuals. Scholasticism was occupied with other matters. The Reformers devoted themselves to the consideration of cognate subjects on the ecclesiastical side, but their interest lay wholly in the form that the kingdom of God must assume. It was not till the science of the nineteenth century began to apply its methods to social phenomena that men discovered how fascinating is the study of the social organism.

Modern Sociology really first took shape in the mind of Auguste Comte. In the discussions which arose both before and during the French Revolution efforts had been made to discover the natural causes of society. But these discussions were so closely connected with the Revolution and were so correlated with its politics, that the study of Sociology was rather hindered than helped. The Revolution leaders found among natural laws the law of Equality, which negated the old social and political order of France, and furnished them with a principle through which they resolved to bring about social anarchy within that kingdom. In their devotion to the doctrines of national independence and the sovereignty of the people they turned aside from the study of the organic unity of society.

It was Comte who first of all saw that society is a unity of living and independent members. He attacked Rousseau's crude theory of a Social Contract, and affirmed that society is organically

related. Opposing the individualistic theories then current in France, Comte gave clear expression to the fundamental principles of Sociology, and especially to that organic social unity which is the reconciliation of Individualism and Socialism.¹

What was begun by Comte in France was continued in England by J. S. Mill and by G. H. Lewes. These were never, strictly speaking, his disciples, for they left Comte whenever he broke away from the individualistic philosophy. They accepted his sociological doctrines with many reserves. It is in the writings of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin—men who had come under the influence of the far-reaching doctrine of evolution—that Sociology takes a new start. Spencer devoted many volumes to the exposition of it on evolutionary lines. His mind had been greatly stirred by the impulse conveyed through Darwin's teaching, and in harmony with that doctrine he seeks to give an interpretation of social changes. Society, according to Spencer, like every living organism, undergoes integration and differentiation. As all matter in the course of evolution passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity, to a definite coherent heterogeneity, so does moral conduct. Every right action tends to carry on vital functions, to increase our vigour and vitality. From the sociological point of view "Ethics becomes nothing else than a definite account of the

¹ E. Caird, *Social Philosophy of Comte*, pp. 18, 19.

forms of conduct that are fitted to the associated state, in such wise that the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible, alike in length and breadth”.

Under the influence of Spencer sociological ideas have penetrated Modern Ethics and have established the “social organism” as an essentially sociological conception.¹ But from him social forms receive only a physical explanation, and he speaks of social sources in equilibrium as being simply social statics. Therefore, despite his chapters on the biological and psychological aspects of Ethics, Sociology is in his conception mainly a physical explanation of society. In the highest type of civilised men all actions become connected by periodicity and rhythm, and one can predict with tolerable certainty what the next social movement will be, just as one can tell when birds will nest and swallows will take their southern flight.

More lately Sociologists have seen the deficiency of this physical interpretation of their science, and have sought to furnish explanations of social changes which connect them with the human will. Heredity and environment alone do not explain the divergencies in social phenomena. There is more than birth or blood in the differences that constitute nationality. Soil and climate of themselves have not made Englishmen what they are. *Ethical*

¹The best books on Ethics from an evolutionist standpoint, besides Spencer's *Data*, are Alexander's *Moral Order of Progress* and L. Stephen's *Science of Ethics*.

ideals and spiritual forces have entered into the current of English history, and must be taken account of in the explanation of political and social changes in this country.

Therefore, the newer school of Sociology *has denied that the objective and physical interpretation is sufficient.* They believe that nations to a certain extent may shape their own destiny, may form new ideals, and may greatly modify their laws and politics. A correct Sociology must take account both of the physical and spiritual sides. If it excludes from its purview these great ideals which have swayed the minds of nations, it shuts out the greatest motor forces that have moved mankind. Sociology in the future will seek to combine the objective and subjective interpretations of social progress. In this way alone it will give a full explanation of all social activities and will attain consistency of method and scientific precision.

For a full discussion of the differences that divide Sociologists and for an acquaintance with the methods by which both the objective and the subjective interpretations of social growth have been carried out, readers may consult (1) Spencer's *Sociology* and his *First Principles*, as well as his *Data of Ethics*; (2) E. Caird's *Social Philosophy of Comte*; (3) Lestrade, *Eléments de Sociologie*; (4) M. G. Yarde, *La Logique Sociale*; (5) Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Grundriss der Sociologie*; (6) Ward, *Dynamic Sociology* (New York); (7) Gidding's *The Principles of Sociology* (Macmillan Company); (8)

A. Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*; (9) De Greef, *Introduction à la Sociologie*; (10) Wright, *Outline of Practical Sociology* (Longmans, Green & Co.).

Within the last quarter of a century the French school of Sociologists have done much good work in developing a complete interpretation of society on its objective and subjective sides. Some, however, who recognise the determination of the will as an element in sociological interpretation, will affirm that heredity, consciously or unconsciously, determines the will and gives directions to the thoughts. This seems to be the only possible explanation of M. Guyau's theory of education in his *Education et Hérité*.

Ought we to use the term Christian Sociology rather than that of Christian Social Ethics? It has already been used by Dr. Stuckenberg and others. The word is an unfortunate hybrid, of Græco-Latin origin, which, once put into circulation, it is now impossible to oust. It was invented by Comte to describe social science as part of his *Philosophie Positive*. He was the first to study the various aspects of society apart from Politics and Ethics. In his mind the word really meant Social Physics. Whatever was supernatural or metaphysical was detestable to Comte, and was banished from his philosophy. In his Sociology, therefore, he sought to discover the natural causes that lay behind the consciousness of kindred or kind, and to explain those impulses and feelings that linked men to men in the home, the tribe and

the nation. He hoped ultimately that *the science of Sociology would become a science of prevision*, which would enable him and his followers to forecast the course of social progress and national development. Religion had entirely failed to benefit society, inasmuch as the latter had long since passed through its metaphysical and theological stages. He was therefore convinced that Sociology would take the place of religion. Where religion had failed science would now furnish a practical guidance.

It is much to be regretted that of late there has been considerable confusion of the boundaries of Sociology and of Social Ethics. Their spheres are contiguous but not identical. Their postulates and presuppositions are not the same. Sociology is properly *subsumed under psychology*. It studies the phenomena which are consequent upon one particular psychological state, *viz.*, the consciousness of kind. Social Ethics, on the other hand, *is based upon psychology*. Psychological facts are part of its presuppositions. It is the rule of social life, and deals with the correctness of social conduct. The processes of feeling and desire must be carefully studied by the student of Social Ethics. The process of mental development from a social point of view, the growth of customs among savage people, the rise of public institutions, and the study of language, all contribute to illustrate the gradual development of the human mind in relation to its social environment. They throw light upon psychology, and especially upon comparative psychology,

which in this connection forms a very interesting study.

The distinction between Sociology and Social Ethics lies mainly in the fact that the one is concerned with *what is*, and the other with *what ought to be*. To a Sociologist *the diseased side of human nature is quite as interesting as the healthy side, perhaps even more so*. What is found to be a fact in Pathology will prove to be the same in Sociology. The student of Social Phenomena will learn many lessons from the errors committed by politicians and by nations, and will study every phase of national wrong-doing. He will have to explain such social wrongs as slavery, freebooting, infanticide, and all those cruel and degrading customs through which primitive races have come to their present position. But very few of these customs approve themselves to the student of Social Ethics, who must condemn them as erroneous. The Sociologist *must pass them by* as soon as he has explained their origin, for he is merely a student of empirical facts. But the Moralist *is bound to condemn them* in so far as they violate ethical principles. It is clear therefore that on no account can we admit the claim which has recently been made on the part of Sociology to absorb Ethics. Though they have many resemblances, yet the two sciences are radically distinct.¹

¹There is an excellent article on the Relation of Ethics to Sociology by H. Sidgwick in the *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1899.

Many people depreciate the efforts and the enthusiasm of the multitudes who to-day have set themselves to realise social ideals. It is enough for them to brand all such brave attempts with the name of Utopias, and to predict a collapse so soon as society has recovered itself from its present fit of socialistic insanity. We admit that there may be a pedantic imitation of social Utopias which has betrayed zealots into many follies and fanaticisms. But who can doubt that the imaginative ideal of social relations, set before our eyes in such lofty pictures as Plato's *Republic* and More's *Utopia* and Lord Bacon's *New Atlantis*, and such as many of us have pictured to our own imagination at various times, has had a very strong influence upon us all? These have inspired us with the enthusiasm of social progress. The world has never wanted such Utopias and Republics. Philosophical thinkers and poetical minds, who have deeply felt the evils that trouble their own time, have been compelled to give vent to their feelings in such ideal creations.

Even at the present day no student can read the *Republic* of Plato—that first human attempt at the intellectual creation of an ideal state containing the best and noblest forms of life—without being deeply influenced and drawn to exhibit in himself the same features and qualities as are portrayed in the social type. Further, he cannot but feel that this type is greatly superior, because of its comprehensiveness, to any individual example such as may be found in Plutarch's *Lives*. The

picture is sketched on a far wider and larger canvas. Men are seen in many-sided relations. If the angularities of individuals are rubbed down in the social mill, yet the social type embodies all the possible multiformities of character which have been realised within the social sphere. The picture may be Utopian, a fancy-woven creation, which we feel to be very lovely, yet almost beyond the power of practical realisation. But when it has come from such master minds as Plato and Bacon, its value does not depend alone upon the likelihood of its being realised in all its details. The various social duties which it exhibits would retain their value under external conditions of a totally different kind.¹ The system of government, the methods of education and military training of the youth, might be wholly different from those set forth with such eloquence in the ten books of Plato's *Republic*. Yet the bodily discipline, the many-sided culture, the union of elegance with simplicity, the fine forms of manly virtue and robust morality which filled the canvas of that visionary state, make it such a glorious picture that it has enduring value for states and social conditions wholly different from that of Attica.

This is the real purpose which all these schemes of social improvement serve. It is in this light that the *Republic* should be regarded and studied,

¹ Cf. Kaufmann, *Utopias*, chaps. i. and ii. ; Julius H. Ward, *The Church in Modern Society*, p. 104 seq. ; *La Revue Socialiste*, August and September, 1898.

and not in the foolish belief that we can to-day introduce into our country the iron discipline of Greek militarism, or copy the outline of the constitution of Athens. But in so far as that social type embodied the many-sidedness of duty and gave it an attractive setting, the social is superior in its comprehensiveness to the individual type.

On the other hand, we have to admit that social institutions are not always pervaded by a common ideal. The successive healthful influences which have played upon the school-boy, the student, the artisan, the citizen, have not contributed to a consistent plan. They may sometimes indeed have helped to mar and not to mend his character. This arises out of the fact that society does not always possess the ethical unity which ought to pervade a moral organism. The Church and also, to a large extent, the school and university make character their primary concern; but it cannot be said that the industrial order and political organisations keep this aim in view.

We need not therefore wonder that the resultant of this social training does not exhibit that harmonious blending of virtues and graces which makes a well-compacted character and a model citizen. But frequent failure in this respect is only an additional argument for the cultivation of Social Ethics. We look for the time when these failures shall be fewer, and when the social organism shall be compacted and jointed together by such an ethical unity that its influence shall be

wholly in favour of the upbuilding of moral character.¹

¹ Cf. W. Graham, *The Social Problem*, pp. 417, 426, 464; Professor McCunn, *Ethics of Citizenship*, p. 54 seq.; *Geschichte der Gesellschaft*, von J. J. Roszbach, Theil viii., pp. 198, 224. Professor Huxley, in his *Romanes Lecture* at Oxford, showed how evolution encourages anything but millennial anticipations as to the future of society. On the other hand, he affirms that science enforces the lesson that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process (*i.e.*, the mere struggle for existence), still less in running away from it, but in strenuously combating it. But this depends on the moral evolution of the character. In reality it means, not the suspension of the struggle for existence, but the suspension among individuals in commerce of the struggle for selfish ends. Only Christian Ethics can teach men where to find *the motive force* in the effort to overcome such natural obstacles, and how to supplant selfishness by self-surrender. The Golden Rule of Christ alone can bring in the Golden Age.

CHAPTER III.

THE FAMILY.

IN this chapter we proceed to examine the bearing of Christianity upon the institution of the family. The homes of our land will always determine what the future of our country is to be. The strength of a nation depends upon the moral character of those who compose its families. The progress of a race is correctly measured by the morality and sanctity of its home life. That is the reason why Christianity has so strongly emphasised the sanctity of the family bond. It is because domestic life forms the foundation of civil society that political anarchists have generally aimed the most deadly weapons at its destruction.

1. In our opening chapter we spoke of the individual as being the *ethical unit* of the moral life. But when we speak of society, we must affirm that the *family, not the individual, is the social unit*. It takes more than one to make a home and to create society. Those philosophers make a vast mistake who suppose that society is created by some kind of social contract amongst adults, who resolve for the purpose of mutual help to live together in the village or city under clan or State government. A recent Baird Lecturer has maintained the same

theory, and has affirmed that the individual is the social unit. If that were so, various circles of society would be simply so many atoms living in entire independence. But we know that this is in contradiction to the natural bonds of society which create the family, the State, and the Church. How can the relation of an infant to society be explained on the lines of individualism? The child is a helpless creature; he has no power at first to utter his mind, no voice in choosing his parentage, his home, or his school. His rights are conditioned by birth, education and training. To maintain that the individual is the social unit, and that individual rights come first, would very soon land us in social anarchy. We shall afterwards see that this extreme individualism is at the present moment working havoc both in the ethical and in the political spheres. The ethical unit is the individual, but the social unit is and must ever be the family.

This fact must be kept in mind more especially when we study the Ethics of the Old Testament. The social constitution of Israel was distinguished by the emphasis laid upon the family. Its morality was social, and those ideas of individual rights, which are amongst our most familiar conceptions, were unknown at first to the Hebrews. The moral education of Israel began with the organic and social group, and only in later ages were the ideas of individual rights developed. It is so in the earliest stages of all races. This peculiarity has been pointed out by Professor Robertson Smith

in his book on *Marriage and Kinship in Arabia*, where it is shown how the lax laws of marriage had their reason and necessity in the primitive historical conditions that fenced round the family. The wisdom of Providence in this training of Israel is seen when we consider how, despite the well-known utilities and worth of the Christian home, modern Communism has attacked the social fabric in this very point. It would build the pyramid of society, not upon the broad base of the family life, but upon the narrow and unstable apex of individualism.¹

In these days of ours we have exaggerated the rights and claims of the individual; but it was very different in the old patriarchal days when these claims received hardly any recognition. On the other hand, amongst the Hebrews there was a high conception of the worth of the family. The doctrine of the Hebrew home viewed the family as a religious and political unit. In the evolution of the family it was necessary that birth and education should be regarded as making the members one, and as investing the patriarchal head with both parental and judicial powers. At all costs this position of the father was secured, and was made the basis of further social advance. Through it also was to come, in the line of Abraham, the Great Deliverer of mankind. In that great patriarchal hope the family acquired a position and a sanctity in Israel which were not recognised

¹ Cf. the Author's *Ethics of the Old Testament*, p. 64.

among the earlier nations of antiquity. It gained still holier associations in the times of the prophets ; and in the gospels all imperfections were finally removed. The temporary conditions which were permitted because of Israel's hardness of heart Jesus Christ abolished, and the age-long process was conducted to its culmination in the establishment of the holy Christian home.

In keeping with this Biblical conception of the family all the promises were made to Abraham and to his seed. For the same reason were the words addressed to Noah, "Come thou and all thy house into the ark". So, on the other hand, when Achan committed the trespass, the dreadful punishment meted out fell upon his whole family, who with himself were stoned to death and buried beneath the memorial cairn.

The importance thus given to the family and the family line had a strong reflex influence on the whole social and political institutions of Israel. It modified their code of justice : it shaped their social institutions : it profoundly moulded their whole moral conceptions. Gradually the idea of the family emerged from the grossness of polygamy in the patriarchal times, and acquired the permanence and sanctity of the Christian home.

To-day the moral order of the world may be said to have its beginning and foundation in the family. The home is the starting-point of all ethical and social life. Every one of us begins his existence in a home. His birth and training are necessarily connected with parentage and family

life. He enters the world not an isolated being, but by descent and generation. The first pair, according to the Book of Genesis, were directly created by God and commenced life at an adult stage : but every one of their descendants has entered life through the gate of birth. The growth of the human race has been carried on by a physical nexus which has united parents and children together in the bonds of social union.

The family, giving thus the starting-point of the moral world, becomes the type and model of all social and Christian life. The State itself should be but a larger family. The kingdom of God reaches its normal form only when it presents the aspect of a household in which fatherhood yields the note of authority and brotherhood forms the link of union. This moral order of the family, which ought to be more fully developed in these larger political and ecclesiastical communities, is one which recognises equality amid inequalities. It is based upon differences in temperament, in mental endowments and tastes : also upon differences resulting from sex and from age. The husband represents strength and force : the wife, gentleness and tenderness. The parents stand for authority : the children for obedience. These relations of strength and gentleness, of command and dutifulness, form contrasts which are not to be abolished, but must be harmonised and changed into bonds of fellowship, in which all inequalities are adjusted, and members become in turn givers and receivers of kindnesses.

In fact the very excellence and strength of the family bond have suggested to some its destruction on the plea that on the analogy of the family the whole of the human race is but a single unity. But to begin the moral order with the love of humanity would be to reverse the law of nature and to commence with a cold abstraction. We must secure our point of departure in the home, where human love is warm and sympathies are strong. And from this point we must learn to expand our affections till we can embrace the wider interests of humanity. Through sympathy and mutual kindness the members of the household become one in every aim and effort. And the unity thus realised may easily be carried out into the wider sphere of society.

2. The existence and the rights of the family are carefully recognised by Jesus Christ. Of the thirty-three years that He is believed to have lived on earth, thirty were spent in the sacred seclusion of the home at Nazareth. The evangelists only once break in upon that period of quiet growth in wisdom and stature to tell us of a visit to the metropolis of Judaism: immediately after which He returned to Galilee and was subject to parental control. That time of training is recorded in a few brief sentences. But this much we know, that it was in a godly home that the Son of Man passed the most formative period of His life and found the atmosphere that was favourable to His moral and spiritual development.

“In what particular way,” says Professor H. Wendt, “He found opportunity, impulse and guidance for the study, and indeed the independent study of the Holy Scriptures, we know not. The fact, however, that during this early period He lived and moved in an element of Holy Scripture, can admit of no doubt.”¹ It was within the enclosure of the family that Jesus met the influences of parental piety that so carefully fostered the religious growth of His youth.

But not only does Christ lay extraordinary emphasis on the institution of the family, He also recognises that it is by means of domestic affections that children are to rise up to the higher and holier love of God. Faith is to be developed out of the natural confidence which is implanted in a child by parental kindness and trustworthiness. On the basis of the home virtues are to grow the corresponding religious graces. In the mind of Jesus the family is the type that represents to Him all that is most sacred in the kingdom of God. No parable better expresses this than that of the Prodigal Son. And as parental love, prevenient and undeserved, first kindles in children a reciprocal affection, so the love of God owes its overmastering strength to its prevenient character, and awakens the first sense of filial love and penitence. Jesus teaches that repentance in the heart of the sinner is nothing else than “the home-sickness of the soul,” yearning to leave the alien country and

¹ Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, vol. i., p. 92.

the swinish fare for the father's house. Jesus can find no better type of the Divine order than the love and harmony of a well-conducted household.

3. The home life is the best school of virtue and of religion. It would not be too much to say that Christianity could not healthily exist apart from the family. Where it has ceased to live in the home, history shows that it practically ceases as an ethical force to exist in the State. When it has left the hearths and the altars of family life, its continuance in the Church is only an empty form and a shallow sacerdotalism. While, on the other hand, it has often been found that religion, deserting the churches and the public temples, has kept its fire burning brightly on the altar of the cottage. As in its opening years, while Scribism and Pharisaism were but organised hypocrisies in Jerusalem, true religion was found within the humble homes of Joseph and of Zacharias, so in succeeding centuries the sacred vestal fire has ceased to burn within many a gorgeous shrine, but has maintained its glow in the homes of the German forests, of the Vaudois valleys, of the English peasant and the Scottish crofter. If ever it disappear from the home, its establishment by the State will be of little avail. The kernel of it is gone, and only the shell remains. The godly home is the strength of the State, and is both the stronghold and the refuge of all public and social morality.

Need we wonder that modern legislation has

always striven to secure the continuance of the domestic relations? The integrity of the family is absolutely essential to the security of the State. "The family is the centre and archetype of the State, and the happiness and goodness of society are always in a very great degree dependent upon the purity of domestic life." The father of a family, to use Bacon's words, "has given hostages to fortune," and is pledged to contribute to the political well-being. The sons of a virtuous home make the best soldiers and the most trustworthy citizens. Patriotism naturally springs up in the breast of those to whom "home is a word as sweet as heaven". They will gladly lay down their lives for the hearthstone and the fatherland.

Out of such primal elements human society is constructed. When in great national crises all political and social bonds have been wrenched asunder, the foundations of society have been laid anew in the family. If the life of the homes remained pure and sweet, then it is not difficult even amid political corruption and disorder to reconstruct the State. Whereas, if the family morals have degenerated it is totally impossible to renovate a nation. The family and the Church are the two main pillars of a stable society.

It must be frankly admitted that there are limits to the healthy influence of the family. Of itself it cannot secure sufficient scope for an all-round development. It requires the education of the public school and university and the training of public life to stimulate a variety of tastes and

to develop the social sympathies. Further, it does occasionally happen that there grows up a clan-nishness among the members of a family and their descendants that is very intolerant. This tends to beget a collective selfishness that is inimical to the best interests of society, and cares only for the prosperity of those within the favoured circle. Yet notwithstanding these drawbacks, which the Socialist constantly accentuates, we hold that in the light of social evolution the family has been the best nursery of patriotism. No doubt "home-keeping youths have ever homely wits," and there are some families in which the home sentiment grows up into a narrow monopoly of privilege or caste. Yet, after all has been said, the family has proved itself the best preparation for the serious work of life; and evolution shows us how it moulds races into sterner stuff and helps to build up the State into coherence and strength. Modern Sociology is at one with Christianity in regarding the family as the best preparation-ground for the service of the nation and the State.

Yet this has not prevented attacks being made on the institution of the family. These have come from two opposite sides. From the point of view of the individualist it has been affirmed that the marriage tie restricts his liberty and ought to be abrogated; while from the Socialist's standpoint the autonomy of the family has been attacked because of the influence it has exerted in opposition to the ideals of Socialism. Ever since the publication of Plato's *Republic* the constitution of the

family has been a favourite subject of speculation. We need not wonder at this. For this is not a matter of mere social expediency, but one that has the whole history of mankind for its background, and, more than any other, conditions the future progress of the race.¹ It is easy to point out faults in the slow evolution of the family from the obscurity of prehistoric ages down through the periods of Greek and Roman civilisation and through the Christian era. It is easy to point to the degradation of woman, to the neglect of children, and to the denial to them of the fundamental rights of human beings. But, while admitting the force of these criticisms, we maintain that it is only here that the true problem of the family can be seen. That institution must have some inherent qualities of excellence which has survived so many abuses and has in its evolution thrown them off. "The family as we understand it, with its mutual sacrifices, its personal self-surrender, its discovery of the higher self in the social group, appears to be an end towards which the movement of social evolution has been for ages tending."²

But if the family has proved itself to be endowed with such vitality, its development has not been aided by any of the Socialistic schemes propounded. That of the Republic of Plato, if adopted in Greece, would have very soon ruined

¹ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. ii., p. 282 (edition 1899).

² Cf. Gidding's *Sociology*, p. 155; Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, p. 105 seq.

the State of Attica by its serious blemishes. It gave the first place not to the family, but to the State. The political aspect was the more prominent, and the interests of the family and of religion were entirely subordinated to it. It took charge of the training of the young, and to a large extent determined their profession and rank. In Plato's scheme the State determines who should be allowed to marry, and also chooses suitable wives for the soldier citizens. But no such reconstruction of the family by external methods can produce the end desired. The well-being of a family depends on other elements than the healthy condition of its parents. Even the transference of the care of the children from the natural guardians to the State would accomplish only one aim, and that not morally the highest. It would certainly devolve on the State duties which it is utterly unfit to discharge. And it would deprive the children of the sacred memories of the home life and the tender influences that emanate from wise parents and from loving brothers and sisters. These influences far surpass, in their permanent results on life and character, those which might come from the public contests of State-regulated academies and the athletic training of public schools. Fathers and mothers will prove better instructors of their children in morals than legislators or military leaders.

It is unnecessary to add that the feminine nature would be permanently injured by the customs and manners of a Platonic Republic, and that

under the mildest of modern Socialistic *régimes* there would be between husband and wife (if such terms remained applicable) perpetual discord and domestic strife. The continuance of the family life, as at present constituted by monogamy, is essential to the right organisation of society and to the prosperity of civil government.

It is also an idle fancy to suppose that the education given by the State can ever supersede the functions of the family. A great deal of the individuality of the child slips through the wide meshes of organisations which deal with children in the mass. In opposition to this view we hold that it is chiefly when education is directed by the State that the individual gifts and tastes of the child (on which Pestalozzi and Froebel laid such passionate stress) ought by the discerning eyes of parental love to be watched, developed or restrained. The family alone can furnish that natural affection which is the greatest lever we have in lifting up children to high ideals. State authority is cold, callous and impersonal; it has none of the tender memories of the hearthstone. It does not supply any unselfish delight in the welfare of relatives; it is without the tender ties of brotherhood and sisterhood. Least of all does it furnish us with that ready recognition of good intentions and slowly maturing faculties for which all children crave. The family, not the State, will prove the best nurse of the affections and the most fruitful seed-plot of the social virtues.

The State is a result of development ; the home is a product of nature. It is not authority and order that bind the members of a household together. It is not even a community of tastes, for that may not exist in a family. But it is what we call family feeling,¹ the sense of a common origin, which arises spontaneously in their breasts and unites them into a totality. It is a feeling implanted by the Creator Himself by means of the natural ordinance that He has instituted. This emotion ought to be deeply cherished by all who desire the welfare and purity of domestic life.

4. In every period of history the position of woman has marked the stage of civilisation that has been reached. Is she an equal ? or is she an inferior to man ? Is she able to enter freely and with equal co-operation into all his interests, to share his anxieties and to be a helpmeet in his aims ? Or is she merely a toy and a serf to keep his house and feed his children ? These questions determine the stage of national morality, and there is no better test.

We need not wonder that the Christian Church counts women among its most faithful friends and

¹ Cf. Dorner, *System of Christian Ethics*, § 73 ; Maurice, *Social Morality*, Lecture II. Paley in his *Moral and Political Philosophy* displays his strong common-sense in discussing this subject. The family as the seed-plot of all social virtues has no better advocate than Burke in his "Reflections on the Revolution," *Works*, vol. ii., p. 320. On Plato's defence of his scheme, see a remarkable passage on the *Protagoras*, p. 346 (Jowett's trans.).

adherents, since it may be said that to it alone they owe their moral and social recognition. The low estimate in which they were held is the worst condemnation of the Ethics of Greece and Rome. The turning-point of their history was found when the Virgin Mary was chosen to bear the child who was to be the world's Redeemer. Jesus bestowed upon woman a new moral dignity, and in Christian marriage called her to the position of equal and helpmeet to her husband.

We have not space to go into the history of this question, and of the well-marked stages in the rise of woman's position in early times and in the Middle Ages. But to-day in almost every Christian land her rights are fully conceded. The chivalrous reverence which is given to her can be proved to be the historic product of Christianity. Tacitus speaks of it as in his time existing amongst our Saxon ancestors; but it is less a Teutonic than a Christian characteristic. Our sisters may claim full Christian sympathy in every effort they make for increased protection of person and of property, and for gaining access to every avenue of education or profession. In this country that question is practically settled in their favour; and the danger is that the movement in favour of women's rights may proceed to an exaggerated pitch which may tend to undermine the stability of the family and to mar the harmony of domestic life. For it must not be forgotten that, notwithstanding the concession made in favour of women's rights, still women and men are not identically the same.

The very bodily organism indicates a teleological distinction which it is worse than folly to ignore. The difference of sex which draws the two together also creates a duality which neither should seek to abolish; for thereby they become complementary the one to the other. The dualism of sex divides humanity into two halves, of which the one represents the masculine nature, characterised by strength, courage and ethical dignity; and the other the feminine nature, characterised by feeling, impulse and ethical grace. The perfect combination was never seen but once, in the Person of the Perfect Man, Jesus Christ. "Strength and beauty are in His sanctuary." Moral dignity and moral grace were united in Him who was "the perfect flower of human time". But in us they still exist in separation, and it is unwise to ignore the radical and physical differences that divide the sexes. Where physical strength and great endurance are demanded, it would be injudicious to claim that realm for women's rights. But assuredly all artificial legislative restrictions that shut the door of such employments as suit their temperaments and talents should be removed from the Statute Book, and their special aptitudes in nursing, in medical work, in teaching, in connection with the press and with literature, ought to be fully recognised. Some women have made their mark in science; many have shown an exceptional talent for the work of the physician, of the deaconess and nurse.¹

¹The number of deaconesses and parish sisters in the Church of Scotland is every year increasing. The need of them is still

And we can hardly yet estimate the enormous value of the service which they have rendered to our Foreign Missions, and especially to Eastern races, among those millions of women whose religious prejudices prevent them from asking the aid of a male doctor. This service to our fellow-creatures in India and China more than justifies the long struggle by which women came to win an entrance into our medical halls. It is to the lasting credit and honour of Edinburgh that its University contained liberal-minded men who were the first in Great Britain to open their doors to lady students of medicine, and to recognise their exceptional fitness for such work. We rejoice that the great majority of our Universities in England and Scotland, as well as the Royal University of Dublin, have now thrown open their degrees to women. There can be no doubt that this great educational benefit, along with the establishment of many high-class colleges for ladies, has profoundly affected their future relation to science and to education. The popular dread that highly-trained women would neglect their home duties has not been verified; or if this has sometimes taken place, we may safely affirm that for one lady who neglects her home duties through love of literature or art, there are a score who neglect

greater. Fortunately there is no occasion to regard the consecration or ordination of these ladies to their vocation as being a "betrothal to the Church". Their service is simply a fulfilment, in this special form of female activity, of the general duty of Christians.

them from sheer frivolousness, lack of knowledge, and love of amusements.

It is another question, however, whether the *political* claims made by women may not seriously affect the peace of the home and make for the disintegration of the family. Hitherto our political system has not favoured the enfranchisement of women, but has entrusted the head of the family with all political rights and privileges. We fear that the adoption by husband and wife of different political creeds, with their consequent opposed electioneering efforts, might introduce much discord into the family. Besides this, if married women are to carry on their profession, or to devote themselves to literature or science as a *primary* pursuit, and not as a *secondary* career, it is difficult to see how minor matters in the family can be so arranged as to suit the diverse aims of the two heads of the house. It would be all but impossible to speak then of *one* head of the home; and the break-up of family life would be an almost inevitable result. Women may choose to enter the married life, or may altogether refuse to do so. But if they do enter on a condition in which they are to love and obey till death do them part, it would surely be advisable that they should do everything to maintain the institution of the family, and nothing to favour the tendency, already too strong, to facilitate the means of procuring divorce. For already we see indications that the monotony of family life is regarded by some clever women as an irksome restraint, and that the moral education

and care of the children are too often given over to hired servants or dependants. Were this practice to become common, it would seriously injure the Divine institution of the family, and would operate to the great moral injury of the coming generation.¹

5. *Celibacy*.—By some the celibate life has been regarded as a condition that is higher and purer than married life. Strange to say, though married life is the model life, and the word of God speaks of it as a calling of God, a Divine vocation, yet in many sections of the Christian Church it has been maintained that celibacy exalts to a position of virtue which is highly approved of God. The idea first of all came from oriental schools of philosophy, and took hold of the early Christian Church. The virginity of the holy mother of our Lord, the pure and single life of Jesus, gave to celibacy a virtuous beauty that it had not before possessed. Many of

¹One is struck with the entire omission in the writings of Rousseau and his school of any recognition of the political rights of woman. We should have expected in *Emile* to find the advocacy of female rights amongst the natural and inalienable rights of mankind which no consideration of expediency could annul or suspend. Yet few authors have assigned to women such a subordinate position as Rousseau gives them. Of that French school Condorcet alone extended to women the same social and political privileges as to men. Napoleon, on one occasion meeting the widow of Condorcet, who was an active Republican, roughly said: "Madame, I do not like women to meddle in Politics". "You are right, General," she replied, "but in a country where it is custom to cut off the heads of women, it is natural that they should wish to know the reason why." (Mme de Staël, *Considérations sur la Révolution*.)

the Christians of Asia Minor began, even in the time of the Apostles, to look down upon marriage as low, carnal and worldly; and in some of the writings of the Fathers we find glowing descriptions of the superior dignity and spiritual worth of celibacy. The whole matter is frankly discussed by the Apostle Paul in the first Epistle to the Corinthians. There he affirms that neither state had any intrinsic merit or was superior to the other. "Art thou bound unto a wife? Seek not to be loosed. Art thou loosed from a wife? Seek not a wife. But and if thou marry, thou hast not sinned." Which is to say, that celibacy may be voluntary, or it may be a matter of duty, but that in neither case is it superior to marriage. A man may from purely personal considerations, or because of his special vocation, forego marriage. The Apostle Paul himself exercised this right in order to have more freedom in his missionary work; but he claims no merit for doing so. He seems to give unmarried life the preference, in consideration of the circumstances of his time and of the great dangers attaching to the life of the early pioneers of Christianity. The position is a balanced one. He who is unmarried may give more time to God's work and be less disturbed by worldly considerations; while, on the other hand, the married man lives in a school of virtue in which he may gain much personal and social benefit, and learn both forbearance and self-restraint.¹

¹ Hofmann in his *Schriftbeweis* says: "It is certain that the Apostle recommends celibacy as decidedly as could be done

No doubt there are some persons who have a special call to celibacy for the sake of others, their near relatives, and also for the sake of the kingdom of God. But in so far as this is the case we cannot fail to perceive that their life suffers from a certain limitation. It is one-sided in its asceticism and in its devotion to God through the avoidance

without derogating from the dignity of matrimony. He does not, however, recommend it as a state holier in itself, but as one which makes a Christian life easier, and undivided activity for the kingdom of God possible. Equally impossible is it to understand what Christ says (Matt. xix. 12) concerning those that have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of God's sake, and those who alone are capable of receiving the saying concerning the indissolubility of marriage, as *an unconditional requirement of celibacy*. He who makes himself a eunuch foregoes entirely the exercise of his manly powers; and when he does this for the kingdom of God's sake, he does it because he is more concerned to enter into and to serve that kingdom than to taste the joys of married life. As, then, the Lord Jesus, in the narrative which (in Matthew and Mark) immediately follows, requires of the rich young ruler that he should give all that he had to the poor for the kingdom of God's sake, without saying that no one can enter into the kingdom of God without first giving all his property to the poor, so it is with the renunciation of marriage. He who does not feel—would the Lord say—that he can willingly make such a sacrifice, when the kingdom of God requires it, cannot enter into heaven. And such an one is also incapable of embracing such a view of marriage, and of leading such a married life as the Lord, upon scriptural grounds, insists on. For he would certainly find the indissolubility of marriage an insufferable restraint, because the bent of his life is not towards God, but towards the enjoyment of this world." (*Schriftbeweis*, p. 411, 2nd edition.) Cf. also Harless, *Christian Ethics in loco*, and Olshausen's *Commentary on Matthew's Gospel*.

of family obligations. For marriage is a union entered into not through a mere impulse of attraction, but out of the deepest intellectual sympathy, and for the highest moral and spiritual ends.

We fear that not a little of the celibate life of to-day springs out of social and industrial conditions more than from religious convictions. We cannot here enter into the "Social question"; but indubitably it is very intimately connected with the darker moral aspects of modern life, and is sapping the very roots of morality both in our rural and urban population. It is a very salient vice in some of the rural districts of Scotland; and there it is closely connected with the habits of the farm servant, and with the scandalous lack of the provision of cheap and commodious cottages for the ploughman and the day-labourer. Further, the problem of marriage is only another side of the modern problem of society. Behind that problem in the dark background are to be found the economic causes of domestic instability. The love of luxuries, the expensive dress of modern fashion, the disinclination to begin married life in a humbler style than husbands and wives in former days were accustomed to, account for much of the enforced celibacy of to-day. Undomestic views of happiness are also too prevalent; and the easy and attractive club-life of the city, which is not very helpful to morality, is distinctly unfavourable to married life.

The institution of the Christian family has thus to contend with many inimical social con-

ditions, not less than with an erroneous social belief. This statement is supported by the fact that it is rather amongst the wealthier classes than among the hand-workers that an unwillingness to assume the responsibilities of marriage prevails. Before marriage is permitted in many wealthy families, a great barrier of conventional obstacles has to be overcome. There the idea of a "good marriage" is too often the idea of "money matched with money," or of Plutocracy united with Aristocracy. Yet there is no assurance that the wedding of money to money can bring happiness. On the other hand, the marriage of two loving souls, bound together by strong intellectual and moral sympathy, where mutual self-sacrifices have to be made through the practice of the fine old virtues of thrift, economy, and foresight, is, under God, the surest way to obtain a happiness that will grow and stand the test of many trials. In the interests of morality we must deplore the modern social tendency that seeks to contract marriage on the principles of commercialism, and enshrine Mammon as the chief household god. We ought to make a strong effort by word and example to counteract those perverted social standards which at the present moment are bringing so many families to the verge of bankruptcy, which are multiplying shameful divorces, and are active in the creation of a very hurtful domestic instability. We shall better the conditions of social health only by the spiritualising of the principles of social life. The springs of morality must be cleansed at

their source if the whole social stream is to be disinfected. We must maintain the reality of the Christian home, in which the lofty spiritual ends of marriage are still dominant, and where the natural instincts of a genuine affection are purified and made lasting in the higher and holier love of heaven.

Note.—In Matthew xix. 12 there is one of the “hard sayings” of Jesus which has especially by its latter clause given rise to much misunderstanding: “There be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.” This seems to imply that there may be a higher level of the Christian life to be occupied by those who for the sake of the kingdom of God remain in celibacy; or it may more probably mean only that the saying is given to a certain class to whom it is appropriate. There were in Christ’s time many dangers to be met by His disciples, involving risks of life which the unmarried might meet with much less anxiety than the married, on whose life wives and families depended. It is one of the sayings to which great prominence has lately been given by the Christian writings of Count Tolstoy, who has exalted this to a test amongst his followers, although he himself confesses he has not practised it. He came to believe that marriage was contrary to the law of Christ, and that Jesus held out strict celibacy as the ideal life for His disciples. In the *Kreutzer Sonata*, republished in 1901, he developed those views with his characteristic force and persuasiveness. There he affirms that marriage is an unchristian institution, and that Jesus never favoured marriage. He enforces this argument by quoting from the Sermon upon the Mount the words of Christ in which He no longer permits His disciples, as the law of Moses did, to divorce their wives save for that one sin that itself breaks the marriage bond. He also quotes this text (chap. xix. 11) in support of his views that it is better for Christians not to marry at all. In another volume (*The Relations of the Sexes*, p. 47) he maintains that marriage is the service of self, an obstacle to the service of God and of man, and consequently, from a Christian point of view, a fall, a sin!

CHAPTER IV.

MARRIAGE.

THERE have been many different constructions put upon this Social Institution, and many different definitions of it given—none better than that of Professor Dorner, of Berlin. “Marriage,” Dr. Dorner says, “is the union of two persons of opposite sexes, in the most intimate fellowship of body and soul, a fellowship in which each personality has its deficiency supplied, and both together form a higher unity. Marriage is essentially monogamic and indissoluble, and only as such can it be morally contracted. The negative condition of a moral union is, that no marriage be contracted with a person with whom, whether on physical, psychical or mental grounds, intimate fellowship of the kind described would be impossible. The positive condition is, that there should be free choice and inward inclination, that is, that the two persons be ready to give themselves unreservedly to each other and also that they should be willing to join the great moral communities ; and this they do when marriage is regarded as a civil and religious contract.”¹

¹ Dorner, *op. cit.*, § 72.

1. Marriage is a Divine institution of objective validity, altogether apart from personal preferences. It is an ordinance of God, who created man in His own image, and "made them male and female". Marriage is placed in the Bible at the head of human history. The Word of God speaks of it as being the fundamental social ordinance and as the most important of human institutions. Although polygamy afterwards intervened, and was not declared illegal by the law of Moses, yet Christ clearly re-established the primitive monogamy. In the three synoptic Gospels He affirms the perpetual obligation of the marriage tie, and opposes divorce on every ground except that one which has already ruptured the sacred bond.¹ No man may sunder those whom God hath joined together. Marriage must be between one man and one woman, since the entire personality of each is surrendered to the other. This fact clearly excludes every other relation of a similar kind. It is impossible there could be perfect confidence or fidelity in a home where polygamy has made the woman only a mistress, where jealousy irritates the wives, and hostility and envy keep half-brothers and half-sisters apart. In the progress of civilised nations polygamy has given place to monogamy, as the spirit of order has gradually triumphed over destructive passions.²

¹ Matt. xix. 3; Mark x. 2; Luke xvi. 18.

² In the history of a nation's development monogamy is always a step in advance, although Sociologists admit that in the very lowest existing societies of human beings the most

The conception of marriage in the New Testament is so lofty that the relationship admits of no dissolution unless by a crime. In the Epistles of St. Paul not even previous marriage with an unbeliever is sufficient to dissolve the union. It is to be continued in the faith that the unbelieving husband will yet be won to Christianity by the believing wife, or *vice versâ*. The wife is encouraged to observe obedience and gentleness as the sure way of gaining ascendancy over the husband, and of creating in him the feeling that she is his partner and equal. But the subordination of the wife will not prevent a free relation of esteem and affection between them, since the husband is to love the wife, even as Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it. Marriage is therefore to be an association of personal life in the deepest sense of the word; and from this it receives its moral consecration.

Marriage is of God's making, and is the most natural of earthly relationships. Some people are foolishly fastidious in speaking on the subject, and

common marriage is a temporary monogamy. But in Tibet, the land of polyandry, the well-to-do nomads are all monogamous (Deniker, *Revue d'anthropologie*, vol. vii., Series 2, p. 358). Where the fidelity of monogamy is customary it always reacts on general morals. Hence it is found that revolutionary efforts are as a rule directed against this element of social stability. Such consistent Socialists as Proudhon and Fournier insist as strongly on community of wives as on community of goods. Here Socialism contradicts the principle of equality, which is lost in a polygamous household where wives are degraded to mistresses.

on the obligations which it imposes. Others again talk of it only in jest, or discuss it in the spirit of levity. Both these modes of regarding it will be avoided by those who regard marriage as a vocation and as an ordinance of God. There can be no doubt that it is incumbent on every healthy and intelligent man to marry. The existence of the family depends on marriage, and it is a duty which we owe to ourselves and to the race. In declining it a man may be said to be frustrating the purpose of his Creator. He will never reach the full development of his nature apart from the education and the enrichment which is received in the constant communion of another who is made a partner of his life. Courage, magnanimity and justice, the distinctively virile virtues, are best developed when they are constantly practised in conjunction with modesty, gentleness, patience, the characteristic excellencies of womanhood. "Woman is not undeveloped man, but diverse;" and it is in diversity that true unity is found. They will best realise their personality in seeking the perfection of the other. The husband will become more manly, the wife more womanly, as they learn their respective rights, and perform their correlative duties. The best of us have our angularities and weaknesses. Marriage is a God-ordained means by which our one-sidedness may be removed, and we may become more like to the Perfect Example.

Marriage is a school of virtue, where self-restraint must constantly be exercised, and where

amid many cares and worries harmony and concord should ever prevail. Hence, along with affection there is needed sympathy in moral aims and spiritual ideals. Only then does marriage attain to its moral meaning. For if the union of two hearts and lives is to be a real fellowship, it must be a fellowship in all that is deepest and truest in life. In short, it ought to be a religious fellowship. The believer must not be unequally yoked with the unbeliever. Marriage should be entered into under God's guidance and also with the sanction of earthly parents. The young pair should seek to carry with them the blessing of the old home, even "as in ancient times colonists were accustomed to bear fire from the domestic hearth in their ships to the distant land to which they were bound".

Marriage is not only upheld by the Church as having inherent sanctity and perpetual obligation, but it is recognised as an institution whose value is attested by the deductions of social science. Unfortunately many modern novels disregard the former truth and have done much to injure the stability of the institution. But the two sides, the secular and the sacred, must not be separated. The extremely individualistic view treats marriage as simply a civil contract between two adults. All that the State concerns itself with is to see that neither fraud nor force is used in forming the contract, but that both parties enter into it freely and voluntarily.

The paternal view of the State which is prevalent has induced many to go further and to affirm that the State has not fulfilled its duty until

it has prevented *all marriages that would injure the physique of the coming generations*, such as those between near relatives, and especially those contracted by parties who suffer from any inherited mental or physical disease. This it should do in the interests of the unhappy children born of such marriages, and in order to prevent the deterioration of the race. Yet interference with individual choice, even though justified on the grounds of social science, might beyond a certain limit only intensify the evil by inducing illicit alliances. At present the law is content to fix the main terms of the contract, and to exercise only a limited control. It strictly forbids marriages within certain degrees of consanguinity. It punishes bigamy; it lays down a uniform marriage law for the whole nation; and it adjusts the rights of the members of the family on that legal basis.

At the same time the State has an undoubted right to protect its people against any deterioration of their physical health which may result from marriages contracted in opposition to the laws of sociological science. Modern Sociology has taught us many things bearing upon national well-being. It has already taught us the value of monogamy and of the family as the unitary group in social composition. It may yet teach us other fundamental social truths which will have to be incorporated in the marriage laws.

2. *Solemnisation of Marriage.*—The ethics of marriage cannot overlook the manner of its solemn-

isation. The way in which such an important engagement is entered into is itself an indication of character. As precipitate engagements should be avoided, so also the whole matter should be brought to God, and His guidance sought in it. Our chief anxiety should be to protect and to further all the moral elements in it. Marriage is a solemn covenant, which ought not to be celebrated in privacy or in the semi-secret way in which many civil marriages are now celebrated, but openly, in the presence of friends and with some religious ceremony. Those who enter upon this new alliance unite themselves to the great moral community that constitutes the homes of our land; and it ought to obtain their cordial concurrence and recognition.¹ Those, therefore, who understand its

¹ It seems almost unaccountable that in the eye of the law of Scotland a marriage is legal though contracted only by word of mouth, it may be on the highway, or on the open street, and may be registered by the authority of the Sheriff if any two witnesses were present. Surely this is a law that in the interests of morality and of the children of such marriages ought to be amended. At least more evidence of the solemnity and importance of the contract ought to be required, and especially evidence that the contracting parties understand the binding character of marriage. If the bond that unties a man and a woman together for life, for better or worse, for richer or poorer, is to be no more than an ordinary civil contract, possibly entered into in a moment of mirth or jocularly (such cases have happened and have been held binding, to the surprise of all), at least the contract of marriage ought to be in writing, just as is at present required by law in contracts with respect to real property. As the law at present stands, a marriage may be effected in Scotland with less abiding proof of it than is required in the purchase of a cottage or the sale of an acre of land!

solemnity will seek the blessing of God upon it through the consecration of His Church. Do not the very strength and permanency of the conjugal bond lie in the truth that what God hath joined together man should not put asunder? Say what men will, there are really only two views of marriage, the low secular view¹ which regards it

¹The increase in the number of civil marriages in Scotland within the last decade compels the Church to face this question with earnest consideration. Hitherto she has allowed such of her members as have been content with the civil transaction of marriage to remain within her pale without discipline. There can be no doubt that in Scotland a marriage is legal without any ecclesiastical rite, and that the Sheriff of the County will authorise registration of it if any two witnesses to the transaction make an affidavit before him. Judging by results, however, we think that the practice of ignoring the growing custom may prove most injurious. If such persons be allowed to remain in the Church, are they to be allowed the full possession of Church privileges? If so, it must react prejudicially on the sacred institution of marriage. The proclamation of the banns of marriage is properly regulated by civil law, since the results of marriage so largely affect the well-being of the nation and the rights of individuals. But it is a true instinct that brings the bride and bridegroom to the Church, and bids them seek her express sanction and benediction. She is the proper guardian of the moral interests of the family. Can she then recognise those to be worthy of her sacraments who thus publicly despise the sanctity of the institution of marriage and reduce it to a mere matter of civil contract?

Rothe (*Theol. Ethik*, § 1088) maintains that the Church can recognise none who enter the married state feeling no need of her prayers and blessing. He would require them to go through the ecclesiastical form of marriage, not to make it valid, but to make them worthy of membership.

The statistics of marriage in Scotland in 1903 show that civil marriage is on the increase.

as a mere social contract between a man and a woman, for such period as they may choose, and as suits their convenience, and the lofty Christian view which looks upon it as a permanent fellowship, a moral union of the highest spiritual value, "for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer," until death do them part. Therefore in the solemnisa-

Marriages numbered 31,387, of which
45·14 per cent. were celebrated by ministers of the Church of Scotland.

27·62 per cent. were celebrated by ministers of the United Free Church.

10·14 per cent. were celebrated by ministers of the Roman Catholic Church.

3 per cent. were celebrated by ministers of the Episcopal Church.

7·88 per cent. were celebrated by ministers of other denominations.

6·22 per cent. of the whole were irregular marriages, being the largest number and rate of such that has yet been reported by the Registrar-General.

Of the total marriages registered in Scotland since registration became compulsory—

45·43 per cent. were solemnised by the Church of Scotland.

33·67 " " " United Free.

9·47 " " " Roman Catholic.

2·57 " " " Episcopal Church.

6·5 per cent. by other denominations, and 2·17 per cent. were irregular marriages.

Irregular marriages are highest in Elgin County—4·76 per cent. ; Bute—5·19 per cent. ; Lanark—9·68 per cent. ; Edinburgh—14·71 per cent.

Of the husbands 6·1 per cent., and of the wives 18·4 per cent., were under 21 years of age ; 63 brides were under 17 and 16 bridegrooms under 18.

tion of marriage the spiritual side of the relation should not be absent, but should be fully recognised.

It is Christianity alone that has given to marriage its completeness, and made it a type of the higher unity which subsists between Jesus Christ and His Church. Only the resolute maintenance of this sacred principle can counteract the lax notions of marriage in certain classes of society. Only this can save our country from the inroads made upon family life by divorce, which is now granted on such a dangerous variety of grounds. Here the Church may soon have to take her stand in opposition to the growing laxity of the law. We pray that under the socialistic tendencies of the age this breach may not happen. No deeper injury could be done to a nation than to lower its moral conception of marriage by degrading it into a temporary contract. If, from motives of expediency and from socialistic influences, the State should come to recognise as legal marriage what the Church can only regard as immoral concubinage, the latter may have to exercise her right of discipline and to bring her moral influence to bear upon the relation thus formed by the civil power, a relation still binding, although it may have had a sinful origin. The Church should not seek to dissolve the union, but should endeavour to get the parties to add to it a vow of mutual fidelity, and to join to the civil act a religious obligation.

3. *The Indissolubleness of Marriage.*—From the essential nature of the marriage bond it logically

follows that it is indissoluble. If it could be annulled by mutual agreement, then it would be only a relation of contract subject to caprice, and its whole sacredness would be gone. The holy bond can be sundered only by a sin which itself destroys the very integrity of marriage. Divorce is the legal termination of marriage and the contradiction of its indissolubility. Christ forbids it in the Sermon on the Mount and in Matthew xix. except for the one sin of adultery. The Church of Rome, following these words, refuses to recognise any other cause of separation. The question is one which has divided Protestant Churches ; and divorces in our land are granted in cases where long desertion, or habitual intemperance, or cruelty, has been proved. We have come to think that these other sins (which perhaps had not reached their full measure of iniquity in Christ's time) utterly ruin the integrity of a home, and morally speaking are not less destructive of the happiness of the home life than the sin to which Christ referred. Hence judicial separation on these grounds has justified itself to the modern conscience.

The important question to-day, in Britain, in the Colonies, and in the United States, is whether the concessions to freedom of divorce have not threatened the primary moral sanctions and endangered the whole social fabric. We hope both our Houses of Legislature will form themselves into a bulwark against proposed laws to recognise marriages which have been contracted subsequent

to judicial separations, based on principles of the loosest licence. Were this permitted it would create a situation that would threaten all social and moral principles and bring about a return to primitive types of barbarism. There should be a uniform divorce law throughout all Christian lands; and we need an organised movement in these countries to strengthen our defences against reckless legislation. The marriage laws of the United States are different within the various States in the Union; and marriage may there be contracted with or without proclamation and without licence from State or Court, if only a magistrate or minister perform the function. In all cases he is the judge of the legal or moral competency of the parties who enter into marriage and of their previous married or unmarried condition. Yet when children are born of such a marriage, and the husband abandons the wife, the particular State of their birth must protect the mother and support and educate the children. Could there be a more deplorable or incongruous situation? It is one against which the Christian Churches of America should unitedly protest.¹

¹The frequency of divorce is largely affected by the ecclesiastical views of it; and these are far from uniform. The Roman Catholic Church wholly denies the right of divorce, affirming marriage to be indissoluble. It bases that indissolubility upon the nature of a contract so fraught with momentous consequences to society, and upon the words of Christ, who points us back to the Divine original or ideal pattern of the institution. High Church Episcopalians and High Church Lutherans favour the same view. The Greek and Lutheran Churches, however,

The cure for all this is the elevation of that oldest institution, the family, in its moral and political importance. One race, the Hebrew, has clung through all persecutions to the higher ideal of family life, to its loyal bonds, and to its submission to parental authority. To this day this is the pre-eminent trait of the Jewish nation. Let us be sure that the best friends of our country are those who will rebuild the house and recreate the family ideal; who seek to restore reverence for parents, and to teach the youth of to-day to make some return, however inadequate, for parental self-sacrifice. The growth of a free and filial reverence among the young will not injure their independence, but will bring strength of character, repose and unity into many a home which, in these self-assertive days, has become little more than a lodging-house for sons and daughters. There are no bonds of reverence, no links of loyalty to parental authority, that are not strengthened by the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, who even upon His

permit divorce for an indefinite number of causes. The Presbyterian and Methodist Churches allow divorce for infidelity and for desertion, but hitherto have rigidly drawn the line at the latter crime. In the United States of America many Churches seem to permit divorce for a variety of reasons. Very unfortunately the Divorce Courts of different States in America proceed on different legislation, many granting a judicial decree of divorce for any cause deemed sufficient by the Court. In some States no less than forty-two such general causes were held sufficient to dissolve the marriage tie. Cf. Wright, *Outline of Practical Sociology*, § 91; Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, p. 162.

Cross tenderly thought of His earthly mother, and commended her to the care and keeping of His beloved disciple. Good Christian homes are the key to reform in our whole social structure.

We want the "Cottar's Saturday Night" atmosphere diffused throughout every family in Scotland. The family bible, the family psalm, the family altar, and every father the priest to his own household—these are the best and most direct means of building up the social fabric in solidity and permanence.¹

Except Thou build it, Father, the house is built in vain,
Except Thou, Saviour, bless it, the joy will turn to pain.

¹ At the present moment *the welfare of the family is endangered from three different sides*. These causes are correlated, and are connected with that spirit of commercialism which pervades the whole community at the present time.

The first is the unwillingness on the part of many members of well-to-do families to enter into the married state owing to the expense of maintaining a household according to their ideas of what is fit. We have spoken above of this impediment to marriage.

The second cause springs from a cognate source. It is the absence in rural districts of fit dwellings for labourers. Everywhere throughout England and Scotland the crofter is slowly disappearing. The landowners are adding the small crofts to the larger neighbouring farms, on the ground that this costs less expenditure for farm buildings and less trouble in the management of the estate. Nor will the landowners build houses even for the farm servants who must necessarily till the fields and reap the harvests. These, therefore, live in bothies, or in rooms above the outhouses; and if they marry they have to find a house for their wives in some distant town where they but seldom see them. This in many parts of Scotland is operating severely against the marriage tie, and is in fact at the root of "the

4. *Marriage with respect to the population of the country.*—The question of marriage has a most important relation to the well-being of the commonwealth and to the prosperity of commerce. It is not necessary for us to discuss the doctrine of Malthus, which won its way so rapidly, that population constantly tends to increase faster than the means of subsistence. To-day that general

social sin" so prevalent in certain counties of Scotland, both in the north-east and south-west. The landlords may not be to blame, for they are able to show that such houses will not give them a fair return for their investment of capital. Probably the recent great increase in the wages of the agricultural labourer may enable him to pay a higher rent and to bring about a solution of the difficulty. There can be little doubt that this is one of the contributory causes operating to produce the recent alarming drift of population from the rural districts to the cities. The rapid increase of Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen has been at the expense of the surrounding counties, whose parishes are being drained of their most intelligent and enterprising youths. Doubtless many different causes are at work to bring about this most regrettable result. But if houses of a cheap kind, with the attractive garden attached, were to be erected in the rural districts, we are hopeful that the modern concentration in urban and industrial centres would be to a considerable extent checked. It is within our personal knowledge that many young men who have gone to the cities went because they saw no prospect of marrying in the country. They dislike the flats of the city; they long to get back to the land to "a place of their own," *i.e.*, a croft or small farm such as their fathers had before them. But they are simply doomed, by the absence of houses and occupation in rural parishes, to spend their lives and educate their children amid an environment and in an atmosphere hurtful to their health and deleterious to their morals. There is great need in the country of cheap dwellings for the labourer. But above all is needed the return of industries from

statement would not be accepted without limitation, since the statistics of the last seventy years show that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, that tendency is occult. If there be a constant possibility of such increase it has not yet been proved to have actually taken place. The actual facts do not prove anything further than that population has usually increased, up to the relative

the cities to the healthful villages. The laws of sanitation are now enforced in these by the County Councils of England and Scotland. The old insanitary conditions, which Charles Kingsley so pathetically described, may be said to have largely vanished. Country village life is becoming more pure and healthful. The little cottage, behind its sunny garden of fruits and flowers, forms an attractive home for the working man. It may easily become his own, if he wants to buy it, by the help of a Building Company.

If ever we are to have a pure, moral, healthy and strong population its foundation must be laid in a wholesome village life. To fight those twin enemies of the family, drunkenness and immorality, we need more than Temperance and White Cross Societies. There must be decentralisation of industries, bringing the work and the people back to the healthy villages, once the strength and pride of our land. Holdings must be subdivided. Crofts and small farms must be multiplied. Were this done, the clever active men would cease to migrate in such vast numbers to the city, and the rural districts would no longer be left to the wastrels and dullards who also too easily become the immoral. Better far for the workman to labour under the blue sunny canopy of heaven for twenty shillings a week than for thirty shillings to be shut up in the dirty atmosphere of a noisy jute or cotton mill.

Educational opportunities and recreation such as were not to be enjoyed thirty years ago may now be found in the larger villages. The replanting of a large part of the urban population in cottages in the country would be of the highest importance to the physical and moral well-being of our nation. It would prevent the physical decadence that undoubtedly is going on.

limit imposed by the power of procuring subsistence, within a given area. There is therefore little danger that for a long time the population of the globe will outgrow the means of subsistence.

On the other hand, it is most important for the welfare of our country that there should be a large and healthy population. History informs us that

So long as 77 per cent. of the population are city dwellers and 23 per cent. alone remain in the rural districts, our nation will suffer from physical decadence and from deterioration in family morals.

In the medical section of the International Congress for the Welfare and Protection of Children, held in July, 1902, Sir James Crichton Browne submitted statistics of a nature that call for earnest consideration. Boys of all ages employed in the jute mills at Dundee fall far short of the accepted standards in height and weight. Girls in Dundee factories are on the average one and a half inches short in height and five pounds too light. Sir James believes that nearly 30 per cent. of the population of the country are underfed. The physical degeneration is due, he thinks, to lack of sufficient nourishing food, and also to the tendency on the part of well-to-do mothers to delegate the duties of motherhood to feeding-bottles and nurses. He recommends as the most effectual remedy for physical decadence the revival among all ranks of the old-fashioned ways of nursing motherhood.

The third and main cause, however, is moral. The revelations of the Divorce Court show us the existence of an unwillingness to submit to the irksome restraints of married life. Women will not submit to a husband's rule; and the husbands refuse to be self-forgetful and forbearing. Intemperate passion is the chief foe of family welfare. Where there is true love and respect between husband and wife, there will be no question of mere command and obedience, and no jealous defence of independence. The problem of the family can be solved only when wedded life moves on serenely and securely in a mutual service of kind affection and helpfulness.

the decay of the Roman Empire was closely connected with the sterility of its people, and with the resulting decrease in the number of those who could serve as recruits in its army. At the present moment politicians on the Continent amongst international jealousies watch with increasing anxiety the rate of increase of their respective populations. France is practically standing still, or increasing her numbers by a very small percentage; while in Germany the population is multiplying at a much more rapid rate. There can be no doubt that these facts will have a most important bearing on the future of these two great nations. Probably more than anything else it will decide the contest for Alsace-Lorraine, which is some day sure to come. Meantime, it is enabling Germany to expand her territory by colonising large portions of Africa, and so providing a market for her manufactures.

In addition to such an argument for growth of population, this increase also stands in direct relation to commercial prosperity. If it is necessary for the strengthening of our army and navy, it is not less desirable for the success of our agriculture and our industries. It is impossible to carry on these without a continual supply of youth and of muscular strength. The cotton industry of Lancashire was built up and developed into its present large proportions by the inrush of large numbers of healthy men and women from surrounding districts. Our huge cities would soon decrease were it not for the continual supply given

by the rural population. To strengthen and increase the growth of city population there is no doubt a large birth-rate in the cities, but there is also a large death-rate. It is a *sine quâ non* of industrial prosperity and of national wealth that a numerous addition to the population should be annually made in the midst of healthy rural surroundings.

The physical deterioration from which statistics prove we are now suffering is very largely due to the separation of the people from the soil and from the healthful labour involved in its cultivation. One cannot but view with sadness the anæmic, old-looking urchins that are found in our board schools and many of our larger cities. One pities the crowds of pale, sickly people that do the work of our factories and daily maintain an uneven struggle with existence. The health of our population is suffering from overcrowding. City life, hurtful to health at the best, is fatal in the noisome, disease-producing slums. Men, women and children need to get out to the country, and to work in the open air. The crowded city is utterly unsuitable to growing children, whose rightful heritage is the fresh air and sunshine of the country. There they can develop a healthy mind in a robust body. A certain amount of outdoor exercise is a prime condition of vital efficiency. The pure atmosphere, the green glades, the quiet river-side and the variety of pleasing natural objects, all rest and rejuvenate the overwrought mind, and inspire a calm peacefulness most favour-

able to health. Happy is the nation the majority of whose people are born amid natural surroundings where they acquire a strong physique and a healthy mind. Britain will soon be on the downgrade as a nation if her people turn their back on the country and bring up within the city the future generations of our land. We cannot make the most of our earth and its products without an increasing and healthy population.

It is clearly a sociological law that the "activity and progress of society depend, within limits, on the density of the population".¹ This, too, is impossible unless the race is rapidly increasing itself. It is only as men marry and replenish the earth with healthy families that the nation will attain all the ends of civilisation. This is the ultimate purpose subserved by marriage. And for this end we are now convinced by a rude experience that the Christian law of monogamy is the only safe means.² Every other scheme, such

¹Gidding's *Principles of Sociology*, p. 366.

²In support of this statement the following may be quoted from Prof. Gidding's *Principles of Sociology*, p. 414 :—

"In illustration and verification of the law of survival, I will recall the later steps in the evolution of the family. These show how inexorably the form of the family is determined at each step by the necessity of adaptation to complicating conditions, and they also show why only the ethical family will survive.

"The religious-proprietary family was, among other things, the social organ of worship and of property. New forms of religion, new organs for the accumulation of capital, and the passion for personal liberty made necessary a change in the

as that of Plato's Republic, or the custom of Mohammedan countries, and all other plans, polygamous and polyandrous, have failed. It is the union of one man and one woman in sacred marriage that alone will give the healthy environment, the moral atmosphere and the parental love that are demanded for the upbringing of children. The family that has the advantage of a father's wise counsel and a mother's love, that is sustained by the skill of the one and the tender care of the other, presents the best moral, intellectual and physical conditions of development. Where such homes are multiplied amid healthy surroundings and the laws of Christian marriage observed, the population should exhibit rapid increase and the prosperity of the nation should be insured.

family system. The religious-proprietary family, as such, came to an end.

"Two possibilities were offered in its stead. One was an irregular union of the sexes. If the irregular union was childless, the genealogical line of the men and women who preferred such relations to legal marriage came to an end. If there were children, they as a rule received either no care and perished, or received public care, which was so inadequate that many of them perished. Therefore, the irregular union tended to extinction, and left the perpetuation of the race mainly to those who believed in legal marriage and who taught their principles to their children. The possibility for these was the romantic family. Although based on preference and contract, this form of the family was relatively stable as long as women were economically dependent and divorce was difficult. Changing industrial conditions, however, and a more complex social life presently brought about a large measure of economic independence for women and easy divorce. The romantic family became unstable."

Within certain areas and at certain times there has been a great redundancy of population, in which the natural increase has been accompanied by a decrease of the standard of comfort. In some of these instances this increase has been also accompanied by a social degradation, either as consequence or as a cause. The multiplication of crofters in the Hebrides has accelerated conditions of wretchedness for which it has been difficult to devise a remedy, simply because the young people are unwilling to quit the crofts and go out into the wide world to find occupation. In China, on the other hand, the great increase of the population has been fostered by religious teaching, and by the endeavour to prevent the Chinese from emigrating. Their poverty is the result of religious and political causes. In each case we must inquire into the cause of the redundancy, and we shall find that it is one which it is within the power of society to remove. In no case will it be found to be an ineradicable evil. It is simply the outbreak at the time and place of some form of disease in the body social, for which a wise Government will seek to discover the proper cure.

CHAPTER V.

FAMILY LIFE AND RELATIONSHIPS.

OUR discussion of the bearing of Christianity upon the family would not be complete without reference to the relations and duties of the members of the house. Marriage is the beginning of the Christian family life, which is maintained by means of the Christian family spirit. This spirit constitutes the attraction of home, the security of which is the desire of every patriotic heart.

It is to be feared that there is less of home life at present than there was formerly. This arises from the altered circumstances of the times, from increased occasions of intercourse with others, and from the enlarged facilities of communication. The hurry of transit, the multiplication of diversions, the introduction of a freedom and laxity which tend to break down wholesome restraints, the arrangements of the Club as they relate to the father, and the social engagements that fill up the time of the mother—all these imperceptibly yet disastrously are weakening the family bonds. Whatever the cause may be, it is certain that people now live less at home. They find in it fewer attractions; and for them it possesses less importance and value. This is greatly to be re-

gretted. Even if long residence at home has a tendency to produce narrow views, yet home is the field for the cultivation of our best feelings. In it are begotten those affections in the maintenance of which lies the surest method of strengthening the bonds of social life. In this respect the importance of the family spirit can scarcely be denied.

The duties involved in the home relations, between husband and wife, between parents and children, between brothers and sisters, are the chief means by which the spirit of religion can be cultivated. The power of Christianity will first be seen in the purifying of the relations of the sexes, in setting a seal upon the innocence of little children, in the growth of the tenderest affection. But if home be regarded simply as a place of feeding and sleeping, where instead of duty and affection there is rather a relaxation of all rule and government, the result will be the death of the family spirit and the constant neglect of our most sacred duties. On the other hand, a well-ordered home, where truth, affection and faith unite all the members, contributes to the formation of strong Christian character, and is the best agency for leading the young into the fold of the Good Shepherd. Wise parents will not disregard the maleficent influences which at present are undermining the stability of the Christian family. It cannot be too strongly enforced that the discharge of those home duties has a very direct reflex influence on our spiritual progress. It is in the exercise of home

religion that we find the most effective method of developing the graces of the Christian character.

At the same time family spirit may be cultivated to an extent which would change family affection into a means of social exclusiveness. History is full of instances in which rulers, in the interests of their relatives, have plunged the State into expensive wars which have proved disastrous to the national welfare. Not infrequently we meet with a type of family life which in its intense selfishness isolates itself from public duties and is guilty of a dereliction of social service. Socialism has not been slow to fix upon this weak point, and to demand in consequence that family life should be absorbed in the wider life and unselfish ties of the nation, and that all separate homes should be fused in larger municipal communities. But if some parents, in their devotion to their families, neglect their social and political duties, they can be reached by the hand of law or by force of public opinion, without recourse to such unnatural methods as Socialists have proposed. We are rightly jealous of all attacks on the family in the name of political expediency. Such forms of selfishness will bring about their own cure; for in their negligence of social duties these people will soon discover that they have landed themselves in social ostracism. The danger of our day is rather that men should be so entirely absorbed in public duties and yield to so many attractions outside the home, that parental responsibility and family duties are ignored. We

are rightly jealous of every influence that tends to weaken the home ties or to destroy the sanctity of family life.

1. *Husbands and Wives.*—The conjugal relation is one of choice, and its bond is the silken tie of love. But love is its own legislature, and where it exists there is mutual loyalty and respect. In husband and wife there is a sense of incompleteness without the other, in which each makes a mutual surrender, the weak leaning on the strong, and the strong imparting strength to the weak. The wife's subjection to the husband is deprived of all sense of inferiority and servility, because love is its sole and animating principle. She is in subjection not because she has found a master, but because her heart has found its ideal and its rest. Marriage being a union for the highest ends of our being, both husband and wife exist each as an ethical end to the other. This is no diminution of their individuality or their personal happiness, but the increase and the enrichment of both. It is a joy to help when the heart goes with the service. "A woman's heart needs to look up where it loves." And where its affection goes, its service is sure to follow. Not only on deep intellectual sympathies and moral fitness is the union based. It finds its true foundation in a love which makes its chief aim of life to work for each other's highest good, in a mutual loyalty that finds its delight in a mutual loving surrender.

If the Bible speaks of the wife as submitting

to the husband, it is a rule that is subject to limitations. Where the husband's rule is really wicked and tyrannical, then the higher principle comes into force, that she must obey God rather than man. But such instances are unfortunate exceptions, and we all feel how far away they are from the true ideal of marriage. In that life there should be no division of interests, but a fellowship of the most intimate and transparent communion.

Since the times of the early Apostolic Church there has been a great advancement in the education of women, such as to make subjection a less fit term to employ. Educated women are perfectly fit to be entrusted with the whole secrets of a husband's life. Their delicacy of feeling and their quick intuitive discernment enable them often to be the best advisers of their husbands. All this is in complete harmony with the Apostolic teaching: "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter against them."

The husband's love will make him very careful to lay no task upon the wife which she is unable to bear. He will share the responsibility of the education of the children. He will be patient towards her weaknesses. No small part of the burden that has frequently to be borne is caused by difference of temperament and of constitution. But such diversity is only intended to evoke mutual help, and the differences are perfectly harmonised in the unity and reciprocity of affectionate service.

Where there are such mutual surrender and forbearance there will be no tenacious adherence to individual rights, no want of respect or chivalrous honour. To obey will be a delight; to help will be a pleasure. "Love uttering a wish speaks to love that listens in tones that are music; and love obeying the wish is as free as a queen." Bishop Martensen has wisely said: "The true superiority to such temptations, the true power for bearing both the less and the greater trials of life, and at the same time strengthening the love which is well-pleasing both to God and man, is to be found in Christian faith. That work by which each seeks mutually to educate and help the other must in its deepest reason be a work for mutual sanctification, for attaining through and with each other maturity for the kingdom of God. Christian faith teaches married people to regard each other not as beings destined for this earthly life alone, but as beings destined one day to rise from the dead, as fellow-heirs of the grace of life."¹

When husband and wife are thus equally yoked, their union is cemented by a bond which outlasts all changes of bodily feature and outward charm. Wedded happiness should never be at its best in the honeymoon days. It should develop into a sacred fellowship which the longer it lasts rises into the tenderest esteem, the most chivalrous fidelity, and the most unalloyed pleasure. The

¹ *Social Christian Ethics*, § 17.

union becomes one which it is felt will last beyond the grave. The marriage has been made in heaven. And as wedded life moves on to old age, it grows into a more complete sympathy and unreserved and open-hearted confidence. Marriage, then, becomes a communion in the Holy Ghost.

2. *Parents and Children.*—The family is itself a type of the kingdom of God. In it two generations meet, and the elder is designed to serve the younger. The pedagogic purpose of the home is written upon the very face of it. It is not an end, but a means to a higher end—the formation of the character of the children whom God has given to the home. It is therefore frequently used in Scripture as a type of the Church, a germ of that kingdom which will yet be consummated when the perfected community of the redeemed has been established.

(1) Scripture reminds us that children are the gift of God. In one sense they belong to us ; but they are ours only in trust from heaven. If we look upon them as altogether ours, we shall make many mistakes in their education. But when we remember they are immortal souls entrusted to our care, we shall understand our proper line of duty.

This is shown to us in the Sacrament of Baptism, in which God declares His gracious purpose towards the child, and in which the child is sealed with the seal of the covenant. We take the Church and world to witness that the children are His, and that we are trustees for their training in

all godly example and doctrine. That being so, the sacrament conveys to us a message of comfort, assuring us that God will co-operate with us in that training, and will grant our children the cleansing of His gracious Spirit.

This view of the parental relation will supply us with the proper motive in educating the young. We shall not then seek to qualify them only to assist us in our business, to gain honour, and to make a fortune. But our main motive will be to fit them to honour Him whose they are and whom they should serve. The danger of this materialistic age is that the young should be encouraged to believe that life is a mad chase after money. The worst future that can befall the coming generation is to live through its minority with a false standard held before its eyes. The young man who is trained by his father to believe that earthly prosperity is the best reward of life is in many other respects mortgaged to failure. The children learn to worship the idol that the parents have built and are ever bowing to. And what to the latter was only a means to an end becomes to their descendants the chief end of their existence. God has made parents the guardians of their children's morals, and they must teach them something better than the doctrines of Dives.

In the loving, genial atmosphere of a Christian home the child receives his best education. Nothing has greater influence than the daily example of a father and mother whose whole speech and actions are governed by the fear of God. Such

example, aided by wise Christian counsels, leads the young into the Shepherd's fold, and helps them to realise their covenanted blessings. This task, however, is too often left to the mother, in forgetfulness of the fact that the duty of education lies equally on both parents. Yet many mothers have, in the moral training of their children, nobly atoned for a father's neglect, and have exercised a wonderful influence over sons and daughters.¹

Above all the father of a family should never abnegate that which is his loftiest function, "that last remnant left him of the priestly dignity of his forefathers," the office of conducting family worship in the presence of his whole household. In this

¹ Napoleon I. once said to Madame Campan, the founder of the *Pension des Demoiselles* at St. Germain: "The old systems of education are worthless—our young girls are not well trained; what is wrong with education in France?" "The mothers," replied Madame Campan. "You are right," answered the Emperor quickly. "In that one word is comprised the system of the whole world's education. You must train us up mothers who know how to educate their children."

"It is an universal rule," says Michelet, "to which I have scarcely found a single exception, that remarkable men *are the sons of their mothers*; they bear the moral impress of their mother's individuality in themselves."

"The first and highest duty of the Department of Education," said Baron von Gautsch, "in what concerns the education of women, must ever be to train a woman to bring up her own children well."

This important subject receives most thorough treatment in a pamphlet, which the late W. E. Gladstone strongly recommended, by Frau Adele Crepaz, termed *Frauen-Emancipation*. It has had a wide circulation in Germany, and is now translated into English and published by Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

office there is truly more honour and sovereign dignity than in any ecclesiastical titles or political orders. It is a privilege and honour that every father and husband should highly esteem. Too many want moral courage to assume it, and do not clothe themselves in the garments which God wishes them to put on. It is a fatal mistake; one that involves irreparable loss of moral influence.

Though religion is best commended by example, yet instruction must not be neglected. First of all let the whole spirit of the home be Christian; then let the parents train the child to the habit of prayer, and explain to him the meaning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. The parents who hear their children say morning or evening prayers are only fulfilling the duty to which they have been ordained of God to a congregation sprung from themselves. Who is there that does not pity those parents whose false modesty or secular-mindedness deprives them of the great privilege of first telling their children the news of a Saviour's love, and opening up to their young minds that wonderful story of the Cross and of the Easter grave? Yet we have known families in which this was left to the paid governess, or to the Sabbath School teacher, who certainly never can fill a parent's place. No Church school or minister's class can, or is intended to, deprive the head of the family of such a privilege. These are only supplementary to parental instruction.

The great pressure of modern business, carried

on amid competition at express speed, has proved a serious enemy to many homes. Fathers engaged in commerce frequently have too little leisure to spare time for their family; but if they are to fulfil their duties, such time must be found at the expense of business and of money-making. The plea of preoccupation cannot prevail even when based, not on the demands of business, but on the higher claim of religious work among the poor, or in connection with Church organisations. We have known men so devoted to social and political work that they have maintained they have done their duty by their family when they have clothed and fed them and given them the best education possible.

The Apostle Paul was a profound student of human nature, who, though a childless man, was yet one of those sympathetic onlookers who often see most of the game. In strong language he denounces those who think of their own household as only a secondary charge; such have denied the faith and are worse than infidels (1 Tim. v. 8). Men engrossed in business might at least find or create a holiday, when amid Nature's beautiful surroundings they might enjoy the fellowship of their own children, and so be able to direct their tastes and mould their character. Sunday ought to be a family day in which the spiritual benefit of the young should be a primary object. Here self-denial will be demanded. For after parents have offered God in worship the first-fruits of the day, they may have to give up some favourite

volume, or some pleasing society, in order to keep in touch with their children. Above all they will seek to make use of the Sunday evenings for conversation on Divine things, such as afterwards comes to be so dearly prized. A little thought and tact in these matters will make the Day of Rest a time of great family benefit.

Education is intended to guide the young from infancy to manhood ; but when they have reached their maturity their separateness and individuality must be recognised by their parents. Love and obedience are still due ; but the nature and limits of filial piety alter with advancing years. In each child there lies the sacredness of humanity, involving an independent personality. Our children are not to be pale reflections of ourselves. They have been endowed with their own peculiar mental and temperamental qualities, and are intended by God to work out their own destiny. Parents should study these qualities intently, and give the young the necessary freedom of development. " We must not try to cramp the firming crystal into an impossible mould." It is possible to require from young men and women an excessive loyalty which amounts to an unfair repression of their individuality and innate tastes. Much tact and wisdom are required to guide the young lives aright and teach them how to make a right use of the freedom which with ripening years becomes their birthright.

It is a mistake, on the other hand, to grant them too early an unlimited liberty that knows no curb or restraint. Parents must remember that a

wise discipline means the training of the will, the power of mental concentration and the cultivation of good habits. "Young men," says Lord Bacon, "in their conduct and management of actions, embrace more than they can hold; stir more than they can quiet; fly to the end, without consideration of the means and degrees; pursue some few principles which they have chanced upon absurdly; use extreme remedies at first, and that which doubleth all errors, will not acknowledge or retract them." This natural tendency of young ebullient life has to be overcome by habits of diligence and self-restraint. Parents will have to make allowance for such faults and tendencies as are inherent in youth bubbling over with energy and frolic. They will not drive the young into exasperation through an excessive use of the curbing rein; they will seek to establish a wise influence rather than to exercise an irritating control. As a rule kindly moral persuasion will lead to a feeling of reverence for all that is worthy and honourable. What should be aimed at is the prevalence of a spirit that finds a delight in doing one's duty, that abhors every evil habit, and puts far away all pride and self-assertiveness.

Dr. Paley, in summing up parental duties, insists on maintenance, education and a reasonable provision for the happiness of the child. He argues that a peasant satisfies his duty if he sends out his children properly instructed in any branch of husbandry, while "clergymen, lawyers, physicians, officers in the army and navy, gentlemen

possessing moderate fortunes of inheritance or exercising trade in a larger liberal way, are required by the same rule to provide their sons with learned professions, commissions in the army or navy, places in public offices, or reputable branches of merchandise".¹

In Paley's day men were more rigidly divided into different classes, each with its own interests, opinions, mode of life and culture. But since then we have come to believe that classes, however useful and necessary for the work of the civil community, are not fixed castes. Class lines cannot be regarded as unchangeable appointments of Nature. The horizon of life has widened out greatly since men have come to appreciate the dignity of labour. Christian parents now feel that when they have given their children the best intellectual and religious training, they must largely leave to them the choice of trade or profession, as tastes and aptitudes may dictate. There was a time when all trade was deemed degrading and commerce was looked upon as drudgery. This is contrary to the spirit of the present day, not less than to the spirit of Scripture. The parent who has given his son a good education and a godly upbringing may rightly feel that he can do little more, and must leave him to fight his own battle. In God's eye no work is servile. All duties are dignified by being done in a Christian spirit. Trade is more honoured to-day than in Dr. Paley's time, and the man is felt to be

¹ Paley, *Moral and Political Philosophy*, chap. ix.

greater than his calling. But every parent will seek to study the aptitudes of his children, and so enable them to make a wise choice of that calling for which Providence has clearly designed them.

(2) Parental love ought to be met on the part of the children with obedience. In infancy such obedience will be absolute, since it has to be given without understanding the purpose of the parent. It will be rendered in the confidence that every command is for the child's highest good. Such obedience is itself the most direct route to freedom, and to the grand virtue of self-control. The more firmly household rules are enforced, the easier will it be for the children to observe them. They will learn how discipline and liberty are necessarily conjoined; and they will discover how the individual has to sacrifice many of his own desires for the good of that higher collective unit, the family.

This requirement implies also respect and honour. "Honour thy father and mother" is a commandment to which a special promise is attached. Honour is the necessary complement to obedience. Obedience without respect may be yielded to a person; but it is impossible to honour and yet disobey. If children would but remember the long years of self-denying toil and endurance which for their sakes their parents have undergone, trials which have set their seal on the aged faces in furrows of care, they could not fail in reverence and respect. The filial devotedness of most of our homes remains unwritten; but it is fair and sweet as an angelic ministry, and with

its loving loyalty it adorns the virtue of filial piety. Yet how many aged parents have to suffer from irreverence and forgetfulness on the part of their children; and they who have sacrificed so much for their family are left in old age in poverty or neglect. Who can read *King Lear*, one of the great dramatist's greatest works, without abhorring the unfilial cruelty of children who treat their aged parents as mere encumbrances?

Between the children of the same home there ought to be the closest intimacy, affection and courtesy. Within that little republic feuds should be absent altogether, and a relation of the closest friendship should unite brothers and sisters. Of one blood, they must seek to be of one spirit, and to make the home the happiest and brightest spot on earth. In a family of boys and girls there are the possibilities of pure joys and inspirations. The girls can bring into it delicacy of feeling, feminine taste and culture, and that softening influence which of itself refines the coarser elements of boyhood. When boys are without such elevating influence, they tend to grow brusque, rude, and unfeeling. Where sisters alone are found, they miss the more robust element which young men introduce into a home. In a Christian family where parents and children, brothers and sisters, meet in happy harmony, we have the ideal home, the citadel and bulwark of undying affection. Their friendship is a rare and lovely idyl of moral beauty. Who can read the tragic story of Charles and Mary Lamb, or the narrative of Wordsworth

tended and helped by his sister in all his work, without perceiving how full is this relation of the highest helpfulness?

What a blessing, too, may an elder brother or sister be to the family when the parents have been removed by death! We have known a brother who has taken a father's place and discharged all parental duties to the younger members with a fidelity that counted no sacrifice too heavy for his sacred charge. His reward was great when they grew up to understand the extent of their obligation to him. Such, whether brother or sister, becomes the real guardian angel of the home. "If the home duties be well performed," said Confucius, "there is no need to go afar to offer sacrifices."

3. *Masters and Servants.*—In the domestic institution of the family must be included those who, not occupying a filial relationship, are yet associated in the household and share in the well-being of the family. The working man finds these helps in the members of his own household, but others hire assistance, and so take into the home those who are not of it.

Servants in the household were slaves in the time of St. Paul. Christianity did not at once break their chains and fell the Upas tree; but it "girdled" the tree, as the Canadian woodmen used to do, and then allowed the hand of time to complete its destruction. This is beautifully shown in the Epistle to Philemon, whose slave Onesimus was sent back to him by St. Paul to do his work,

“no longer a slave, but a brother beloved”. If Christianity did not at once abolish slavery, it mitigated its horrors; and from that time the progress of civilisation was ever onward towards its abolition.

At the present time one hears much of the great dearth of domestic servants, and of the unpopularity of this department of work. That this is no transient phase of the great labour problem is sufficiently proved by the fact that the difficulty has occurred not in Great Britain alone, but in every continental nation, as well as in America. In France, and Switzerland, and Germany, we hear the same complaint regarding the increasing deficiency in the supply of domestic servants. At home it is affirmed that emigration to the States, to Canada, and South Africa, has been the prevailing cause. Yet one cannot accuse the Swiss or the French of depopulating their country for the sake of Colonies. Nor can the drift of the population from the rural parishes to the cities account for the dearth of such service in the cities, though to some extent it may explain it in the rural districts. The reasons are to be found more in causes that operate in the region of desire and of taste, and in a growing divergence in the idea of service. Possibly the larger wages offered in other departments of work and trade may have had some effect. In towns where cloth and linen manufactures are carried on this is proved to be a hindering cause. But those who speak of larger wages being offered in shops and factories are apt to overlook the expenses in-

curred in lodgings and the many outlays incident to life spent outside of a home. While in point of healthfulness there is no doubt that domestic work is far superior to the nervous tear and wear of the factory.

But the prevailing reasons for the growing dislike of household work seem to be these two: first, a desire for greater liberty than is to be had in domestic service, and secondly, shorter hours of labour. In some families female servants are treated as virtual prisoners, whose every moment from morning till evening belongs to their employer. Although this reason is now losing its force, it has left its evil effect in the unfortunate creation of a spirit which regards household work as a species of domestic slavery. Employers should remember the words of St. Paul: "Render unto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also have a master in heaven". Justice is the primary virtue in this relation; and it requires that the servants should be treated as members of the family, and their well-being should be a matter of the deepest concern. When they are made to feel that they are really members of the household, are invited to join in family worship, and find their physical health and moral welfare cared for, then less will be heard of the dislike of domestic employment; and we shall approach a solution of one of the growing problems of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, servants should remember how much they can contribute to the comfort and happiness of a household. Their service should

be conscientious, and should be given in the spirit of those who are members of the family and have it good at heart. The servant of St. Paul's time might be excused for giving "eye-service". In one deprived of his liberty such a vice was venial. But when service is equitably paid for, eye-service means injustice. The Apostle would transfigure it altogether by throwing a new light on it: "Not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but as servants of God, doing the will of God from the heart". Such a Christian spirit evokes new power for service and changes drudgery into delight.

It is to be regretted that on this subject of service many pernicious notions have been circulated. In itself service is a grand and noble thing. The Prime Minister of our realm is simply the best and ablest servant that the King can find within the realm. How different, too, is the connotation of the word in Scripture!—"I am among you as he that serveth". "The Son of Man came, not to be ministered unto, but to minister." And the term of honour in the Old Testament for the prophet was "the servant of the Lord". Strange that the word should now have a sound and significance offensive to the ears of many! One often hears it said: "I do not wish my child to go to service; she is fit for something better". It should be the effort of every servant of Christ to redeem the word from this association. Instead of the legal relation of bargain, the moral relation must be accentuated. Service would then in the minds of the working classes be restored to

its Biblical dignity. The bond which unites employer and employed should be the assurance that in God's sight masters and servants are equal, because both have come to know that their respective duties must be done under the eye of one taskmaster. The whole matter is lifted up into this lofty sphere by the Apostle: "And ye, masters, do the same things unto them, and forbear threatening; knowing that both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him".

CHAPTER VI.

THE STATE.

IN proceeding to consider the relation of the State to other moral organisms, we must commence by defining what the State is. But since such a definition can be properly reached only after a consideration of the science of politics, we must at the beginning be content with a provisional definition. We may consider the State to be an independent organised society, comprising a certain number of civilised or semi-civilised peoples. It is a community of men, women and children, deriving its corporate unity from its obedience to a common government and its recognition of common legal institutions.¹ This provisional definition will prevent us from giving a too narrow interpretation to the conception of the State, or from excluding any necessary factor involved in the conception. Perhaps if we add that it implies also a certain definite territory which it occupies, we have then got all the characteristic features of this unity called the State.

1. The State is often spoken of as being one large family, and its chief ruler is then regarded, like the Czar of Russia, as the father of his people.

¹ Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, p. 220.

There is no doubt that a monarchic constitution, or an autocracy like Russia, lends to the conception of the State many of the associations and kindly feelings of family life. Also it cannot be questioned that States in these days tend to become more paternal, and that our British Government in its recent legislation has, under modern influences, given ever-increasing attention to the moral needs of its citizens.

But it is a mistake to speak of the State as simply an extension of the family, or to derive any civil laws from such a conception of family relationships. A father out of love to his children will exercise a wise discipline. Those whom he loves he will chasten. "We have had fathers of the flesh who corrected us, and we gave them reverence." But no possible conception of the State can include such loving chastisement. The State can never exercise parental discipline through any of its magistrates. It knows only justice; it exists to vindicate the right-doer and to punish the wrong-doer; to protect honesty and to punish dishonesty. In the case of citizens whose arbitrary actions have endangered its well-being, it may do what no father does to his children—it may banish them entirely and forbid their return. For certain offences against its laws and its integrity it may even inflict capital punishment. No parent, possessed of any Christian principle, would pronounce perpetual banishment upon a child; and he dare not put his child to death.

This confusion of two social spheres has been

productive of many errors. If it make some Parliaments too paternal, it has made some rulers too autocratic. These have ignored the laws of the realm in the exercise of what they consider a parental guarding of the well-being of their subjects. And on the other hand, in many semi-civilised countries, it has induced rulers to keep their subjects in a species of tutelage, which has impeded progress and deprived the people of many of their rights.

It is a further condemnation of this view that Political Paternalism denies in a practical form the rights of majority to its citizens. These are regarded in the light of pupils who are still minors and require to be under tutors and governors. But even in the family there comes a period, not easily in each case defined, when parental authority must be limited by the intellectual and moral growth of the young, whose personality begins to assert itself. "They are under tutors and governors till the time appointed." For the State to refuse a voice in shaping the nation's policy to those who have reached their majority and have become householders would be to condemn them to political tutelage. What may be the best qualification for the franchise is a difficult question, and the answer to it is necessarily relative to the stage of development which the nation has reached. But if a man contribute to the taxation of the country, and be intelligent enough to understand what good government means, it is not easy to see any reason why the State should deny him

the rights of a citizen and a vote in shaping its policy.

While the spheres of family and of State must not be confused, the tendency of legislation among all modern States is to extend the area of paternal interference. Under the influence of the socialistic spirit Parliament has now passed laws with the special aim of benefiting the poor and of providing partially gratuitous education, which it makes compulsory. It has passed the Factory Laws for the protection of women and children, and many would ask it to make compulsory a State-aided insurance against the infirmities of old age. If this method of interference grow, it will require very careful legislation to keep the action of the Government from injuring the character and morals of those aided.

It is not less an error to confuse the State with the Church, and to consider it under the Old Testament aspect of a theocracy. The two spheres must be kept distinct, for the State is as much an ordinance of God as the Church is. They are connected by many intimate links; but there is a wide difference between their duties and their ends. And while power exercised by the Church is purely a moral and a spiritual influence, the State may and must employ physical force in order to dispense justice and maintain its laws in opposition to human arbitrariness.

The recently formed Science of Sociology has made clear to us many facts concerning the rise and progress of society, and the influences that

determine the aggregation of peoples and their co-operative activities. We have come to see that the social mind has its own aspirations, and works according to well-known genetic laws. The problems of social structure are now being eagerly investigated, and our knowledge of them should greatly assist us in our treatment of those subject-races in Africa and elsewhere that are still at an early stage of social development.

2. How, then, did the State originate? First of all, there is the *theory of Rousseau* that it originated in a social contract between adults who are its members. This theory has been the fertile cause of many misconceptions. Each man as he enters the State is supposed to make a bargain or contract with it by which he sells his individual liberty in order to purchase the protection of the State for his property and person. This idea of social contract was the principle on which Locke and Kant founded their theories; and at the present day it colours the political view of many writers. Its utter fallaciousness has been ably exposed by Sir Henry Maine, Professor Sidgwick and others. It contains one element of truth—that every individual citizen may lawfully make his influence felt in a constitutional way. But he is entirely mistaken if he imagine that he is free at any moment to either obey the laws of the State or to retire from his citizenship. If he is not prepared to abide within the laws of the land, he must quit its shores and seek another State, where again he will find his liberties cur-

tailed without being asked whether or not he has entered into a contract with it. Though he should choose to step ashore in New Guinea, he will discover that he is under the restraints of the rude government of the land, and that these are not less but rather more severe than those which limited his freedom in Great Britain. Even in Sokoto and Dahomey there are the embryonic elements of a political constitution. And he will find that the tyranny of the rulers of these African States is not one whit more endurable, because it is determined by the simple will of the tyrant.

(a) There are evils incident to every civil State, which yet are less in extent than those that spring from pure barbarism. No man can divest himself of his social instincts without becoming worse than the savage himself. Rousseau, in his discourse on the Origin of Inequality among men, admits that the state of nature in which his Social Contract is supposed to be made, "has perhaps never existed, and probably never will exist". That is to say, that Rousseau was only making use of a hypothetical argument, and was not attempting to describe the actual state of mankind. It is not the fact that individual freedom has decreased with the growth of civilisation, or that the return to a state of nature would bring any increase of our natural rights. The experience of history shows the reverse of this to be the case.

(b) Another theory finds the origin of the State in the *strong personality of some ruler*. In the book of Genesis we read of a Nimrod who "was

a mighty hunter before the Lord," and whose first kingdom was Babel or Babylon (Gen. x. 9, 10). Strong men, endowed with great force of character and an untameable efficiency of soul, who have been able to clear their way through what to others were impossibilities, have imposed their will on their weaker fellows, and thus founded States. This explains also the singular fact, well authenticated by history, that not a few States originated in criminal acts or in high-handed force. Their constitutions still carry the proof within them that they were founded by despots whose tyranny subdued many clans or races under a strong military government. Plato in his *Republic* assigns a peculiar origin to the State. He says (*Rep.*, 2, 369 *seq.*) the State arose because the strength of individuals is not sufficient to supply their material needs; and in order to meet these wants they organise themselves to supply all their own needs. The State originates in handicraftsmen who help to make furniture and build houses; and it is only when a desire for luxury is introduced that the classes of warriors and legislators spring up, and with them a complement of State functions.

Hobbes, the political philosopher of England, developed a theory of the State in which he sought to found it on the unconditional submission of all acts and opinions to the will of the reigning monarch. He believed that in the simple condition of nature, preceding political institutions, every man was his own policeman, and vindicated his own rights. But since in such a condition

there was no law and therefore no possibility of breaking the law and committing crime, Hobbes affirmed that men agreed together to elect an authority that should be supreme within the State and should have the power of inflicting capital punishment. In such a State the natural rights of the individual were completely transformed, so that he might now claim what he could not claim in his previous condition. The authority of each man was vested in the monarch, who could do as he pleased, since he embodied in himself the rights of every citizen. Thus the Government and the State were practically one.

Since the time of Hobbes the majority of those who have written upon the State have been men of legal training, accustomed to accept this philosophic basis given by Hobbes to the English constitution. But when men came to see that the social contract, by which they were supposed to quit the condition of nature, is a fiction of the imagination, and that the State is a very artificial product, it was impossible to abide by this legal conception. The social unit cannot be the individual who enters into the contract. For, as we said in a previous chapter, the individual at birth finds himself the member of a household. And it is an undeniable fact that the social unit is the family. The contractual origin of the State is now an exploded theory. We become subjects of the State by birth into the family.

(c) Accordingly, within the last fifty years a different philosophical basis has been given to the

State. It came from the school of Darwin and Spencer, and may be called the *Biological Theory*.¹ Here we meet with no mere fiction of the imagination, but with living facts and vital forces.

The conclusions of Darwin have greatly influenced the progress of thought in recent years, showing us how the laws of heredity and environment hold individuals and society within their grasp. Herbert Spencer, adopting Darwin's main conclusions, points out the resemblances between society and living organisms. The lowest types of animal life are unorganised, consisting entirely of protoplasm. They are homogeneous in character, there being no division of labour. But in the higher forms the biological cells combine into tissues and organs with specialised functions. In these there is complete integration and interdependence of parts, while the organs become unlike and heterogeneous. Spencer points out how in the Protozoa there are no true organs, but the whole body is simply a mouth or a stomach without coherency. But in the cat and dog these biological units are united into a coherent organism thoroughly heterogeneous, showing increasing complexity of structure. Life is thus a continual progress "from the incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity," from a structureless mass in the Protophyta to a highly developed organism with eyes, feet, hands, nerves and head.

Spencer draws four parallels between society

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 176.

and individual organisms.¹ Not only are societies and organisms alike in these peculiarities, but the highest societies such as the State, Spencer thinks, resemble each other in the greatest degree. Social life in its early stages, as in the Amæba, is virtually structureless. Every person is engaged in the same work, with but little differentiation of functions. Every one is his own shoemaker, farmer, gardener and schoolmaster. But gradually the nomads divide, some taking to farming, others to carpenter work, others to teaching. At every stage there is differentiation of parts and specialising of functions.

But at one point the analogy singularly fails. In both there is a sustaining system, which may be called alimentary in the animal and industrial in society (shepherds, farmers, fishermen). In both there is a distributing system, which in the one case carries blood to the animal system, and in the other distributes food by commerce, ships and railways, through the community. In both there is a regulating and expending system—in the animal by an apparatus of nerves and muscles, and in society by armies and governors who defend it and direct its energies.

These analogies, however, will be seen to concern themselves chiefly with the physical side of society. But when we ascend to the sphere of intelligence the differences are very great. The sustaining and distributing systems of a State are

¹ *Westminster Review*, 1860, Article on the "Social Organism".

not found in itself as in the animal. Argentina supplies Britain with wheat, and Britain supplies Argentina with machinery and steel goods. Political economy exhibits to us many cross divisions, the result of Free Trade and Commerce; and it is upon these that at the present moment our deepest attention is fixed. With these the welfare of every State to-day is intimately concerned.

Besides, in the biological conception of society there is nothing in the animal organism corresponding to the moral sense and to the moral life of the people. Might becomes right where only physical forces rule. Thus at the most important point of the analogy the comparison fails. The Social Conscience is not found in Mr. Spencer's State. It is subject only to physical laws invariable in their operation. Hence it is that Mr. Spencer argues in *Man versus the State*, that the latter should interfere as little as possible with the former. Men should have the utmost liberty in following out the lines which heredity and environment lay down for them. The biological view is born of materialism. It is one of the strangest paradoxes of the present day that, in a century in which mind is so triumphant over matter in the field of action, matter should have come to dominate mind in the field of thought. According to this theory men are exploited by matter; and there is no need for a Divine mind to guide the world.

(d) This leads us to the view of society which at the present moment may be said to hold the

field. It is *the Psychological Theory*. This theory connects the various points of view presented by the previous analogies. If the theory of Hobbes failed to give its proper value to the State, in contrast with the supreme authority, on the other hand the biological view gives no proper place to the central control in which the perfection of the organism consists. The former laid too much stress on the irresponsible will of the ruler, the State being a real unity in one person on whom it has devolved all its powers. The latter is an organism so imperfect as to have no controlling will; or at least its intrinsic bond is such that Mr. Spencer coins another word for it—the term “super-organic”.¹

This was necessary, because the analogy of the organism is far from a complete expression of the Social Consciousness. The fact that it is borrowed from the physical realm, a realm that lies beneath the sphere of personality, might itself have suggested the likelihood that the similarity will fail at those most vital points where we approach the facts of the social mind. It is always dangerous to reason from physical facts to ethical truths.

Besides, the analogy of an organism only faintly describes that like-mindedness and consciousness of kind which is the strong bond of society within the State. If it does so to some extent, still the link of connection is devoid of any ethical content. The most important social forces are outside of it. The members of the State are persons possessing

¹ *Sociology*, vol. i., chap. i.

a sense of obligation and natural affections. And while co-operation, similar to that which unites the parts of an organism, can be traced between them, the phenomena of social and political relations include a social consciousness and a sense of ethical freedom, which are far above the attributes of a mere organism.

The State is more than a physical organism governed by material laws. It is psychical, not physical. The bond that unites its members is not merely one of flesh and blood. The State is a community of ideals and of beliefs; it is possessed of moral purpose; it has ethical and political obligations; and it claims the power of jurisdiction and legislation.

Professor Bosanquet illustrates the point in the following manner: "On Fridays, we are told, the passenger traffic returns of French railways, omnibuses and steamers show a decline. What dumb fact is this? People do not like to travel on Fridays, or prefer to travel upon other days. What is this preference? The only unity that can really afford an explanation, that can correlate this irregular fragment of fact with the whole to which it belongs, is the living mind and will of the society in which the phenomenon occurs. Explanation aims at referring things to a whole; and there is no true whole but mind. Necessarily, therefore, with widening experience and deepening criticism, mind has become the centre of the experiences focussed by sociology."¹

¹ Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 43.

In illustration of this same truth, we may point out that modern discussions as to the true conception of society mainly centre round the ideas of imitation, invention, and what is called by Professor Giddings "the consciousness of kind".¹ If we watch the manner in which a new idea takes possession of a nation, and compels institutions built upon former ideas to adjust themselves to it, we shall at once see that the science of society must be based upon psychology. When the idea of the equality of all men, white and black, took possession first of the mind of England and then of a majority of the States of America, it came into conflict with a great number of political, commercial and social institutions. The time had come for that idea to pass judgment upon the laws and the commerce connected with slavery. Great Britain consented to settle the matter by a payment of twenty millions sterling to the owners of slaves in the West Indies. The Southern went to war against the Northern States of America in order to maintain the institutions based on slavery. After one of the most sanguinary and expensive conflicts of modern times, it was found that the institution had to be adjusted to the new idea that had taken possession of the social mind. The States of America are now at one regarding the treatment of the Negro race.

Errors with regard to the theory of the State will be found to be traceable in large degree to

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 17.

misconceptions in the underlying psychology. The question, What is the characteristic excellence or proper work of the State? is answered by the previous question, What is the nature and constitution of the State whose essential excellence we desire to discover?¹ No theory of the State is complete which does not embrace the action of the Social Mind, the impulse of Social Feeling, and the operation of the Social Will.² The fact

¹ It was in the same wise way that Aristotle and Bishop Butler based their moral systems on psychology, answering the query as to the proper life of man by investigating man's nature and constitution. It is owing to a deficiency in the Kantian psychology that Kant's ethical theory is so abstract and one-sided. Man, according to Kant, is wholly a rational being, and all sensibility must be eliminated. Reason is set over against feeling, and a psychological dualism is created that divides human nature into two hostile sections. The only way to gain peace is to exterminate one of these; and so Kant decided that the feelings must be disregarded, and man must live in the passionless life of reason. The will is simply the practical reason, and duty is done, not because we love it—for that would vitiate the act since it introduces the emotions—but solely for duty's sake.

² It were well that our ethical and theological writers should receive with attention and patience the definition of the Social Mind by a Sociologist. We cannot do better than quote Professor Giddings' explicit statement: "There is no reason to suppose that society is a great being which is conscious of itself through some mysterious process of thinking, separate and distinct from the thinking that goes on in the brains of individual men. At any rate, there is no possible way yet known to man of proving that there is any such supreme social consciousness. To the group of facts that may be described as the simultaneous-like mental activity of two or more individuals in communication with one another, or as a concert of the emotions, thought and will of two or more communicating individuals, we give the name,

that these are present and operative in all the legislation enacted and in every policy adopted by the State, is to us an evidence of its spiritual character. That character was hidden by former materialistic conceptions of the State which for some time prevailed. But when the psychological conception has taken hold of the public mind, the errors inherited from individualistic theories and from modern biologists will disappear, and we shall gain a more correct political philosophy. It will become clear that the State has a will and a conscience of its own; and that, with a national responsibility for all its actions, there ought to be a national acknowledgment of Divine authority and national instruction in the principles of religion and of morality.

This conception of all events that we call national, as containing within them a spiritual essence which they will ultimately yield to patient study, lies also at the basis of Modern History. Former historical writers gave us a narration of the births and deaths of kings, the story of their battles and their bickerings. Montaigne speaks of Guicciardini as describing the intrigues and

the Social Mind. This name, accordingly, should be regarded as meaning just this group of facts and nothing more. It does not mean that there is any other consciousness than that of individual minds. It does mean that individual minds act simultaneously in like ways and continually influence one another; and that certain mental products result from such combined mental action which could not result from the thinking of an individual who had no communication with fellow-beings." (*The Elements of Sociology*, pp. 119, 120.)

wars of Italy "without ever referring any action to virtue, religion or conscience". Mitford gave us the conservative and Grote the radical view of the Athenian government. Thucydides wrote to expose the vices of Greek democracy, and Tacitus to exhibit the hatefulness of Roman Imperialism.¹ History has been hitherto written mainly from the political and ecclesiastical points of view. Probably we shall soon have it written from the standpoint of Economics, telling us how trade has developed and how the markets of the world have moved from East to West.

But after all, these various standpoints are only different moments in the social evolution of society. History is a record neither of wars, nor of churches, nor of markets. Rather is it a record of the struggles of the Social Mind in its effort to give embodiment to its ideas and convictions in social institutions. It should describe the life of the people; it should show how they became a community subject to common legal institutions, and how ultimately they perfected their national life. When they have reached this point, and the new standard of political life is accepted and social conduct adjusted to it, then there begins the growth of new habits on this loftier plane of action, and social progress quietly proceeds. The people have made up their mind; the Government has embodied the idea in legislative enactment; and on this higher level of social life henceforward the

¹ Froude, *Short Studies*, Series ii., p. 483.

nation moves and acquires corresponding national habits. The development of the social mind constitutes the real history of a people. Future historians who write scientifically should be careful to trace the inception and working of great social ideas in the institutions and legislation of the State.

Another proof of the fact that the doctrine of the State has a psychological and ethical basis is pointed out by M. Tarde in his work *Les Lois de l'Imitation*. He believes that all social progress is conditioned by imitation and invention. These may be said to be the conservative and progressive forces of the world. The results of imitation are seen in children, who copy in the most literal and mechanical manner every act and custom of their parents. The same thing is visible in nations. Oriental races, as a rule, abide by the customs of their forefathers. The Chinese have hitherto objected to railroads, not because they believe that the railroad would impede trade, but simply because they think it would injure those domestic and social institutions which are hoary with the growth of ages and have gained the reverence of the whole people. They cannot persuade themselves to change their national habits, and are perfectly contented to rest in social stagnation. Their unwillingness to accept the ideas of Western civilisation and to move with the times, as the Japanese have so wonderfully done, simply proves that habits are the static element of society. That element is of course a necessary one in Social Evolution ; but

where it alone prevails there are many hindrances to political and national progress.

Hence it is that the principle of Imitation must be balanced by the faculty of Invention. If the former is the static element in the East, the latter has become the dynamic power of the West. In the recent remarkable progress of science, a most powerful influence has been exercised on social progress by mechanical contrivances, which are nothing else than scientific ideas embodied in machines. Arkwright's invention of the water-frame to facilitate the process of spinning simply gave embodiment to the idea that a stronger motive power than the human hand might be applied to the processes of textile manufacture. The discovery of steam power by James Watt was an invention which upset many old social habits and revolutionised many political ideas. No sooner did that idea get embodiment in the steam engine than the old ideas found in other machines became anachronisms. The commerce of Britain at once took a leap forward ; new forces were marshalled into the service of the State, and the whole nation was carried up to a higher social level. That invention lies behind much of Britain's economic progress. It has aided education, accelerated the progress of literature, and indirectly prepared the way for Britain assuming the position and obligations of an Empire.

Thus we see that, while ideas originate in the minds of individuals, it is through imitation and invention that they become social factors. The one

tends to conserve and to consolidate social energy, giving it stability and permanence. The other is a powerful factor in social progress. Both are contributory elements to the welfare of the State.

Our explanation of the Origin of the State will help us to understand its *End*. The State is not its own end, but is a means to something beyond itself. On the other hand, if it be but a means, it cannot be a means to the production of something entirely different from itself. That end must be in keeping with the work of the State and the nature of its government. Yet though its end must be something more than any individual good, we find many utilitarians who would make it nothing better than an instrument for promoting general happiness. The school to which Bentham and J. S. Mill attached themselves reduces the State to such an instrument. They deny its organic functions, and maintain that men in society have no properties or duties that may not be resolved into the laws that as individuals they are bound to obey. This, however, is to reduce the State to an individualistic basis, to isolate men from their fellows, and to make their political life a meaningless assumption.

But we should be without warrant if we gave way to the other extreme, and elevated the State to such a position of worth as to entirely absorb the life of the individual citizens. Hegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, has pointed out how in the Greek State the citizen might be said to have no personality apart from it. In Plato's view ethics

and politics were so blended that the virtues of the individual were regarded as identical with those of society. The ancient Greeks held that "the State was the first object of all moral activity, and the virtue of a man was entirely the same thing as his political efficiency".¹

But the State has an organic life of its own quite distinct from the lives of those who compose it. It is not a mere mob or aggregate of individuals, but it is a society of which the members have definite relations that remain comparatively constant, while the individuals may change.

It is this view of its real unity that enables us correctly to define the end of the State. The good of the State and the good of the individual are not different, but the same. *The end of the State is clearly the highest welfare of both the individual citizen and of mankind.* This reverses the old Greek idea in which the life of the individual counted for little, and the well-being of the commonwealth was alone kept in view. It unites the Hedonistic principle with Kant's doctrine of the State—the promulgation and enforcement of law on the basis of Right. When the two are combined, when the union of abstract right with particular pleasures and interests is reached, then we find the true end of the State, and we discover that it is in line with the destiny of mankind.

¹ Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy*, chap. xi. Cf. Kant's *Philosophy of Law* (Hastie's translation), where the purpose of the State is reduced to the dispensing of justice, under the political triad, Legislative, Executive and Judiciary Powers (p. 165).

CHAPTER VII.

THE NATIONAL STATE.

IN our definition of the State, we spoke of it as comprising a civilised or semi-civilised people. Such a people or peoples are usually found existing under the forms of national life, and within some definite territory or country, it may be Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Hindustan, China or America. In a nomadic State it is not possible to possess the judicial arrangements and proper form of national life. We cannot call migratory hordes of Arabs that roam over Arabia and Africa a nation, although they may be classified in families and clans. But national life requires for its security and development some defined territory, a land, a soil on which it shall grow, and in relation to which it shall stand on the closest and most intimate footing, and through the influence of which it shall develop its national traits and character.

I.

We know the vast influence which is exercised by mountainous countries such as Wales, the Scottish Highlands, Switzerland, and the northern territories of India upon their inhabitants, making

them a brave, hardy and indomitable race. Whereas low-lying alluvial lands, such as those along the banks of the Ganges and the Amazon, have fostered in their peoples a character of the very opposite kind. The valley of the Ganges contains a vast plain of rich mould, which under a tropical sky can furnish from its granaries sufficient nourishment for millions of people. On its banks and on its tributary waters are the wealthiest cities and the largest markets of India. But the result has been that this rich tract of land, producing with the least possible trouble rice, wheat, sugar, vegetable oils, spices, cotton, silk, and almost everything that man can want, has bred a race of Bengalese who are notoriously lacking in pith, energy and courage. The overflowing bounty of Nature has made it needless for them to contend with those difficulties of soil and climate which evoke the vigour of the mountaineers of Kashmir and Afghanistan. Thus enervated by their luxurious climate, deprived of the necessity of contending against Nature's harshness, and accustomed to only quiet agriculture life, they have developed a character distinctly Bœotian, a temperament phlegmatic and cowardly. Their territory has again and again been devastated by the hardy mountaineers of the north-west, the Mahratta freebooting race, who are as conspicuous for their bravery and energy as the Bengalese are for their lassitude.

The same influence of soil and climate upon national character is visible on a smaller scale in other countries. The dwellers on the banks of

the Po in the rich plains of Lombardy are very different from the hardy sons of Piedmont. In Spain the people in mountainous Castille have a saying that in low-lying Valencia, laved by the warm Mediterranean, the earth is water and the men are women, a race naturally fitted to yield to a foreign conqueror.

Soil and climate have also tended to call forth other peculiarities of a people, peculiarities noticeable in their songs, music, proverbs and legends. They have also influenced their language, and are the cause of many variations in it, such as those that obtain between the low-Dutch of Holland and the German of Saxony and Bavaria. Other national traits are visible in the physique and physiognomy of different races. The oval-eyed Japs and Chinese are very recognisable; the Malay has one face, the Arab another, and the Negro a third. The fair-haired Saxon of Northern Europe is in feature very distinct from his dark brother of Tuscany. The Jewish type of face may be recognised in the Boulevards of Paris, or on the streets of New York; and the United States of America are producing a type of feature of a very distinct kind.

The causes of these diversities and national idiosyncrasies are more than geographical. While we bear in our constitution the character of our native land, and feel the influence of soil and environment, we are also affected by our national history. In the growth of every nation there has been the continuous evolution of the peculiarities

and the possibilities of the peoples composing it. These tend to get concentrated by the historical development of the nation. The many persecutions which the Jews have endured have developed their patience and their astuteness, and have helped to make them the bankers of the world. Each nation, since the one race was broken up at Babel, has followed its own path and developed its own traits. No doubt there has been a very strong and one-sided development of nationality, fostered by the traditions of nations and by modern investigations of history. This was very much aided by the Humanism of last century. It is not necessary that different languages or dialects should cause national divisions. Even within the British Islands we have distinct languages, Celtic, Welsh, Irish, and Anglo-Saxon: and yet we remain one nationality. Languages change in a very singular manner. Many are dying out, and others survive. Gaelic and Irish will soon be extinct; probably many of the tongues of India will quickly disappear in favour of the purer and stronger dialects. On the other hand, we have a great nation rising in America, speaking the English tongue, yet developing a nationality very distinct in form and idea from that of Great Britain. But the character of each people is distinct, and its history helps to make it conscious of its possibilities. It reveals to it the direction in which its powers may best be utilised and in which it may reach its national destiny along the line of least resistance. Who can doubt that the wonderful history of the

Jewish nation has tended to confirm its solidarity, has awakened in every Jew's heart a deep desire to develop the latent possibilities of the sons of Abraham, and to maintain the traditions of his race? Providence has led them through strange experiences, and may yet so shape their historic development as to bring them to their true national destiny. For every nation has its God-given mission and its appointed path. It is in the fulfilment of its destiny and along the path of its true development that it will come to know the best political forms which its government should assume, and the best shape in which to embody its legislative enactments. The laws which suit its primary growth and infancy will have to be changed for others more adapted to its maturity. In the course of that history customs will arise, habits will strengthen and harden into what will become great national laws, which in turn will mould the constitution of the State, and influence the character of the people.

Ordinances that do not naturally spring out of the nation's experience and are not genial to its temperament may be enacted by a government temporarily powerful or by a usurper of the throne; but they do not long survive. They must be germane to the historical interests of the race: they must be the expression of a feeling or desire that lies deeply embedded in the nation's consciousness.¹

¹ Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, chap. ii.

For all laws rest on national habits, and Government coercion can never go beyond or before popular feeling and conviction. Besides these laws springing from custom, there are codes of honour which in a loose sense may become social laws, and are the seeds of future legislation.¹

It is in this manner owing to causes moral, local and historical, that a modern national State is consolidated. It is thus that laws get their sanctions, that rights and obligations are established, and that people grow into a political society or commonwealth. Here we have the origin and basis of that particular organisation that we call the State. Every State is the outcome of a national history, and that history has modified its legislation and moulded its form of Government. All this is in accordance with the teaching of the book of Genesis, by which, when men began to multiply and sought to maintain their unity by creating a Babel, one great centre of political union, God separated them by the intensification of national and linguistic peculiarities. Whatever the story of Babel may mean, we know that all language is due to the law of Association, and to the metaphorical mode of expressing thought which makes language one vast volume of compressed allegories. Philological inquiry has shown to us that language is

¹ The modern Sociologists have amplified and illustrated this point—none in a more suggestive way than M. Durkheim in his *De la Division du Travail Social*, livre 1, chap. ii; also M. Tarde, *Les Lois de l'Imitation*, p. 115.

a human invention, that it originates in custom, that we have great families of speech belonging to the Aryan race, the Semitic race and the Turanian or Allophylian races, including the monosyllabic Chinese and the Indian languages of America. The divisions of language have in many cases been helpful in protecting men from violence, and in fostering that variety of laws and institutions and governments which have enriched the world, and in which the various nations have embodied their historic growth.¹

The nation has not only furnished a basis for the State, but it has also been the condition of mental and social growth. The common medium of the mother-tongue has aided culture and education. It is in the languages of nations that all literature has found its embodiment.

By this medium mind can correspond with mind, and heart feel with heart. A common language is for a nation the invariable condition of mental and political progress. And although there are nations at the present time in which two or more languages are spoken, this divergency has been found to produce other divergencies in racial ideals which, as in Austria, produce a cleft that cuts deeply into the national unity and results in dangerous internal weakness.

¹ Cf. Ward, *The Psychic Factors of Civilisation*, Part 2; Andrew Lang, *Custom and Myth*; Dan. G. Brinton, *Races and Peoples*, 1890; Tylor, *Anthropology*, 1891; Article by J. Donovan in *Mind*, Oct., 1891.

II.

At the present time the relations between the State and national life are clearly defined, and national peculiarities are more and more being merged in that cosmopolitan spirit which encourages nations to become increasingly dependent on each other, and to promote by every possible means international trade and intercourse. Free Trade has long been the fiscal policy of Britain, although in this respect she is now found to stand alone, and other nations are building up huge tariff walls against her exports. Many large questions, pregnant with moral and economic issues, here present themselves; but the one which is most pertinent to our present argument is, not that of international trade, but that of *the relations of nationality to Empire*.

Are we justified in extending the legislative and governmental power of Great Britain so as to include not only those Colonies which are peopled by our own race but those which are of other languages and of entirely different religions? Is the Greater Britain beyond the seas now to include those who have with us no community of speech or of blood, the vast tribes of India with their 300 millions of people and their many dialects, the Hottentot and Zulu races in South Africa as well as the Boers in the Transvaal? Are we justified in speaking of the Empire of Britain and in doing our best to unify those races under one crown? Is it possible for us in a Christian way to realise the

solidarity of our Empire? Are we justified in extinguishing rising nationalities? Should we not rather encourage the Bechuana and the Zulu to develop their best characteristics, and to cultivate their own literature and ballad poetry, and to take their own place in the vanguard of civilisation? Twenty-five years ago the answer to this question would have been in the affirmative. But a change came when Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India. Egypt, with a large and rapidly growing population, and containing the great African water-way of the Nile valley, has now been brought under English influence, and English officers are the advisers of the Khedive. Since it was found impossible to have a hostile nationality and a disaffected race barring the way to the progress northwards of Britain's sphere of influence, the Transvaal and Orange Free State are now made part of British South Africa. Our former respect for nationality has in some measure declined. While we still guard with sympathy all that unique individuality and the stamp of character which are the mark of a nation, yet the claims of Empire, our ever-increasing trade, and the necessity of self-defence have weakened our interest in nationality and vastly enhanced our appreciation of the value of Imperial integrity.

This diminution of esteem for nationality has been aided by the vanity and restlessness of minor peoples, such as the Boers and those nations that occupy the ground round about the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the buffer States between Austria,

Turkey and Greece. The peace of Africa, of America and of Europe has been so frequently broken by these races that the larger Empires, which now watch each other with vast armaments of trained soldiers, are perplexed by their many political uprisings. The result is that the sentiment in favour of nationality has decreased in proportion as the opinion gains ground that the six or seven leading nations of the world can best administer just laws and preserve order. The belief is growing that the extension of Empire will be coeval with the dawn of universal peace. Confederation will prove better than faction. The powers of common government may be gradually extended, and the relative importance of the Governments of the subject States may in the same proportion be gradually reduced.

A mere alliance for a limited time does not result in the formation of any important common organ of government. But in Canada and in the United States a confederate union of States has tended to become permanent. The boon conferred by such a confederacy has been continuity in home legislation and strength in foreign relations. This desirable consummation has been gained, however, only where those States have formed a common Council and Supervising Senate, and where there has been management of military forces under one strong hand. Progress in national life has always resulted from the combination of social and political forces under one wise sovereign power. The proof of this is seen to-day in the great advance-

ment made by a united Italy and a united Germany.

It may be difficult to mark the definite point of time at which unity predominates over plurality and the aggregate of States becomes in reality an Empire. This must be left to the instincts of the people and the judgment of politicians. Lord Beaconsfield seemed to recognise the psychological moment when India was ready to include herself within our Imperial unity. The cessation of the South African war has given pause to our British Colonies to consider how they may better tighten the ties which already bind the Empire. Although our Imperial expansion has been marked by some serious faults and by ignorance of the real needs of subject States, yet, on the whole, Britain has shown a sincere desire for the highest welfare of every race that she governs. "We have, with whatever mistakes and misunderstandings, striven to raise our subjects to a higher type of life. The India of to-day is a monument of lofty policy to which I know no parallel; and the loyal offers of help from Indian princes, Hindu and Moham-medan, in our present need may well fill our hearts with gratitude. We may have learned our lesson slowly, but we have learned and are learning still, that the sign of Empire for nations, as for men, is not self-assertion but self-sacrifice."¹

The ideal of an Empire and the conditions of its progress are with growing experience becoming

¹ Bishop Westcott, *The Obligations of Empire*, p. 7.

more clear to us. Its ultimate aim must be to further the highest welfare and the relative completeness of the various peoples included within it. We must seek to bestow upon every portion of the Empire, as soon as it is ready for it, the full wealth of our own political and social life.¹ We should be careful to evoke every good feature in their character as fellow-workers with us towards a common end. There must be no attempt at assimilation to our political forms of government; but we should strive to the uttermost to help them to fulfil their destiny, and to occupy effectively the place for which their Creator designed them. Further, with respect to the heathen races, we must take up "the white man's burden," must give them good government, maintain order, and provide for them an efficient system of education. And if the Civil Power may not do it, yet the Christian Churches of Great Britain will not have discharged their duty until they also send to those heathen races the Gospel which calls them into the great spiritual heritage of Christianity. For without doubt the idea of the holy Catholic Church involves the Imperial idea, and points to

¹This thought is eloquently developed by Prof. Seeley in the *Expansion of England*, Lecture 3, in which he contrasts the colonisation of the Greek States with that of Modern European nations, and shows how we mean by "Greater Britain" an enlargement of the English State and not simply of English nationality. Greater Britain is a real enlargement of the English State, and not merely another addition to the English-speaking race. "We call it," says Prof. Seeley, "for want of a better word, Empire."

the time when "all the nations of the earth shall be blessed". Here the Government and the Churches may well co-operate, since the conditions of political and spiritual progress among these races are identical.

III.

The State being thus based on nationality not less than on the common good—or at least implying a nationality as well as a defined territory—we should expect that the nation and the State would be co-extensive. But this we have seen is not the actual case, and many nationalities are now embraced in such States as India and the United States of America. Whether or not it be possible in these days to arrive at a great confederation of the civilised nations, certainly such a confederation will only be for certain purposes of peace or commerce, and will not constitute a true State. Indeed, there may be a danger in the attempt to bring about such a consummation, unless it be the result of those Christian principles and aims which are to precede the final millennium. We remember how in Europe Napoleon attempted the creation of "La grande Nation," and in his efforts so overlooked and ignored all national individuality that he produced a reactionary tendency in favour of nationality. In Germany the sentiment of nationality became triumphant and swept everything before it, until now, under the leadership of the King of Prussia, the States have become a powerful German Empire. Belgium,

too, was erected into a kingdom as a buffer State between France and Holland ; while in Holland and Denmark the feeling of nationality was greatly intensified by the war of liberation.

This revival of nationality, however, led to an exaggeration, and resulted in a policy which gave the principle too much weight.

It is possible to magnify the value of small nations and to forget that, in these days of huge armaments and of world-wide policies, it is scarcely possible for a small nation, such as Greece and Portugal, or for small States like Servia and Montenegro, to exist unless under the protection of a powerful nation that has a voice among the great powers of Europe. At present there is a reaction in favour of internationality, which is necessary to help us to maintain peace and to promote the general well-being of humanity. With the twentieth century has come a more cosmopolitan spirit, which favours political confederation and friendly relations with every nation throughout the wide world. Our trade relations and economic laws have taught us that the welfare of each means the welfare of all.

Our Foreign Missions, which are the outcome of the mind of Christ in the Church, have also contributed to create this spirit. The missionary has been the pioneer of commerce and of trade ; he has penetrated to the heart of Africa and won the esteem and confidence of the tribes. Where he has gone, there mainly a British sphere of influence has been erected. The flag of England

has been hoisted, and trade has followed the flag.

Thus we have come to feel that the maintenance of its own national individuality and the cultivation of its own gifts are not the only ends which a nation has to serve. Its God-given mission is not fulfilled by the assertion of its peculiar customs, traditions and laws. The task imposed upon a nation by the Creator is to civilise and culture its people, and to develop their gifts in order to make it an organisation which shall work for the good of the whole world. A nation, like the individuals which compose it, can reach its true end only by the perfecting of its latent capacities in the interests of the highest human welfare. Its real end is to carry forward towards fulfilment the eternal purpose of God throughout the universe.

IV.

It is impossible for us logically to determine what is an ideal constitution until we understand what are the proper functions and work of the Government. For many centuries controversy occupied itself almost entirely with the discussion of the form which the constitution should assume. Was it to be monarchic or republican, or some compromise between them? We still go back with interest, and study the politics of Greece and Rome, and learn much from the comparisons instituted between their forms.

But in our days the centre of interest has

passed over to the other great question, from the inquiry as to the structure or constitution to that which relates to the functions of Government. It is not easy to decide which of those main divisions of political speculation should be first considered. A good deal may be said on each side. The writers of the time of the Reformation and the Revolution would have said that it is impossible to know what a Government can *do*, or what duties belong to it, until first it is known what *power* it has to effect its decrees, and whether the power lies in the hands of the kings, lords or commons. On the other hand, it may be argued with much logical force that one cannot know the right constitution until one has made up his mind as to the duties of the Government. For, even in considering the benefits which attach to Government by one strong ruler and to Government by popular representatives, we are practically considering which is the better instrument for performing the functions of Government, and carrying on the work of the State. That question can be settled only by the answer to the other question—What are the duties of Government? What are its internal functions within the State, and what are its international duties to those outside? ¹

As a proof that the question of the constitution was thought the more important by our forefathers, we find that this was the line of cleavage between political parties in former times: in Rome between

¹ Cf. Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, p. 17; Hume, *Moral and Political Essays*, Pt. I., Essay V.

the Plebs and Patricians; in Italy between the Guelphs and the Ghibilines; in England between Liberals and Conservatives, between Home Rulers and Unionists. The whole history of Party Government is the story of attempts to maintain the old form of constitution or to change it.

To-day these lines of demarcation are fading out. The spirit of socialism has raised another question of vast importance to the interests of the people. The problem that demands solution to-day is one which is involved in the question—What duties should the State undertake? Should it undertake paternal duties and aim at the maximum of interference with the individual? Or should it leave individuals as much as possible to provide for their own welfare? If in past ages men considered what should be the form of the Government, to-day their main interest is centred in discussing the breadth of the sphere of its operations. The people are asking, not—What should the Government be? but—What should the Government do? Shall it be content with the minimum of service? or shall it not increase its functions?

Our definition of the State as an organised unity for the general welfare of humanity compels us to take the latter view. The State is not constituted merely for the purpose of protecting men in the exercise of their natural rights and in their property.¹ The policeman theory of the State must give way to a new and better conception of the

¹ Cf. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, pp. 23, 25.

duties of Government. On the other hand, the extremely socialistic idea of the State which would interfere continually with the individual initiative and private effort is a most undesirable extreme, and would probably lead to the extinction of all individual enterprise. Only such primary relations as lie within the organising of the State can be made the subject of legislation. But those duties and services which belong entirely to the personal life of the intelligent citizen should not be brought within the scope of legislative enactment. Were the State, as in Plato's Republic, to interfere in the free choice of affection which precedes marriage, such interference would be intolerable; or were the Government to prescribe to each man his trade or profession, that would be very unfair to the freedom of initiative under which every man, knowing his aptitudes, follows the line of his instincts and desires. All such individual activities are best left outside the area of governmental control. The State must not interfere with a man's choice of his wife, of his profession, or of his theology. But on the other hand, all those human relations and duties which concern the welfare of society and the omission of which would be detrimental to the common weal, are certainly matter for legislative interference. The distinction is one which is broadly drawn; therefore, it is difficult to say where the individual freedom may not impinge upon the social welfare, or where the rights of society may not interfere and injure the claims of the individual. The wisdom of the Government

must be continually exercised upon this problem, and without doubt the line of division will not be a fixed one. The area that society claims to supervise and to bring under legislative control is one which will be continually growing as the reintegration of society proceeds. The individualistic basis of society will certainly never be overthrown ; but the undeniable evils of *laissez faire* will be counteracted by the conceptions of the State which to-day prevail. What we must aim at is a scheme of State control wide enough to include the direction and regulation of those conflicting industrial forces which every now and then produce an upheaval of the social fabric, and threaten to undermine both the basis of Government and the well-being of society.

On one point all parties are agreed. The duties of Government are administrative, legislative and judicial. These functions of Government are found, in one shape or other, in the most primitive communities. Among uncivilised races they may exist in rudimentary forms, and may not be clearly distinguished from each other. But as nations progress, these duties come to be performed by separate individuals or bodies ; and the executive is carefully kept apart from the Legislature and the Bench.

Nothing is of more importance to the State than the sure administration of judicial functions. The stability of society depends upon it ; for if a suspicion be created throughout the community that the judgment of the Courts of Justice is

prejudiced by favour, or bribes, or intimidation, it fosters a desire to corrupt the judge, and the disease spreads like a cancer through the community. If the foundations of justice be poisoned, the corruption soon manifests itself in all the strata of society, and public morality rapidly deteriorates. Personal rights are in imminent danger, and liberty is undermined. No effort on the part of the executive of the State should be spared to preserve both our Legislature and our Courts of Justice from the least suspicion of contamination. This superiority to suspicion is the best mark of the progress made by a nation in civilisation. The absence of it in Turkey gives her the lowest place in the rank of civilised communities in Europe. The nation that reaches the highest water-mark in her Courts of Justice is entitled to claim the premier place among civilised peoples.

But it is impossible for the executive to fulfil its function unless it be invested with the power of coercion. A ruler who cannot compel obedience, a State which cannot enforce its laws, would very soon lose the respect of the citizens. Therefore application of force is a *sine quâ non* of every executive. The policeman's baton is its symbol at home. Against foreign foes and disturbers of the peace it is now big guns and battalions that enforce the will of the State. Every executive has behind it the power to coerce, to fine, to imprison, to banish, or in the last resort to deprive of life itself.

In our country the supreme administrative function of the Government is exercised by those whom the King invites to form a Government—the Cabinet Ministers. The legislative function is discharged by the two Houses of Parliament. The expounding and administration of the laws are in the hands of the judges of the land, assisted by the magistrates and police.¹ And for the discharge of these separate functions the possession of the power to enforce obedience by means of punishment is absolutely necessary. Justice must be done; and the enforcement of justice, not less than the protection of citizens, necessitates punishment. This solemn duty belongs to the judge; and in discharging it within the sanctuary of justice, he may be properly described as the priest of the State. The decisions of judges are the most solemn acts of public or civil life. No other acts demand such dignity, impartiality, and the total absence of prejudice.

The purpose of punishment by the civil power is primarily the infliction of a penalty proportionate

¹ Paley very clearly states the reason why the administration of justice should never be in the hands of the Legislature: "The first maxim of a free State is, that the laws be made by one set of men and administered by another; in other words, that the legislative and judicial characters be kept separate. When these offices are united in the same person or assembly, particular laws are made for particular cases, springing oftentimes from partial motives, and directed to private ends: whilst they are kept separate, general laws are made by one body of men, without foreseeing whom they may affect; and, when made, must be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will." (*Moral and Political Philosophy*, chap. viii.)

to the offence. Justice must be administered ; the law must be upheld, and its authority vindicated. The crime must be made to react upon the criminal, in order that he may see and realise the evil consequences of his deed. This view of punishment has always prevailed, even among uncivilised peoples. It is in accordance with the natural instincts of justice. The humanitarian sentiments of the present century, however, are opposed to it, and are in favour of either the preventive or the educative theory. Many now abjure retribution and keep *nemesis* out of sight. They maintain that retribution is unchristian, and is nothing less than the State taking its revenge upon the criminal for the indignity done to its constitution.²

This is an error full of very serious consequences, and it is a total misconception of the aim of civil punishment. It ignores the fact that a sentence imposed by a judge in vindication of the law of the land has in it no element of revenge. The judge decrees against the prisoner simply the punishment which his crime deserves. The culprit has earned the wages of sin, and he receives what he has earned. Were he to escape the infliction of punishment, and his crime to pass scathless, every right-minded person would feel that the law had been defied, and that the sanctity and dignity of justice had been outraged. Law must

¹ Cf. Kant, *Philosophy of Law*, p. 194.

² J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, chap. v. ; Sir J. F. Stephens's *General View of the Criminal Law*, chap. iv. For a different view cf. Sidgwick, *Ethics of Politics*, p. 110.

speak with a Categorical Imperative. It does not recommend; it commands. Of necessity it attaches penalties to all violations of it. The laws of a nation are not moral commandments subject to qualification. They are absolute; and every citizen is bound to obey them, unless he is prepared to pay the penalty of disobedience. They react and recoil upon the perpetrator, and their first aim is to make him realise his guilt.

But this purpose is not inconsistent with other secondary aims, which may be justly combined with it, if it be found that they do not render this primary object nugatory.¹

It is in this same connection that we find the necessity for, and justification of, capital punishment. This subject is one which has for many years aroused against itself a great amount of popular antipathy proceeding from the humanitarian sentiment of the age. It has been construed by many as nothing better than blood revenge. But this view arises from a false sentiment, and proceeds upon an erroneous conception of the origin of justice and of the value of life.² The Divine law is expressed in the words, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made He man" (Gen. ix. 6). That law is one which, given in the very morning of history, continued to prevail throughout the whole Old Testament period. It

¹ Cf. Dorner, *Christian Ethics*, § 77; Carlyle's *Latter Day Pamphlets*, No. 2; Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Essay I.

² Cf. Lecky, *History of Europ. Morals*, i., pp. 135, 136.

is implied in various texts in the New Testament, and in the words of Christ it is restated, "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matt. xxvi. 52).

On this point civil law corresponds with the teaching of Scripture. It regards life as man's first right, and the preservation of life as its primary duty. Because the taking away of life is the maximum wrong, the penalty attached to murder is the maximum punishment. There can be no greater outrage on society; and the State deems it right to visit this crime with the punishment we call capital. "Since life is the whole compass of being, punishment for taking this away cannot consist in the loss of that which is of non-equivalent value, but only in the deprivation of life."¹ It may seem to be a barbarous thing—Schleiermacher has used this word—to take from any one this precious gift. But we defend capital punishment only in the case of wilful murder; and the murderer is one who by his intention and act has committed this most heinous crime against another, and has thereby in the eye of society and of God forfeited his right to live. "There is," says Kant, "no equality between the crime of murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the criminal. This ought to be done, that every one may realise the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people. Otherwise they might all be

¹ Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 345; cf. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, v., pp. 278-81; Martensen, *Social Ethics*, p. 180.

regarded as participators in the murder as a public violation of justice.”¹

Where the moral sense in the criminal is alive, the justice of the sentence of death for murder has been acknowledged even by him before execution. And cases are on record where the capital sentence has been desired on the part of the murderer, on the ground that he can only in this way make atonement for his crime. Were the purpose of punishment only reformatory, capital punishment might be superseded by banishment, or by imprisonment for life. Or were its end, as Paley maintains, to deter others from crime and to protect the State from criminals, then imprisonment with hard labour might be sufficient.² Yet in those lands where abolition has been tried as an experiment, it has been found to favour crime and to increase it ; and in some of them there has been a return to capital punishment.

From the method by which the sentence is carried out all features of barbarity should be removed. In the United States the criminal is executed by means of electricity. In England the execution is no longer in public. And to all criminals the aid of religion is offered to prepare them for their end and to bring them to a state of repentance.

At the same time, no means should be spared to make the sentence of death have as deterrent an effect as possible. The Newspaper Press of our

¹ Kant's *Philosophy of Law*, p. 198.

² *Moral and Pol. Phil.*, book vi., chap. ix.

land has generally done its duty here in an excellent spirit. In criminal trials it has emphasised the justice of the sentence of death in a way fitted to bring home to our people their own responsibility for crime, and so to awaken in them sorrow and revulsion. For it must not be forgotten that we are all, to a certain extent, the partakers in the guilt of a crime which our carelessness respecting the criminal's education may have fostered, or which our evil example may have helped to make appear less heinous in his eyes. Society is not without responsibility for the existence of its criminals; and the fact of our being to this extent involved in the crime of the felon should be emphasised by the teachers of morals.

Besides vindicating the authority which has been violated, the judge may well seek to mingle with justice a deterring element. The infliction of punishment has a secondary purpose: it exhibits the majesty of law in such a way as to deter others from the commission of crime. Christian zeal will also seek to make use of the term of imprisonment for the moral improvement of the criminal; but this cannot be said to be a necessary element in the administration of justice.

Justice must prevail in the State; herein lies the necessity of punishment. The judge is the vicegerent of God, whose command it is that righteousness shall prevail and that evil shall be overcome. The infliction of punishment is not a derived right; it does not arise from the tacit consent of the people, nor is it inherent in the

executive. It is a duty laid upon rulers for the vindication of justice throughout the world. It cannot therefore be said to be a usurpation of the Divine prerogative when men pass judgment on their fellow-creatures and enforce that judgment by fine or imprisonment. It is a service owed to justice, both human and Divine. It is the carrying out to its full extent, not of the wish of man, but of the will of God.

Which moral offences shall be held by the State to constitute crimes will be determined by the judgment of the rulers and by the condition of progress to which the people have attained. All sins against the moral law cannot be made penal. The civil law can take notice only of such offences as can be proved to be against the general well-being of the community. There are some even of the Ten Commandments, such as the Fifth and the Tenth, of the violation of which the State takes no cognisance. These Commandments have reference to emotions and desires so subjective as to be beyond the rough handling of the civil prosecutors. Further, the infringement of them mainly injures the offender by the blunting of his conscience and the degradation of his moral nature. For this reason it is deemed better to have no statute against the taking of God's Name in vain; public sentiment sufficiently condemns the swearer to moral ignominy. It would be impossible to inflict punishment for such a sin without injuring religion more than helping it. It is best to leave it to be repressed by moral and

spiritual education, and by the growth of the sentiment of reverence. A man who swears aloud, however, in a church, for example, and offends the reverence of the congregation, might be properly punished at the hand of the civil law; but the crime would probably be classified under "breach of peace," and not scheduled as a breach of the Third Commandment.

This question of the limits of civil penalty introduces us to a much wider subject which at present divides political parties—the question of State interference. How far should Government go in the way of regulating trade, of inspecting factories and mines, of restricting certain manufactures, of promoting the virtues of thrift and economy by Savings Banks, etc.? The marginal line is drawn tightly by some at the individualistic minimum. By others State intervention is widened out to embrace a far broader area of human affairs. This subject will occupy the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

STATE INTERVENTION.

IN considering the functions of Government, one of the most burning questions of the present time is the extent to which Government may interfere with the liberty of the subject and the general affairs of individuals. Widely different views are entertained on this question.

1. We have said already that the State is a society whose authority is that of the whole over its parts, and whose true function is to mediate and fulfil the personal life of the citizen. The measure of its power is found in the ethical value which the State possesses as the vehicle of the personal life of the citizens. If this ultimate sanction rested on any other basis, such as force, then the State would be an assumption, a sovereignty of coercion which would be an infraction of free personality. But all that the State can impose on any citizen is simply the outward expression of his obedience. It cannot force the chamber of his desires; it has no power to regulate his feelings or to dictate his motives. When it requires him to be honest, peaceful and loyal, it requires merely the outward demeanour which is consistent with these virtues. But it cannot com-

pel a change of heart in the dishonest scoundrel, provided he abstain from acts of theft. It cannot convert the drunkard into a lover of temperance, though it can restrain him from committing a breach of the peace. It may employ the school-master and the Christian pastor to give the instruction and use the means which may bring about these desirable ends. Still, the limits of the State prevent it from going beyond these appeals to the individual conscience.¹ It remains for the citizen to make himself loyal, and to add to the outward homage of compliance with the Statute Book the inner homage of a loving obedience. But in all this there is no infraction of the rights of personality. The inward disposition may or may not correspond with the outward life of the law-abiding citizen. What the State does is to say: "There must be no crime committed although at heart you are a criminal. You may be a dishonest man, but I shall restrain you from committing the outward act of theft."

Many writers have expressed a great jealousy of this power of the State. One does not wonder at it, considering how often political power has run into the opposite extremes of despotism or of anarchy, the tyranny of the one strong man, or the tyranny of the mob.

Despotism allows no liberty to the individual. Anarchy is the very apotheosis of individualism.

¹ Sheldon Amos, *Science of Law*, p. 43.

It is the insanity of freedom. It is not liberty but licence. Usually it ends in teaching such a lesson of the value of order and government as to create a reaction and make society seek the strong hand of a Cromwell or of a Napoleon to take the helm of the State and guide it out of its dangers. These two extremes have frightened men and made them extremely jealous of the power of the State. There is no doubt also that the use of the word "State Intervention" has increased this jealous tendency, and that they have in consequence sought to confine its function merely to the duty of protecting certain personal rights. Consequently they would as far as possible let people manage their affairs in their own way so long as they do no mischief to others. Individualists have strongly advanced the doctrine that the first and only duty of the State is to maintain peace and enforce contracts.

But that this view is utterly inadequate for the present stage of civilisation may be easily shown. In the earliest stages of a nation's life the State may be spoken of as an arbitrary arrangement between the ruler and the ruled, by which the former is to observe the customs then prevailing. But this stage soon gives place to a higher one in which there is advance from mere custom and contract to legislation. Modern progress could not exist apart from the unceasing activity of legislation and the intervention of the State with many spheres of social life. It is possible to do this without passing into the other extreme and

setting up a system of what has been called "Socialistic State Management".

The principle of *laissez faire* and of contract in these days of unrestrained competition soon comes to defeat itself. It was no doubt the principle of the manufacturers of the nineteenth century. But a society founded simply on the free competitions of commerce, the State merely policing it, protecting its property, and guaranteeing enforcement of bargains, very quickly ends in the tyrannical reign of capital and the enslavement of the hand-workers. It did so in the case of the British coal mines and cotton manufactures. It still tends to do so. If new legislation and State intervention do not prevent it, we shall ere long see vast moneyed Trusts and Steamship and Railway "Combines" throttling all free trade, and ruining all traders who do not give way and join the capitalists as subordinates or as hired workmen. These combinations have shown that they have the will no less than the tendency to extinguish all competition, and drive the small shopkeeper and manufacturer out of the trade. Did *laissez faire* prevail to-day, Britain and America would be helpless in the hands of Rings and Trusts. It may be suitable for the early stages of civilisation; though even then it will prevail only because of the less articulated condition of commercial and political organisation and the prevailing spirit of individualism.

But whenever a people become conscious of the place they are to fill in history, whenever the spirit of progress seizes them, and they desire to

bring to realisation their highest ideals of political life, then they demand that the due functions of the State shall be performed, and that social needs and political organisations shall be adjusted. The policeman theory of the State no longer suffices.¹ It is not enough that Government, "like a night watchman" (as the Socialist Lassalle said), merely protect us against thieves. The State is, in Milton's words, one huge Christian personage, one mighty growth or stature of an honest man. It is more than an aggregate of individual proprietors and merchants, caring only for goods and stability of contract. It is a unity whose end is the development of its own life, the relation of whose individual members to the State is not accidental but essential, and in which all change takes place by growth of the vital principle from within. These inward changes of the State organism demand corresponding outward adjustments; and if no room is to be made for growth and progress, the result will be friction, collision, and probably revolution.

2. The opposite extreme from *laissez faire* is that which has been called "Grandmotherly Legislation," or the paternal view of State intervention. At the present time it has been developed under the influence of Socialistic tendencies into a thorough-going system of State control over the

¹ Carlyle's phrase in *Sartor Resartus*, p. 161, "the State shrunken into a Police Office straitened to get its pay," refers to this ignoble conception of the nature of the State.

principles of free contract, as well as over economic production.¹

It is not easy to define what Socialism is, for under it are vaguely included many shades of political opinion and of economic theory. Besides, Socialists differ among themselves, and include many who are extreme Communists, as well as those who seek to reduce any excessive inequalities in the distribution of property. Between these two extremes are found some who desire that the State should become a joint-owner of property, and should abolish all private proprietorship. Of these some would be content with the nationalisation of land, while others would go on to nationalise all the instruments of production. Again, among these other differences are found. One party would confiscate all land without compensation to the landowner, and would divide it equally amongst citizens; and as the equality would very soon cease, through thrift and diligence making some wealthier than others, they would insist on a re-division every four or five years, or even annually, so as to prevent the growth of new inequalities. Another party would simply buy out the landlords, and endeavour, by the imposition of death-duties and a graded income-tax, to prevent the accumulation of large wealth in the hands of a few. But the feature common to all is the desire to invoke the strong arm of the law in order to redress inequalities and to save individuals from the conse-

¹ Rae, *Contemporary Socialism*, chap. ii.

quences of their own acts. Compulsory Education, Old Age Pensions, Local Option all partake to a certain extent of the characteristics of Socialism. Since the individual has been found unable to protect his own interests and to guard against poverty, Socialists would make the State his guardian. But this is an effort to escape from the condition in which each man fights for his own hand, and to put in its place an organised co-operation for existence.¹ Socialism would substitute joint-proprietorship and joint effort for individual ownership and individual labour.

In all this one can see that the end in view may be most virtuous and honourable, while the method by which it is to be realised is purely political. We are in these days more and more inclined to invoke the authority of the State in order to help us to carry on good work. Men have come to think that in matters affecting the whole community the Government of the country can no longer abide by its *laissez-faire* policy, but must aid Christian effort by energetic co-operation. Thus it will be seen that Socialism, though in its aim only a scheme for social betterment, in its methods of operation appeals to State authority, and always tends to become a political organisation. It is not content with merely asking the State to confirm the rules of association or Trades Union regulations which workmen may make among themselves, or to grant its imprimatur to arrange-

¹ Cf. Prof. Flint, *Socialism*, p. 15; Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, chaps. vi. and vii.

ments made by the citizens, etc., for the education of the young or the care of the poor ; but it insists on getting the authority of the State to compel citizens to do these things. It would attain its objects by the compulsory powers of legislative enactment and so make the principles universal in their application. The result of this Collectivism would be that the individual would cease to have importance or freedom and be entirely absorbed in the State.

No doubt one extreme is just the natural reaction from the other. In former days the rights of the individual were too strongly affirmed and maintained. The swing of the political pendulum has now carried many to the other side. Nothing less will satisfy the Socialist than State ownership of land and of the instruments of production. Free contract must be abolished ; tenants must be prohibited from contracting out of the provisions made in their favour.¹ We are threatened with a new era of government under which, in our revolt from the untrammelled liberty of the *laissez-faire* policy, we are urged to run into the opposite extreme of nationalising the land and all the means of production. Government intervention is to put a stop to all commercial competition, and the anarchy of individualism is to be supplanted by the drastic methods of Collectivism. All will have the same rights, the same liberties, the same possessions and privileges. The distinctions of rich and poor

¹ Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, i., p. 27.

will vanish, because none can then be poor, and there is no cause for a man desiring to accumulate wealth. Thrift will be needless, for society will be one household and brotherhood in which all will be cared for : the whole community becomes the capitalist, and will provide food, houses, and equality of opportunity for all.

Men have always been fond of drawing attractive pictures of Utopia. Plato long ago indulged in this kind of dreaming ; and no one can read the delightful talks between Socrates and his interlocutors in the 7th and 8th Books of the *Republic*, or study the Protagoras, without being charmed with the ideal picture of a Greek State there presented. We have had many Utopias since, including Sir Thomas More's and Lord Bacon's, which their authors hoped might be realised amid idyllic scenes of restful quiet and far away from all the fuss and trouble of competition and contract.¹ They are worthy of the attention of social reformers and of practical politicians in so far as they may contribute some little help towards the solution of the social problems that press upon us at the present time.

3. But the solution of these difficult questions will not be found in either Individualism or Collectivism. All such activities as are primarily personal should be left to individual freedom and should be outside the purview of the State ; while on the other hand, those duties which are

¹ Kaufmann, *Utopias*, chap. i. Cf. also Fenelon's *Télémaque* and Morris' *News from Nowhere*.

directly social and have an immediate bearing on the general welfare, are fit subjects for legislation. It is not necessary for the State to become proprietor of all factories in order to punish a mill-owner for having a dangerous driving-belt unprotected. The State may not nationalise the land, and yet may pass a Crofters' Act to entitle a crofter who has converted the virgin soil and wild heath into arable land to occupy his croft long enough to repay him. It is not easy to draw the line where individual acts end and social welfare begins. The marking of that line will be the crux of all coming legislation, and will test the skill of our future Governments.¹ It is a question of detail, the answer to which will be determined by the stage of development which the nation has reached. The days of entire freedom of contract are over.

The old order changeth yielding place to new ;
And God fulfils Himself in many ways
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.

What changes lie before us in the future we do not know. But we do not think that in our progress from *laissez faire* it is necessary to rush into such extremes as are pictured in Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, or in the *Merrie England* of Mr. Blatchford. Neither in the extreme of Individualism nor in that of Socialism will the solution of the problem be found. The one logi-

¹ Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-68.

cally leads in politics to Atomism, which again can end only in Anarchism. The other probably would develop, as it did a century ago in France, into a Military Despotism which would deprive the individual of his freedom and of the ethical prerogative of self-government.

Fortunately these extremes do not exhaust the possibilities of State control. "Autonomy is of the essence of the moral life, and it is essentially a personal life." The only workable solution must be one in which the personal life is not lost in the political, but in which the sovereign power of the State gains the willing loyalty of the individual citizen.

Now this solution is found in the view we have taken of the State as an organised community. It is not found in any of those compromises which have been proposed both by Individualists and Socialists. There are some who would urge as a compromise that the State should avoid all interference with economics, and that its intervention should be made only for such moral ends as the care of the poor, the helping of legislation, or the promotion of temperance. Others again would endeavour to find common ground by excluding freedom of contract and the provision of life-necessaries from Government control. But none of these methods meets the requirements of the case. The only safe solution of the problem is that which recognises both sides and gives full justice to the State and the individual. These two are organically related; for in truth there is

no stable institution to be found that is not at once socialistic and individualistic.¹

Every political party, every ecclesiastical sect, every literary club possesses these essential relations; and were either to be extruded, the society would fall to pieces. A review of the past history of Great Britain assures us that the legislative effort to find a proper adjustment between society and its parts will never cease. The State and the individual must live in unity. For apart from the community the citizen can never reach his full maturity of experience and usefulness; and apart from the individual citizen the State cannot be said to have any real existence. The one cannot thrive without the other. They resemble the centrifugal and centripetal forces of nature which keep the world in balance and maintain the established order of things. If they work in unison, the health of the State will be promoted and the liberty of the individual will be conserved. We shall then have an ideal condition of things, in which the relations of the individual and State are so wisely adjusted that, while the citizen enjoys full liberty and receives everything necessary for the development of his powers,² the State also will maintain its sovereignty, and guard itself against all the disintegrating forces of anarchy and revolution.

¹ Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, chap. x.

² Cf. Prof. Bosanquet, *Fundamental Theory of the State*, chap. vi.

CHAPTER IX.

CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL AUTHORITY.

OUR position as Christian citizens within the State prescribes the duty of obedience to the Government. This civil virtue will manifest itself in compliance with the laws of the State, and in a willingness to take part in the defence of our country. At the same time our relation to the laws and the Government compels us to consider what is the best kind of political constitution, and whether one type is more favourable than another to Christian Morality.

I.

In the Old Testament we find that the first form which the State assumed when Israel became a nation was a theocracy, in which God was ruler and was represented by vicegerents such as Moses and Joshua. At certain crises, when the people had rebelled against God and had turned to idolatry, judges were appointed. They were men of strong character, military despots administering the law with a strong hand, under whom, however, the people enjoyed the blessings of order and good government. Family and tribal life remained the basis of civil society. A firm consciousness of theocratic government was manifested; and at two great gatherings of the people Joshua sought

to quicken this feeling and to repress idolatry.¹ In this system of theocratic rule, however, the Divine kingship expressed not God's general relation towards the world as Creator, but only His special relation to the elect people. He was the source of all political and ecclesiastical power, and civil laws were simply the expression of His will. The prophet or judge was His deputy. This was the reason why Gideon, when offered a throne by the people, declined the proffered honour with the words, "Jehovah shall rule over you". The law-book of the people was the Thorah, in which the life of the nation was set forth in conformity with the civil and ceremonial regulations. These were the forms in which a citizen was to manifest his civil obedience, a virtue which formed an essential element of his religion. Church and State were indissolubly bound together; and the political life of the nation was not separated from its religious conduct. The whole aim of the Hebrew State was "to realise in its national life the main features of the Divine order of things".²

It is very singular that in the book of Deuteronomy (chap. xvii. 14-19) we find what is nothing less than the constitution of a State, as if from the beginning Moses himself had contemplated the probability of such being needed when the people got settled in Canaan: "When thou art come unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possess it, and shalt dwell therein, and

¹ Oehler, *Theology of Old Testament*, § 91.

² Schultz, *Old Testament Theology*, vol. i., p. 138.

shalt say, 'I will set a king over me, like as all the nations that are round about me; thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose. . . .' Only he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses: forasmuch as the Lord hath said unto you, 'Ye shall henceforth return no more that way'. Neither shall he multiply wives unto himself, that his heart turn not away. . . . And it shall be, when he sitteth upon the throne of his kingdom, that he shall write him a copy of this law in a book: . . . and it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life: that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes, to do them." If we adopt the views of the great majority of modern critics, we shall see in this chapter a transference to the Mosaic era of the constitution of the kingdom which was known to the period of the exile. This seems to explain the total absence in any other of the Mosaic writings of such a constitution being contemplated, not less than the very distinctly expressed resolution of both Gideon and Samuel to oppose any attempt to set up a monarchy. And when at last Samuel unwillingly yields to the popular cry for a king to lead the people to battle, he seems to have no knowledge of this constitution laid down in the book of Deuteronomy.¹

¹ Cf. Prof. G. A. Smith's *Modern Criticism*, Lect. V.; also Driver, *Introduction to Lit. of Old Testament*, p. 82, 3rd edition.

But the danger of invasion, ever near to a land that lay adjacent to the great empires of Egypt and Assyria, made the people desire a monarch : and under Saul, who was the choice of the nation, and with Divine sanction at last given, the monarchy was constituted. The kingly office, though at first apparently confined to military and civil duties, came to be regarded as a religious function, and the king's power and wisdom are in many parts of the Old Testament extolled as God's best gifts to the nation. The theocratic king reflects the majesty and power of Jehovah, and his authority is derived entirely from God.¹ He is at first invested with priestly functions : and not until the post-exilic times are these functions confined to the priesthood. In the divided kingdom that followed the death of Solomon the monarchs as a rule were irreligious men, and there is no trace of popular confidence being reposed in them. But down to the close of the Old Testament history the people clung to the promise that the kingdom would not depart from the House of David, and that out of the Davidic stock would come the future conqueror, the true king of God's Israel.

In the period that elapsed between the times of the Old and the New Testament, the High Priesthood seems to have taken the place of honour and leading which formerly belonged to the kings. Some of those men by their force of character were indeed true priest-kings and lofty examples of patriotism.

¹ Oehler, *Theology of Old Testament*, § 178.

When we enter the sphere of the New Testament, we find that from the lips of Christ there falls no systematic teaching in regard to the constitution of the State. He Himself refused to be called an earthly king, and he abjured all pretensions to the throne of the Cæsars.¹ He frowned upon any attempt on the part of His followers to create a popular rising in His favour; and we find from Him no denial of the sovereign rights of the Roman Emperor who had conquered Palestine and was administering law and order in it. When His enemies sought to entice Him into some expression of antagonism to the Roman Emperor, His reply was in the well-known words: "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's; and unto God the things that are God's" (Matt. xxii. 21).

But this reply does not enunciate a principle, beyond affirming that if the Jews accepted and made use of the Emperor's coins, they virtually thereby acknowledged that the independence of their country was gone, and that in secular matters Cæsar was supreme. If Cæsar's coinage was current in Palestine, and he was thus accepted as ruler, then they were bound to pay him their taxes for the maintenance of law and order. But, on the other hand, if that implication were not admitted, no inference can be drawn from the words as to the sovereign rights of the emperor. What the reply of Christ seems to settle is that in all

¹ John vi., xv., and xviii. 37.

threatened collisions between the secular power and the Church, there should be on the part of Christians an earnest attempt to recognise the obligations pertaining to both spheres, and to prevent the outbreak of any antagonism between them. Moreover, the manner of the reply and the effect upon his interlocutors show that the answer was intended to rebuke them for their attempt at entanglement, and above all to emphasise the duty of rendering to God the things that were God's. Clearly, in the answer there is no preference given to any form of Government, much less any admission of the rights of a tyrant to subject the province of Judea to his domination.

In one instance we know that Jesus submitted to the payment of the tax or Temple rate paid by every male in Israel. The payment of this tax had been a disputed point, and the cause of much quarrelling between the Pharisees and Sadducees, and Christ's reply is conceived in the spirit that would give no offence to tender consciences. The passage gives practically no political teaching. The tax being a Temple tax or Church rate, the whole incident furnishes an illustration rather of readiness to pay tithes than State taxes. Its real lesson is to furnish an exhibition of the spirit proper to the higher law of love that will do nothing to cause a weak brother to stumble.

Both Socialists and Anarchists have claimed that their theories on this question have the support of the teaching of Jesus. But so far as we can gather from His own words, and from the

repeated instruction which He gave to His followers, Jesus favoured neither Socialism nor Anarchism, neither empire nor republic. Most of the great religious teachers and philosophers of Asia and Europe have been tempted to do so. Confucius and Mahomet both were guilty of introducing politics into the religion they taught, and the latter made his doctrine a political creed. But with the passing of the centuries and the progress of mankind, the political side of all these religions has been found to be too narrow ; it has become a Nessus' garment, an intolerable framework, to which progressive society can no longer adjust itself. Brahmanism by its deep and impassable lines of caste tends to create a polity and a system of Government which represses all healthy ambition, and for ever fixes the social position of men within its borders.

But Jesus refused to become politician or constitution-maker. He was content to reveal the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Grace, and would leave it to the wants and wishes of each race to determine the details and framework of their political constitution. Whatever be the form which the Government assumes, that is a Christian State in which justice is strictly administered, in which truth is taught, and in which rulers and ruled endeavour continually to live together as the children of God, and to promote each other's highest welfare.

The disciples of Jesus in the same way acquiesced in the political conditions which they

found existing at the commencement of the Christian Church. St. Paul frequently, both in Palestine and outside of it, came into collision with the power of the State. Yet in every case he acknowledged its just authority and reminded those who were its servants that in imprisoning him without a fair trial or after a proved breach of its laws, they were violating its constitution, by which he himself strictly abode. He was by birth a Roman citizen, and valued the position and rights which his birth gave him. To him the Roman State was the embodiment of justice, and its laws existed for the repression of crime and the maintenance of order. In the New Testament epistles we find no preference expressed for any particular form of civil Government. That question is passed over in silence, and Christians are enjoined with great directness of speech "to be in subjection to rulers, to authorities, to be obedient, to be ready unto every good work". St. Peter is peculiarly emphatic on this point (1 Peter ii. 13, 14), and he closes his exhortation by stating that governors are appointed by God "for the punishment of evil-doers and for the praise of them that do well".

II.

OUR CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO THE STATE.

One aim of the Divine Word is to make men good citizens. Christianity confers benefit both on individuals and on the State. It opposes those evil forces which are separative and disintegrating. It furnishes a principle which is promotive of unity and solidarity. He who is a faithful servant of Jesus Christ will be a worthy citizen and a friend of public order. At the same time he will not be indifferent to any abuses which the State still permits within its borders. Where injustice or unequal laws prevail the Christian can never remain dumb or inactive. He will take every just means to make the principles of his religion bear upon all questions of social and civil politics, in order that he may bring them all into harmony with the spirit of Christ, and cause that spirit to prevail throughout the whole bounds of the nation.

1. The attitude which Christians ought to assume to the State is one that recognises their personal obligations to it and sees within it a sphere of excellent Christian service. Whether the form of Government be autocratic or democratic, whether monarchical or republican, they will be supporters of order and law. The genius of Christianity has always favoured obedience to rightly constituted authority. For neither in

Church nor in State will lasting progress be made where disorder and disruption prevail.

We know how the Christians of the early centuries were tempted to resistance and revolution by the unlawful cruelties which they suffered. Even in Rome, where the genius of the nation was so strongly in favour of law, they were subjected for their faith to unheard-of cruelties, and were often butchered to make a Roman holiday. Yet they patiently endured their sufferings, while they appealed as best they could for justice. They conquered the temptation to break out into revolution, and they ultimately were victors in their cause. In contrast with this result one cannot but remark how in Palestine the Jews, who had broken out into frequent rebellion against the Empire, were crushed beneath the iron heel of Rome, and were deprived both of their land and their civil privileges.

In our own country, at the Reformation, such leaders as Knox and Melville used very strong language to the rulers. Yet they desired to attain their ends by constitutional methods and apart from an appeal to the sword. At the Revolution it was only because the despotic tyranny of the Stuarts had swept aside religious freedom that the Scottish people resolved to oppose the Government by force of arms. There comes a time when resistance is lawful, because those at the head of the Government have entirely broken faith with the people, and have put themselves outside the protection of the law which they ought to administer. When the Government, which is the

sole administrator of public justice, violates the constitution, the people by their proper representatives have a right to protest and appeal for redress ; and if such appeal is totally disregarded, and all lawful authority is superseded by sheer brute force, then at last resistance may become a Christian duty. There are dire occasions on which Revolution, "the last bitter poison of distempered States," as Burke said, may be the only means to freedom and order. But so long as civil authority exerts itself in favour of justice and does not overturn the general basis of right on which its authority rests, it is to be respected and obeyed as an ordinance of God.¹

2. In this case the Christian man will be careful to observe the distinction between the person of the ruler and his office. The former may be wicked, and unworthy of regard, but it is to the office as an ordinance of God that Christian obedience is given. It will be a heavy sorrow to every good man when the official and the office disagree, when the ordinance demands our respect, although he who sits on the seat of justice merits only our contempt. But even in these strained relations the Christian will recognise that the administration of law and justice is possible. And he will submit himself thereto, while all the time he endeavours to secure that the character of the ruler shall be consistent with the dignity of his office. He will act thus in the interests of peace

¹ Dörner, *Christian Ethics*, § 76.

and government, knowing well that in revolution many innocent persons suffer, and that the temporary overthrow of lawful order is the most serious detriment that can happen to a State. His obedience will be given with the devoutness of one who recognises that civil government is a Divine ordinance, and that in complying with its legitimate requirements he is in reality honouring God. This he will do both as a Christian and as a patriot, as one who, because he loves the highest welfare of his country, is "subject to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake".

3. It should also be recognised that the object which every patriot keeps in view in resisting established order is simply the defence of the right and the just. He must be careful not to make political institutions subservient to his own ends. And he should make sure that he do not injure the status or the influence of magistrates within their proper jurisdiction. For the magistrate, in his own rightful sphere, and so long as he is justly administering the law, is entitled to reverence and obedience. He who in this spirit and by these methods serves his country is its best friend, and is well entitled to the name of patriot. Christianity can never be unfriendly to a generous patriotism. Although its spirit is cosmopolitan, and it seeks to make all the world Christian, yet it never releases its followers from the obligations of citizenship. The religion which has purified home and made the family hearth sacred cannot but deepen the love of one's native country. Religion

supplies the ethical power which enables men to work for and maintain the purity of social life. It is the basis of that domestic integrity which is the bond of every enduring State. The fulfilment of family obligations and of social duties, commanded by Christianity, reacts beneficially on the State and weaves all the best virtues into the political fabric. The obedient son, the good husband, the kind father, makes the most loyal and patriotic citizen. His obligations to the State are fortified by new sanctions; since for his discharge of them he is answerable to an enlightened conscience and to God his judge.

Patriotism, springing from the love of home and family, necessarily ties men's affections to the soil on which they have been born and bred. "Our native land" has ever been the theme of poetry; and the heart that is not thrilled by it must be cold indeed.¹ What Scotsman is there

¹The following lines give expression to this sentiment in a new and extended form:—

Where is a Briton's Fatherland?
 Is't English land or Scottish land?
 Is't Wales, with many a wild ravine?
 Is't Erin's groves and meadows green?
 No; greater far it seems to me
 A Briton's Fatherland must be.

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 Where is a Briton's Fatherland?
 Will no one tell me of that land?
 'Tis where one meets with English folk,
 And hears the tongue that Shakespeare spoke;
 Where songs of Burns are in the air—
 A Briton's Fatherland is *there*.

who does not respond to Burns' "Scots wha ha'e"? Or what German lives whose soul does not thrill at "Die Wacht am Rhein"? The original object of patriotism is the protection of the soil on which the nations grow.¹

But the natural sentiment of patriotism is strengthened by morality and religion. As soon as man becomes conscious of his place in the nation, his patriotism expands into the free choice of its institutions and customs. It becomes love of the nation, of its manners, laws, national customs and traditions, as these are embodied in its songs, its ballads, and its history. The loftiest patriotism means the true understanding

That is a Briton's Fatherland
Where brother clasps a brother's hand ;
Where pledges of true love are given,
Where faithful vows ascend to heaven,
Where Sabbath breathes a stillness round—
A Briton's Fatherland is found.

Oh may that Fatherland be still
Safeguarded by th' Almighty's will !
May Heaven prolong our times of peace,
Our commerce bless, our trade increase,
And wider yet the bounds expand
Of our Imperial Fatherland !

Our glorious Anglo-Saxon race
Shall ever fill earth's highest place ;
The sun shall never more go down
On English temple, tower, and town ;
And, wander where a Briton will,
His Fatherland shall hold him still.

—DAVAAR.

¹ Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ii., p. 432.

of, and the hearty attachment to, the nation's political constitution. Here the virtue is greatly strengthened by religious faith. So much is this the case that we find religion was the support and strength of all the great patriots—of Alfred the Great, of Bruce, of Wallace, of William Tell, of George Washington. It has inspired men to do their utmost for the commonwealth and to seek its highest good, even when its Court may not be pure nor its Legislature filled with men who are models of moral excellence. No greater boon can be possessed by a nation than a virtuous ruler, a pure Court, and wise counsellors in the Legislature. Yet patriotism, upheld by morality and religion, will not flag in the absence of all these desirable possessions. The love of one's country is an innate virtue. It consists neither with the courtier's flattery of the prince nor with the demagogue's flattery of the people, but only with the deepest desire for the moral welfare of the nation and the most consecrated devotion to its service.

Such is the patriot's boast where'er we roam,
His first, best country ever is at home.

III.

ETHICS AND POLITICS.

Of the necessity of taking ethical principles into consideration in deciding political questions, there can surely be little difference of opinion. No sensible man will deny that the field of Ethics extends to public affairs, and that a policy which cannot stand the moral test is by that very fact condemned. Of course considerations of possibility and of practicability will enter into all questions of State policy and of legislation. An impracticable policy would for a State be a wrong one, since under whatever lofty ethical principles it might be advocated it would entail waste and increase misery.

No doubt contrasts between rigid theology and actual life are here very great. We all remember the striking passage of Cardinal Newman, in which he measures by ecclesiastical canons the relative importance of things: "The Church holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are upon it to die of starvation in extremest agony, so far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor farthing without excuse".¹ We at once see

¹ Newman, *Anglican Difficulties*, p. 190.

that such a view of duty would involve us in consequences that would shortly bring our political existence to an end. No mitigation of the suffering of life, no increase of human happiness, no material progress or intellectual advance, could, according to this theory, be anything but an evil, if it brought about one single sin or caused one man to tell an untruth. Not a single war has happened in defence of liberty and right that did not compel men to leave their quiet pursuits and join the army, and thereby meet many new temptations that led to many sins which might have been avoided at home. But scarcely any sane man would condemn a war in defence of liberty on that account. This mode of measuring the relative importance of affairs by rigid doctrinal formulas is unwise. A large field of moral compromise is of necessity entered upon when a nation undertakes war. This is so even when the war is a thoroughly righteous one. But granting that moral compromise in the event of war must enter, yet public policy should always be in accordance with ethical principles. The application of such principles to public life is as clearly a duty as is their application to private life. If legislators fail to apply Ethics to Politics, they are guilty of a double dereliction of duty. They would themselves be the cause of public offences, and would leave the people without instruction and guidance in the most important of all ethical spheres.

Into all politics we must endeavour to introduce Christian principles. We must assert the truth

that Christian politics is a branch of Christian Ethics, and that all legislators should be inspired with religious aims. In no sphere is it more needful that men should be ruled by the highest motives than in that in which they seek to solve the intricate problems of moral statesmanship. Yet it is notorious that in this arena justice and truth are not so conspicuous as are partisan hatred and misrepresentation. In the storm and stress of Parliamentary elections political leaders, under the urgent necessity of obtaining votes, give but little attention, provided bribery is avoided, to the manner in which these may be secured. And the result is that high-minded men in these days are too prone to abjure politics and to quit its muddy currents, with the sad result that their place is taken by others who are not so troubled by conscientious scruples.¹

¹ Need we wonder this is so when we find the following in the *Hibbert Journal* of April, 1904, p. 434: "The rôle of the State stops short of the inner life of its citizens, and ends in securing for them a free field and favourable circumstances for the practice of the virtues. Owing to these opinions, the practical man is very reluctant to subject political projects to moral criteria. Ethical considerations, weighty as they are in their own proper province, are deemed to be somewhat remote from the ordinary business of Parliament. We do not desire that our statesmen should complicate their task by raising moral problems. If they are contemplating a change of our fiscal policy, for instance, their duty is simply to discover the system which conduces most to the industrial and commercial prosperity of the country. Morality will take care of itself: and, in any case, it is a concern of the people themselves rather than of their political representatives."

Besides this, men of earnest convictions and high aims have observed how the successful leaders in the legislative chambers are those who know the value of compromise, and do not take up a new cause until it is popular. In all stages of our English history there have been far-foreseeing spirits that believed in great principles, and have advocated them when few understood them. They were maligned and misrepresented, and fought a life-long battle in which nothing seemed to be gained. They did not study what was popular and immediately possible; so that though honest and earnest and devoted to the nation's well-being, they were distrusted by the House of Commons and disliked by popular leaders. They went to their grave and were called the dreamers and unpractical enthusiasts of their day. They were before their time; and they were therefore "Faddists".

And now men see how statesmen in after days take up the cause that fell from those brave hands and carry it to a victorious conclusion. They observe how these latter are not of the stuff of which the former were made; they are sagacious men who never run their heads against stone walls; who watch the currents of national feeling; who discover what is within the bounds of possibility. They do not spend their days in advocating unpopular causes. They are the Peels and Palmestons of their time. They carry Bills in favour of Catholic Emancipation and Free Trade and reformed currency, because they keep their ear close to earth to catch the ground swell of the ocean of

humanity. Not unpractical idealists, but men of practical aims, they do not pitch their political ideals too high nor seek to legislate above the average level of human goodness. Experience has taught them the great importance of compromise in practical life, and they are apt to measure the relative importance of things by the standards rather of utility than of the highest good. They seem somehow to know by a kind of gregarious instinct what is the feeling of the multitude, and how much legislation of a progressive character is suited to the stage of the nation's progress. Lord Palmerston was a typical politician of this kind—the bell-wether of the flock (as he was called), who knew its instinctive cravings and adjusted the Bills he promoted to this popular demand. To sincere reformers he seemed deficient in sincerity; to others he appeared lacking in lofty feeling; some were not slack to call him irreligious. In all these charges there may be some truth. Only he had, what every Parliamentary English leader requires, a majority behind him, a number sufficient to carry the Bills that helped to guide the nation in its political progress.

But this working by gregarious instincts, this working by compromises between parties, is so hateful to many men of high principle that they turn away from politics as if it were a sphere in which it is impossible to act in accordance with a code of Christian morality. Consequently, there prevails a conviction in certain circles of society that Christian men cannot take an active part in

politics without lowering their moral tone or compromising their character. Probably this sentiment is a survival of the supremacy asserted by the Church of the Middle Ages over the Empire, by which she so much injured the authority of the State and impaired its position as a divine institution. But according to the teaching of Christianity, the State is of divine origin. It is a noble institution for the maintenance of right and justice. It comes into existence so soon as the interest of men in the administration of justice has become energetic enough to constrain them to enforce and protect the right at all costs.¹

Such administration of justice is nothing less than the insurance of that liberty in which alone lies the possibility of the free development of personality, the protection of property, and freedom both of thought and of worship. If these most precious rights are secured to us by the State, it cannot but be the duty of every Christian man to interest himself in the State's welfare. If justice is a good of absolute worth, without which we can have neither freedom of development nor liberty of religious belief, the very bulwark of its defence is in the rectitude of our legislators and administrators. But where can these be found if good men decline to enter municipal and political life on the ground that they will get their character besmirched in the mire

¹Dorner, *Christian Ethics*, § 33 (a).

of politics? If the order established within the State is the only sure basis on which the whole moral world rests, then without doubt Parish Councils, Town Councils, County Councils, Houses of Parliament, and all Magistracies are included within the Divine order. It is our duty to sustain and uphold them as Divine agencies for our good and for the preservation of righteousness. Our conception of right cannot be realised otherwise than through them. He who, in the interests of his spiritual well-being, refuses to enter these spheres of public duty, is really not furthering his moral education. He is abnegating his privileges and neglecting his plain duty in declining the obligations of citizenship.

The one ground of the subject's obligation is the will of God as made manifest in the moral order of the State. That will is not discovered, as Dr. Paley asserts, from expediency merely.¹ But our political guides and rulers are "ministers of God's service, attending continually upon this very thing" (Rom. xiii. 6). He who desires God's will to be done by all within the nation will do his best to uphold civil order and to cleanse the streams of politics. He will feel that the call to political or municipal service may be as directly of God as is the call given to the Christian minister. It may be that he who, possessing the qualifications, declines to respond to the

¹ Paley, *Moral and Political Philosophy*, book iv., chap. iii., "The Will of God as Collected from Expediency".

invitation to enter the municipal chamber or the House of Commons, may be as truly sinning against his country as the soldier who deserts the ranks when war breaks out. The question ought to be decided in the court of his conscience, and not according to considerations of ease or pleasure. The service of the State should afford a man the very widest field of Christian work.

On this point the inconsistencies of many pious people furnish a strange chapter in Christian Ethics. They will put themselves to much trouble in order to exclude a professed sceptic from St. Stephen's; but, on their own principle that politics should be abjured by Christian men, it is only the godless and worldly that should enter Parliament. To interfere on such occasions is surely inconsistent for those who hold that this arena is under the prince of the power of the air, and that Christian people only sully their character by touching the pitch of politics. If we are to enjoy the blessings of good government and escape the many evils of municipal mismanagement, let us remember that these things can be purchased only by fidelity at the polling booth on the part of the voters. Christian men should not desire to enjoy civil benefits purchased at the price of spiritual injury to politicians.

St. Paul has taught us a nobler and profounder theory of politics. "The powers that be are ordained of God," ordained for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of life, of property, and of personal freedom. Civil rulers

are "ministers of God"; and their services are necessary to secure the diffusion of material comfort, the accumulation of wealth, the progress of education and the transmission from generation to generation of the discoveries of science and art. Apart from civil society some of the noblest and most generous virtues could never be developed. Through the Municipality and the State, as well as through the Family and the Church, God has provided for the discipline of human character. The true duty of the Christian man is not to forsake municipal and political life because it is corrupt, but to carry into it the spirit of Jesus Christ. He must do his part to secure for his fellow-countrymen all those blessings which a nation, justly and efficiently governed, alone can secure for them.

To stand aloof from these spheres of public service, to refuse from fear of peculiar temptations to take part in shaping the polity of the nation, is false in theory and indefensible in practice. Who that has read the *Life of Dr. Arnold of Rugby* can forget the stern indignation that stirred that good and wise man when he saw the indifference of his Church to the social evils of his time? "If the clergy would come forward as one man from Cumberland to Cornwall, exhorting peaceableness on the one side, and justice on the other, denouncing the high rents and the game laws, and the carelessness which keeps the poor ignorant and then wonders that they are brutal, I verily believe they might yet save themselves and the State."

A Christian man's duty is not to leave political and municipal government to the demagogue and the place-hunter, but to elect those to public offices who have the qualities necessary for filling them, and who will discharge their political duties as the servants of Jesus Christ.

If these are, as the Apostle says, "not a terror to good works, but to the evil" (Rom. xiii. 3-4), then it follows that one man may have as much a divine call to enter a County Council or a House of Legislature as another may have to enter the sacred ministry.

CHAPTER X.

THE CHRISTIAN STATE.

CAN the State be said to possess a Christian character? Is it to be permeated by Christian principles and ideals? Or is it to maintain the character of a thoroughly secular agency? Our answer cannot be uncertain. Already we have seen that all "social tissue" is moral tissue. It is built up of men "as the tissue of physiology is said to be built up of cells".¹ If this social organism contains not only economic and political elements but also human sympathies and desires, then it contains moral elements and must exhibit moral character.

I.

It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that man is made for moral order. He cannot realise his highest ends apart from economic and political fellowship. It is one of Hegel's deep and true sayings that the human spirit is realised only in the objective world of institutions. And of these the State is the most comprehensive. To it has been delegated Divine authority in order that it may administer justice and equity. It is absolutely necessary, if the human spirit is to attain its ends,

¹ *The Science of Ethics*, by Leslie Stephen, p. 120.

that by the State disorder shall be repressed, justice administered, law enforced, and the kingdom of truth and brotherhood established.

This is the chief reason why we cannot accept the secular theory of the State. Merely "to protect our persons and our property" is a conception which the Socialist Lassalle fitly sneered at as the "Night-Watchman" conception of the State's duty. Much more lofty and nearer to the truth is John Milton's idea of it as a huge Christian personage, "one mighty growth or stature of an honest man". We find proof of this position both in the origin and the end of the modern State. Its genesis was coeval with the beginnings of human intelligence and morality. The law of the State is the universal Will, the practical reason, which is the same in all men who are true to their moral and rational nature. Only in the social will, operating through righteous moral principles, can a sure basis be found for government and order. Religion must pervade our political not less than our family and individual life. Unless we hold to the exploded theory of faculties in men, unless men are made on the plan of watertight compartments, it is impossible to secularise one section of their life and keep another section sacred. Life is a unity and not a dualism. They who argue that religion should not pervade politics, and that the State in all its action should be secular, fall into a psychological error, but one not the less fatal to the public weal. If religion be a vital factor in humanity it cannot be excluded from the sphere of politics and government. Christianity gives law to

every part of our social life ; and the man is not Christian who keeps some portion of his life independent of religious control. He commits the error of the old Tartar Chief who, when baptised by a missionary, kept his right arm and sword out of the water that with them he might still settle some old scores against his enemies and wreak on others his revenge.

The facts of history go to prove that, from the most ancient times down to those of to-day, States have had their religions and have been influenced very largely by them. This was as true of Greece and Rome as of China and Hindustan. In the olden times there was no attempt at the separation of these two spheres. It is in modern times that their functions have been separated. Yet even in these days it has been found impossible for the State to ignore religious convictions or to frame laws that run counter to the religious creed. The end of the State cannot be attained unless legislators recognise the religious ideals of the people and give room and opportunity to accomplish them. In short, "Christian politics is a part of Christian Ethics".¹

There is a theory that seems at first to be inconsistent with this argument, and it is one that can claim for its support the great name of Bluntschli. It maintains that the true end of the State is to perfect the national genius and development and complete the national capacities. "As the life-task of every individual is to develop his capacities

¹ Smyth, *Christian Ethics*, p. 271.

and to maintain his essence, so too, the duty of the State-person is to develop the latent powers of the nation and to manifest its capabilities.”¹ But this theory of individual development, supported though it be by some great names in literature, has too often issued in eccentricity and not in all-round culture. Many national traits would be the better of repression. Every excellent trait needs development, but we all know of characteristics in the Englishman, the American, and the Russian that would be much improved by pruning. The end of the State cannot be limited to the development of a nation’s latent powers. It must include the highest well-being of the community. The nation is an organic part of humanity: it is a member of the wide brotherhood of mankind. It is not enough that it aim at self-sufficingness. While it will in all probability serve humanity best by manifesting its capabilities along the line of its evolution, it may have, for the sake of the good of humanity, to cut its national prejudices against the grain and sacrifice some of its exclusive interests. The end of the nation must embrace the highest moral and religious culture. This is only another way of seeking its self-realisation.

To-day we have left far behind us Kant’s theory that the “legal State is the union of a number of men under juridical law”.² The modern State aims at the highest welfare of its subjects on every side of their complex being. A wise observer of

¹ Bluntschli, *Theory of the State*, p. 301.

² Kant, *Philosophy of Law*, p. 165.

the action of Government has noted this fact. "We appear in all our legislation to be more and more unreservedly accepting the principle that the physical well-being and the mental and moral training of the community are matters within the special care of the State."¹ The State that has this end in view may certainly be termed a Christian institution.

It may be replied that a State can serve moral ends without definitely assuming a Christian name or claiming to possess a Christian character. It is true that an individual may attain a certain moral stature without being consciously a religious man. But a lofty morality without religious roots has never survived. If in some cases it seems to have done so, it has been only in a society which has long been enriched by the influence of religious truth, and furnishes a ready soil for those exceptional moral growths. And just as the individual life does not culminate in its highest attainments apart from religion, so the collective life of the State in its institutions or laws cannot ignore religious sanctions. If the State is our highest means of self-realisation, it cannot attain this end without the inspiring conception of a high ideal of Christian progress. In short, it must make room within itself for the Christian conception of life; and its whole laws must be constructed on the principles of Christian Ethics. This is the supreme task to-day of Christian nations.

¹ H. D. Traill, *Central Government*, p. 160.

II.

THE STATE AND THE CHURCH.

1. Many will admit that the State ought to be Christian. They think that Christianity should pervade its legislation. But they are of opinion that the State should not make a public acknowledgment of the authority of Jesus Christ, nor support a national establishment of religion. It should content itself with laying down a definite ethical standard for legislative, executive, and judicial conduct.

The history of Christianity affords examples of two extreme positions which have been taken up on this question. Apart from the Old Testament Theocracy, in which Church and State were one, with the advent of Christianity a new force appeared in the Roman world. In the decline of the Empire Christianity was adopted by Constantine, and became the religion established by law. Whatever view we may take of the sincerity of that Emperor's conversion, there is no doubt that the enthusiasm of the Christians brought to his aid an organisation of great value in support of justice and order. The Church now became popular, and membership in it was the path to all civil offices. Here the State virtually took the Church into its bosom, and in the union the Church may be said to have lost its individuality and its independence.

Church and State were one because the State had practically absorbed the Church.

But in the Middle Ages the pendulum swung to the other extreme. The Church of the Papacy had grown so strong that she asserted her superiority over the State and created a dualism between the two provinces. The Emperor was sovereign of the one and the Pope the ruler of the other. The former was bound to protect the Church with his army, and the latter was to bring the aid of the spiritual power to support the Government. But this contract, made for the purpose of harmony, never held good in any emergency. The history of the Church in the Middle Ages is a continuous record of war between Guelph and Ghibelline, between Pope and Emperor, until at last the rulers of the Hohenstaufen dynasty were compelled at Canossa to submit to the papal power. In those days the Church may be said to have included under its sway the greater number of the States in Europe. The only bond which united England, France, Spain, Italy and the German States was the bond of the Romish Church with its canon law, priesthood and Latin tongue. The Church in reality had become the State.

Both extremes were found to be injurious.¹

¹ The former of these extremes was practically advocated by the famous author of the *Theological Ethics*, Rothe. Rothe's idea was that in the progress of Christianity the Church must decrease and gradually disappear as the Christian State progresses. He ignored the relative contrast which must always exist between religion and morality; and in his later years he

The result has been that a wider severance has taken place. Whereas in the Middle Ages the

advocated with much enthusiasm this theory of the ultimate absorption of the Church by the State. In his view the Church, as a hierarchical body, only emerged out of its Judaistic shell after the destruction of Jerusalem. During the Middle Ages Christianity passed into its cocoon or larva stage, only to reappear in Reformation times in the purified form of a Christian State. The Church had done its duty and accomplished its mission; it was now the part of the State to incorporate the spiritual elements of Christianity and thus retain what was divine and essential. But in rejecting the sacerdotal or transient element, Rothe was led into an Erastianism which ignored the independence of the Church and carried out the parable of the Leaven in a very one-sided manner. The fact is that Rothe in middle life turned away in despair from theology. Its clear-cut dogmas made him think that he could never arrive at the truth by theological method. The Church and theology had failed with their obsolete arguments and antiquated ways to meet the wants of the time. Rothe, therefore, turned to the State as the one hope of social regeneration. It was to be the heir of the Church and the depository of the undogmatical Christianity of the future.

Between Rothe and Bunsen, the Prussian statesman and diplomatist, there was on this question a divergence of view which is instructive. Bunsen was a theologian amongst statesmen, while Rothe was a statesman among theologians. The diplomatist naturally saw and detested the evils of bureaucracy. To him the Erastianism of the German Church was hateful, and he sought to counteract it by vitalising the *Gemeinde* or Christian congregation. The theologian, on the other hand, was too well acquainted with the weaknesses of churchmanship and bravely battled with its professional narrowness. He sought, therefore, to subordinate theology to ethics and to merge theology in Christian politics. Consequently, the two men towards the close of their life changed sides, and each sought to supplant the weakness of his own side with elements of strength drawn from the other. Rothe landed in Erastianism and the theory of a moral

one Church may be said to have been contained in many States, now the one State contains within it many Churches. The question still remains whether the union of Church and State is possessed of so many advantages as to be worth our efforts in striving to continue it.

2. A State may take up several attitudes with respect to the question of the establishment of religion. It may resolve to recognise and support all religions alike on the ground that all of them are favourable to order and that each contains some elements in it favourable to morality. Or it may choose to establish one religion based upon a uniform creed and system of discipline. Such an establishment of one faith assumes that all the other faiths are false, or less true. Or it may assume the worthlessness of all religions alike, taking up a purely negative position with respect to them. We believe that so far as it does arrive at such a conviction, it would of necessity cease to occupy a negative position, and would in the course of time assume a hostile attitude.

We have seen that it is idle to talk of excluding religion from one sphere of social life while it is re-

police. Bunsen ultimately arrived at something very near Independence, the theory of the entire freedom of the Church from all State interference and all bureaucratic control. It was an instance of the law of reaction in professional life. Men feel most keenly the evils with which officially they are acquainted. Horace epigrammatically expressed the truth long ago, as he watched the pack-horse on the road and the laborious ox at the plough: "*Optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus*".

tained elsewhere. Life is organic, and in the organism every part of its function is co-operant to the one end. If Christianity pervade the social life of the nation, it would be difficult for the Government to assume an attitude which is hostile to Christianity. Yet on purely voluntary principles it may be held that Churches need no help from the State beyond the protection which is given to all associations.¹ Or it may be claimed that, while the Church has perfect spiritual independence, yet she has the right to interfere with the State in all matters which concern the people's well-being.

Or another position still may be taken, that the State should have no relation to the Churches, but that each man should be the keeper of his own religious conscience. But this last seems to be the *reductio ad absurdum* of militant Voluntaryism.

3. What, then, is the proper relation of the State to the Church? And can we get any clear light on this point from the teaching of the Founder of Christianity?

¹ A remarkable address on "The Larger Mission of the Church" was in October, 1904, delivered by Rev. Dr. Goodrich, President of the Congregational Union of England. In his opinion the Church to-day has gained a larger conception of its position and functions in the State, and religion ought to be "a vital, universal principle, inspiring and controlling the life of the State". He also admits that the Church touches earth as a holder of property, and is subject to State protection and control. The whole address represents an intelligent advance in the right conception of the relations of the Christian State to the Church, although it maintains that religion should not be a special department of the State. This latter phrase, however, is not a correct representation of the Establishment in Scotland.

Many advocates of Voluntaryism, in defence of their principles, allege that the teachings of Jesus were essentially non-political in their character, and that He sought no national recognition of His cause; that in fact He exhorted His followers against all political ambition, and declined to play the rôle of revolutionist for this very reason (Matt. xxii. 18).

But the fact should not be overlooked, which to a large extent accounts for the non-political character of the Gospels, that in the time of Jesus it was impossible for a Jew to have any share in the legislation or administration of his country. Jesus left no instructions to His disciples on these points, for the simple reason that these questions did not then emerge. The Jews were then without any share in the government of Palestine; and Jesus was content that the Roman Government should preserve order, collect taxes, and protect property. His much-quoted words, "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Mark xii. 15-17), do no more than assert that Cæsar has his sphere in which he is governor, and that men must discharge their obligations to him as well as their obligations to God. "He has not," says Professor Wendt, "merely drawn the conclusion, from His assurance of the character of the Kingdom of God, that the payment of tribute in the Roman Empire was indifferent to the fulfilment of one's duty in the Kingdom of God, and was therefore allowed; but He also, in pointing to the image and superscrip-

tion of Cæsar on the coin, declared that this money belonged to the sphere of Cæsar, that Cæsar therefore had a right to it, and that payment of tribute to him was a necessary duty. He did not further disclose His view of the relation in which the fulfilment of duty to the emperor stands to the fulfilment of duty to God."¹

In the province of Judea the functions of the Government were limited to collecting taxes and preserving order among the Jews. The taxes were farmed to the highest offerer, who was detested by the people, but whose office was a perfectly legal one. It was enough that the people paid their taxes and thus helped to preserve order. Had Jesus lived in a country where, and at a time when, political and social questions, filled the minds of the people, there can be little doubt that He would have laid down many rules relating to these questions.

With the Apostles, who travelled into other countries and distant lands, circumstances were different. Accordingly, we find both St. Peter and St. Paul laying emphasis upon the relation of the citizens to the rulers. The Epistle to the Romans was addressed to a Church whose members might at any moment be called upon to undertake political offices or to serve in the Roman army. Consequently, we find (Rom. xiii.) that St. Paul accentuates the fact that civil government is of God, and that the Christian's attitude to the State

¹ *Teaching of Jesus*, vol. i., p. 355.

is not that of a revolutionist, but of a loyal subject. Whatever the personal faults of the State's officers may be, the disciple of Jesus is to regard them as dignified by their office seen in the light of its Divine institution. Since they are a terror not to good works but to evil, they are to be respected for their work's sake.

By making good men and godly citizens the Church gives a rich contribution to political life, and one that proves in every political crisis to be a makeweight for righteousness. The Epistle to the Romans is a proof that the principles of Christianity are applicable to every form of civil and political life, and are meant to be so applied. The Kingdom of God is not to be postponed to a future life, but to be realised in the life and institutions of the State under whose Government we presently live. When and only when that Kingdom has come to pervade the life of the people, so that the principles of Christianity are embedded in the laws of society and of the nation, is the State a Christian State and the union of Church and State a living reality. There is nothing in the teaching of Jesus that contradicts such a union; but there are many principles enunciated by Him which help to sweeten the institutions of the State, and to pervade the harshness of law with the spirit of love.

Most certainly it would be impossible to found a State or administer laws in which justice is not to inflict penalties, and law-breakers are not to be fined and imprisoned. But this is not to prove that

Christianity cannot be reconciled with the legitimate exercise by the State of physical force and of corporal punishment or imprisonment. So long as vice abounds and undermines justice, so long as evil rules men and selfish motives actuate princes, so long will the State have to exercise coercion and repression. It is true that in respect of these matters of external jurisdiction Jesus left us no direct injunctions. But He did enforce on His people the spirit which should penetrate the whole of political and social life. If war must take place, it need not be a war of extermination; it is not necessary that the discomfited should be deprived of their freedom and stripped of their possessions. Jesus has taught His followers how to mix love with justice, how to mingle tenderness with severity, and how to span the dark cloud of war with the rainbow of mercy. If war to-day has in some respects new horrors, such as Roman and Jewish battles did not possess; if the weapons be more deadly and the numbers engaged be far greater, yet States have now learned to conduct campaigns in a Christian spirit. The army doctors and the Red Cross nurses are on every battlefield, and prisoners of war are treated like brothers. The teachings of Jesus have found innumerable applications to the external ordinances of the State and to the institutions of civil life.

4. In recent days a certain school of political writers has aimed at effecting a complete severance between government and religion. The State, it is maintained, has nothing whatever to do with

religion, which is the concern solely of the individual. This was the ground on which the *esprits forts* of the French Revolution based their plea that religion should have no place in civil law, and was a matter of entire indifference to the State.¹

The opposition of others is based on the moral necessity that the Church must possess entire freedom of worship, must be left free to develop her own inner life, and to regulate her own creed and conduct. The separation of Church and State is regarded by these as the acme of political wisdom, and as the remedy for those dangers which history has shown to be incidental to the union of those two bodies.

That the functions of Church and State are not mutually exclusive, and that their spheres overlap at many points, cannot be denied. On the other hand, while these circles are not concentric, a large portion is common to both. All Christians are citizens, and patriotic citizenship is an essential part of Christianity. The Church must ever be a moral force in the community, exercising all her powers in the interests of both social and political well-being. Certainly, the employment of physical force is entirely outside the sphere of the Church. But on the other hand, it is of the utmost importance to the State that she should be aided by the force of public opinion

¹ In 1793 it was decreed by the National Convention in Paris that God and religion were to be entirely ignored in the instruction of the youth of France.

and sustained by moral and religious ideals. It cannot be denied that one of the noblest duties of the Church is to make clear to the people that the highest aim of the State is to realise within its bounds the Kingdom of God. The constitution and laws of Britain should be in such harmony with the Christian convictions of the nation that the people may cordially acquiesce in its entire policy and support it with a good conscience.

Thus, while the Church and the State are independent of each other and may be said to be equally authoritative forces, yet their absolute separation is an abstraction and not a reality. It is a political theory which can never be translated into living fact. To suppose that the collisions between Church and State will be ended by their total separation is nothing better than abstract doctrinairism, which would banish all difficult problems by simply asserting that they are invisible or non-existent.

Even in those countries where there is a distinct division and a thorough dualism, it has been found that it is impossible to recognise the total separation of the respective provinces of Church and State. In the United States of America the supremacy of Parliament is an essential principle of the Constitution. There it has become apparent that the ecclesiastical government cannot override the civil, nor the authority of any one sect supersede the authority of the Civil Court. The total disjunction of the Church from the State in America has resulted only in another kind of relation

coming into existence. And whereas in the case of a National Church those relations are clearly defined by law and mutual agreement, in the case of voluntary churches they have to be discovered by litigation and to be determined by statute law.

“All of these Churches,” says one who cannot be accused of prejudice on this question, “whether free or established, are subject to the sovereignty of the State and its various laws and organs of control, the only differences being that, while the members of the Established Churches voluntarily associate themselves with an institution which owns a special tie to the State, and whose relations with that State are defined by a Code of special customs and laws, the members of the other Churches refuse to recognise such special ties, and leave the relations between their Church and the State to be determined by the ordinary common and statute law of the land. Both classes of Churches are subject to the dominion of the State in both temporal and spiritual matters.”¹

Within recent years the phrase has come into use—“A Free Church in a Free State,” which seems to take for granted a necessary distinction between the two. But it is impossible by a phrase of this kind to abolish all complications and causes of collision. In fact it is a *petitio principii*, and assumes the point at issue that the provinces of Church and State are mutually exclusive. Our experience in Scotland during the

¹ McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*, p. 395.

past few years has exposed this too prevalent fallacy. It has been clearly established by recent decisions of the House of Lords that the State is both a spiritual and a civil power, and is invested, through its highest Court of Appeal, with the supreme legal decision in all matters of contract that concern the property and civil rights of Church members. The State can step in and decide these matters as between Churches and their members, just as it may step in and decide relations between the members of a life insurance society or the shareholders of a railway. Until the Church has been declared to be superior to the State, there can be no doubt that the latter is vested with the supreme legal power in all matters.¹

¹ "The spiritual independence of the Church is a principle of the Church of Scotland, and in virtue of being the Established Church she has more spiritual independence than any other Church in Scotland. The Free Church, for example, is under the control of the civil courts of this country, both as regards doctrine and discipline, in a sense and to an extent which the Church of Scotland is not. In a case either of doctrine or discipline, any person who deems that he has been unconstitutionally dealt with by the Free Church can bring either her creed or her procedure under the review and control of the civil magistrate. From this subjection there is no possible escape. A hundred successive disruptions, although they might allow of a hundred changes of her constitution, would not take her a step nearer towards freedom. She can only find deliverance from what she has often called Erastian dependence on the civil courts, by having jurisdiction, within proper limits, duly secured to her own courts by statute law. Establishment, instead of necessarily involving what is called Erastianism, is the only way to sure and complete immunity from it." Prof. Flint, *On Theological, Biblical and other Subjects*, p. 429.

III.

DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION.

So far from impugning the sanctity of the State because of the prevalence of democratic ideas at the present day, it should be the aim "of all men of light and leading in England" (to quote Burke's memorable words¹) to clothe secular government with every possible attribute of sanctity. Surely those who are so eager to dissever politics from Christianity and to exclude the Bible from the schools have forgotten the well-ascertained truth that it is religion alone which supplies an adequate check to the revolutionary passions of mankind. Those who administer government know well that it has never been so firmly rooted in the affections of the mass of the people that it can be safe to despise any of the moral or religious sanctions that have hitherto strengthened its pillars. One of the most powerful of these sanctions has been that which is furnished by Christianity. It has proved itself equal to the task of overcoming the jealousies of the poorer classes and of helping to make them more contented under the hardships of their lot.

A very mistaken idea has often been communicated to the public by the glowing style in which authors imbued with a socialistic spirit have

¹ *Reflections on the French Revolution*, p. 96 (ed. 1872).

pictured the triumphs of democracy.¹ These writers assure us that with the advent of State Socialism and universal suffrage the hampering restrictions and penalties of Government will no longer be required. A perfect democracy is the panacea for all political ills ; as soon as it arrives the land will be bathed in the sunshine of universal contentment, and the people will discharge all their duties without the need of any restraint. Have such writers forgotten that King Demos, *unrestrained by religious convictions*, may become more dangerous than King Charles or King Louis ? They have only to go back to the times of the French Revolution to learn that democratic rulers may commit crimes of as revolting a character as any ever committed by an autocracy or a monarchy.

All the political signs of to-day point to a *broadening* of the conception of the State far beyond that of a mere commercial company or a co-operative society, such as Mr. Bryce asserts to be the limited conception of it existing in the United States.² The popular conception of the State now prevalent is that of a body that shall care not only for the temporal but also for the mental and the moral education of its citizens. Free education has now virtually been granted to the children of the working man. But with that he is not content, and goes on to demand that free education shall be accompanied by free dinners, since the underfed

¹ In such writings, for example, as those of Mr. George and the editor of *The Clarion*.

² Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. iii., p. 473.

child must also be the undereducated child. More and more this conception is gaining ground; and it seems clear that the State will have in the future to undertake many duties for the moral well-being of the people which it does not at present fulfil.

But if the people are to make such large demands from the State, we must not forget that *in the ethics of a socialistic democracy there are no elements of transcendency or spiritual purpose*. All is commonplace and secular. Socialism has little power to raise man above himself. Its inspiration is soon exhausted. So far as we have seen its effects among Trades Unionists, it has not tended to breed "better manners, nobler laws". Nor has it shown itself easily restrained from acts of plunder, which are the outcome of the instinctive greed of human nature. Why should we suppose such a democracy would be restrained from those acts of pillage and oppression that Kings and Emperors were wont to exercise?

Just because to-day democratic power in every country is *widening* and is knocking at the door of senates and the palaces of kings, is it the more necessary that its force should be governed by the restraining influences of religion. It will not be denied that the more the constitution of a nation approaches to a democracy, the more must safeguards be erected against possible abuses. Too often does the popular mind regard individual liberty as the absolute end of the State; it would grant the widest freedom to each of its component

and individual members.¹ But when liberty and individuality are exaggerated into the sole ends of government to which all others are made subordinate, the Box of Pandora is opened and the way is straight to innumerable abuses. There is great danger that the state of practical equilibrium between individual freedom and governmental control may be upset, because the units think that they constitute the government, and *naturally they have no fear of their own action*. This popular confidence very soon runs into tyrannical extremes. As soon as some new want is felt, it is demanded of the friendly government. And if under present laws it cannot be granted, there is little hesitation in conferring further powers to enable it to meet the popular demand. This is why Mr. Spencer so fearlessly pointed out the tendency of democracy to end in despotism, and spoke of it as calling a Frankenstein into being who might soon prove the ruin of the radical voter who created it. Where the power of the people is so unrestrained and diffused over such a wide surface, the controlling power of religion is urgently required.

Another reason in the same direction may be urged. History shows us how much the action of rulers has been restrained by fear of a popular revolt. The imposition of taxes by a monarch has frequently led to dreaded unpopularity. There are many acts of the sovereign over which the people may be said to exercise a power of in-

¹The phrase is Spencer's, but the dictum was really borrowed by him from Kant.

spection through the criticism of the press and liberty of public speech. But a war, entered upon by a Republic and sustained by a popular vote, is one which is practically beyond criticism. The very approbation of the people themselves constitutes a public judgment in their favour. In these days of large liberty within our limited monarchy, every one may easily air his grievances and state his rational objections to the legislation or the administrative acts of the central authority. But in a socialistic democracy this might not be so easily done; indeed as history proves, it might be scarcely possible amid the din of opposing voices. This is why Burke made the strong and oft-quoted assertion, "A perfect democracy is the most shameless thing in the world". It has no absolute or independent standard of right to which it appeals. The *vox populi* is the *vox Dei*. And the one power that teaches responsibility to a higher standard, that sets up an immutable standard and supports it by the highest sanctions, is the power of religion.¹

We believe there is no earthly power that can prevent the constant tendency on the part of a democracy to the abuse of force except that of Christian faith and love. Majorities will ride rough-shod over tender consciences unless they have learned what we may call a Christian respect for individual liberty and personal rights. This

¹ Cf. Sohm, *Verhältniss von Staat und Kirche*, 1873; Prof. Dorner, *Kirche und Reich Gottes*, p. 305. Also Gladstone, *The State in its Relations to the Church*, chaps. ii. and iii.

is needed both in monarchies and democracies, but more especially is it required in the latter. "Without faith in a living Providence," says Prof. Dorner, "no nation can successfully meet those crises in its political life which cannot fail to arise, or pass through them with courage and patience, with moderation and justice. And further, legislation also which always bears the impress of the whole character of a people lacks healthy productive power when that character is without religious vitality: for then the nation wants that ideal element upon which the formation of its aim depends. It is this ideal element which unites rulers and subjects by inspiring them with a common spirit, upheld by enthusiasm for the discharge of national duties."¹

¹ Dorner, *Christian Ethics*, p. 557.

CHAPTER XI.

PUBLIC MORALITY AND THE STATE.

IF the State requires the aid of religion in the discharge of its many onerous and responsible duties, not less does it need all the help which it can get from public opinion and general moral sentiment. The Legislature can never make any positive enactment much in advance of the stage of morality reached by the people.

That stage depends upon the progress which the nation has made in civilisation and in mental and moral culture. The legislation which within the last thirty years has taken place in regard to education would have been impossible at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In that earlier period the mind of the community had not regarded education as of such value that it should be made compulsory for the parent to keep his children at school until they could read and write. The laws bearing on drunkenness and gambling which have been recently enacted would have been scouted in the time of George III. as a piece of grandmotherly legislation.

If laws are to be efficient, they must be backed up by public opinion on the part of the citizens. Such public opinion is a thing of slow growth ;

and, unless it be translated into definite laws of the State with penalties attached, many ignorant people would never be brought up to its moral level. Hence it is a well-known fact that law lags behind morality, and can never safely take precedence of public opinion.

Not only so, but law, being that part of morality to which legislative sanction has been given, assumes an artificial rigidity; it hardens with the passage of time, and it cannot adjust itself to the continually varying conditions of advancing civilisation. Hence the notorious fact that when infringement of an ancient statute brings upon the offender a severe penalty, a judge has to introduce equity in order to save the name of justice and to hold in check the severity of law. Legal justice would be unbearable if, in the changed conditions of our time, some of the laws of the eighteenth century were stringently enforced. Though not swept from the statute-book, they have become unsuitable to the commerce or the customs of to-day. Some of them have become positively hurtful to the best interests of morality, and judges dare not administer them. It became impossible to get juries to convict sheep-stealers when it was known that the only possible sentence which the judge could pronounce was one of death by hanging. This is the reason why statutory laws have to keep pace with the advance of public morality, and why the Legislature has continually to modify old laws and to adjust them to the changing conditions of to-day.

In its attempt to repress vice the Government must be careful to see that its interference with the liberty of the citizen will in all probability secure its end. Intervention which goes beyond the stage at which public sentiment with respect to morals has arrived, may do more harm than good. Were the British Government at the present moment to pass an Act closing all the public houses in Ireland on Sundays, it is probable that it could not enforce the law without a very strong exercise of force; and this would rouse a consequent indignation, which would tend to weaken the habit of obedience to statute law. It does not follow that what Scotland years ago obtained by the Forbes Mackenzie Act can be wisely carried out in Ireland. Irish public opinion must first be educated up to the point of perceiving the desirableness of such legislation.

In India, where the English Government, though strong, is an alien Government, the very greatest care has to be exercised that legislative interference with public morality do not collide with long-standing prejudices or with the religious customs of the people. The well-known origin of the terrible Indian Mutiny amongst the Sepoys, who believed that the cartridges which they were compelled to use were greased with the fat of the cow, the sacred animal of India, is an instance in point. Our Christian Government, it is true, resolved, notwithstanding the almost universal prevalence of infanticide and of Suttee, to use the strong hand of the State to put down these all but

universal customs. They were, however, justified in doing so, because in these two instances the custom amounted to a crime of such heinous magnitude as no civilised Government could permit. More recently, in compliance with the petitions of many missionaries and of the Christian Church, they have ventured to enact that it shall not be legal for Hindoo parents to disinherit such of their children as may embrace the Christian faith. This latter legislation was carried, however, in the belief that the people of India have to a large extent seen the injustice of such conduct, and feel that a spirit of equity is behind the new legislation.

It is not every violation of the laws of morality that can be punished by the State. There are many reforms which it would be impossible to accomplish by statutory law but which may be brought about by the education of public opinion. When a nation is at a comparatively low stage of moral culture, positive laws are far from efficient. In fact, the enforcement of them may produce a reaction. On the other hand, when a nation has advanced far on the path of order, then many positive laws cease to operate, and it is wise to let them fall into abeyance.

On the whole, it is the better course to further public morality and to elevate general morals than to multiply statutory enactments. The former method is the cultivation of man's inner nature and conscience. The other plan partakes too much of the rules and limitations of the nursery, and pertains to the infancy of a nation. Owing

to the progressiveness of the moral ideal and the fact that the conditions of life are continually changing, it happens that laws which help to preserve the moral equilibrium of society at one period, may at a later period come to disturb it. This is not a moral condemnation of the law as it first existed. It had its day and ceased to be. A good law is beneficial for a time, and then frequently its greatest benefit is its death and burial. If we did not require new laws and institutions, or at least old laws modified and superseded, we should not require legislators or a Legislature. Were our statute-book like that of the Medes and Persians, we should be saved much work now done by many of the best intellects of the time.

What, then, is the essential distinction between Positive Law and Public Morality? How do Positive Laws differ from Public Morality? How can the one help the other?

I. How do they differ? The moral law takes account of all conduct, both the outward manifestation and the inward disposition, and not only of that which arises in connection with social and political life. It pierces through the external rules of positive law and gets at the thought and intent of the heart. It passes judgment on the motive that induces us to perform our actions. It takes into view both the immediate and the remote intention.

On the other hand, positive laws take account only of the outward consequences of conduct. In

some cases they also investigate the intention. But the inscrutable workings of the disposition and the mind lie beyond the area of their cognisance. Positive laws protect property, award damages in the case of infringement of their enactments, and punish the evil-doer. But they cannot insure that those who obey them shall be loyal to the Government or shall use their individual liberty of action to promote the ends for which Government exists.

1. The purpose of much of the paternal legislation that has recently taken place is not to compel men to be virtuous, but to withdraw many of the temptations to vice which previously existed. "We cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament." But Acts of Parliament can make the conditions of life to the factory children and the coal miners more healthful, and so can enable them to resist inducements to lawlessness. These laws concern themselves with external conditions and results; while ethical laws are not content with external obedience. These latter would condemn a man who acts honestly on the ground that honesty is the best policy. If it is policy that moves his will, then ethics condemns an action springing from such a feeling. "There is nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him; but the things which come out of him, these are they that defile the man" (Mark vii. 15).

This is the reason why Christianity has never sought to make use of the sword for the propagation of its tenets. It was a great mistake that Constantine made when he determined to compel

the people by an edict to become Christians. A National Establishment must guard against any attempt to force men into religion, lest it should induce them to adopt the form of piety without the spirit. "Forced prayers are no devotion" is an old saying of much wisdom.

2. Civil law enforces its authority by the aid of the legal courts and the policemen. If the criminal escapes from the clutch of the officer, he may have to flee the country; but otherwise justice does not take hold of him. The law of extradition between civilised countries makes it possible for the one to help the other in the apprehension of criminals; so that with the spread of civilisation and the extension of international law there is less hope of crime escaping its condign punishment. Still the breaker of the law may escape. He often does escape through some legal loop-hole or lack of sufficient evidence. The prisoner at the bar always gets the benefit of the doubt, it being better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should suffer.¹

But there is no escape from the authority of moral law. Public morality quietly pronounces upon the guilty man its own sentence of condemnation. It is its own prosecutor and its own judge. If it cannot punish by fines and imprisonment it punishes by social ostracism. It condemns the offender to banishment from the society of the polite, the cultured and the pure-minded. It rises beyond the distinction of political party, and

¹ Cf. Lecky, *History of Europe*, i., pp. 147-48.

permits only those to belong to its friends who are temperate, just and of good report. This power of social repudiation is a valuable one in the interests of morality and of religion. For it may have the effect of the legal stage of education to which St. Paul refers in Galatians iii. The man who is ostracised from the company of the pure and honest realises his own sinfulness in the tacit judgment of his neighbours. Often it has been a schoolmaster to drive the prodigal to repentance and to confession of his sin. There are men who can endure fines and imprisonment who cannot endure the cold shoulder, the diverted look, the frown of friends. The general disapprobation of society may thus become a strong support of positive law and of good government.

3. Prof. Sidgwick adds another important distinction between State law and public morality consisting in the comparative definiteness of the former. If any of the terms of a statute be indefinite or vague in its application or ambiguous in ordinary use it is the duty of the judge who investigates a particular case to interpret the ambiguous language so as to make it consistent with the meaning of the whole statute. In this way judicial law-making is always going on, and the meaning of the statute becomes the more explicit with every decision given by the court of law. It is otherwise with respect to public opinion. Here there is no selected judge or jury. In some parts of Scotland there are to be found social strata in which illegitimacy of birth is scarcely counted a stain, and where what is known

as the social sin is hardly frowned upon by the rural community. There were times not over a hundred years ago when drunkenness was so far from being punished by social ostracism that manhood was measured by the number of tumblers of whisky-toddy that could be taken.

There is great need for an exaltation and purifying of public opinion with regard to social sins. Every Christian man is bound to contribute by word and by conduct to the formation of an enlightened public morality that shall bring the great force of popular opinion to bear upon our national vices, and shall stamp with its loudest condemnation all that betting and gambling, all that intemperance and immorality which are injuring our commerce, polluting our pleasures, undermining the morals of our young men, and gnawing like a wolf at the very vitals of religion. The insidious vices of to-day, springing from a growing luxury and increasing wealth, can never be met and overcome by statutory enactment. They can be vanquished only by a more robust type of religion, and by a more enlightened spirit of public morality.

II. Can positive law help public morals? In several ways we believe it may. Experience has shown that when once a law has been enacted by the State a public sentiment accumulates in its favour. Many ignorant people are to be found who hardly believe that drunkenness is a sin and a crime against humanity. It is the policeman who brings the sin home to their doors and becomes the agent of their moral education.

1. There is a necessary action and reaction between the State and public morals by which the general respect of the citizens for the laws of the realm comes to weigh in favour of the particular law which is being enforced. The people under the present wide suffrage elect their own representatives to the House of Commons, and they naturally believe that the laws made by their representatives are binding upon the conscience and are entitled to their respect and obedience. In this manner the Legislature can powerfully aid in the formation of a high conception of public morality.

2. The State may aid morals both negatively and positively. It may do this by refusing its protection to any kind of vice or to whatever is hurtful to public morals. And it may effect the same end by extending its aid to education and to religion.

(a) In connection with the former method the State will refuse to permit the existence of gambling houses that live upon the known weakness of people with a passion for games of chance. It will condemn the whole system of State lotteries so much favoured in many continental countries. For nothing more quickly injures the moral character of the people than to be induced to believe that they can earn their living without honest work, or that it is wise to stake their savings upon the throw of the dice. The gambling spirit is the antithesis of the Christian love of service and the law of work. It is destructive of the habit of foresight, and it minimises the power of

skill. It tends to foster a spirit of rashness and of false confidence which too readily relies upon haphazard. It creates an attitude of mind which, strange to say, welcomes chance simply as chance. To the majority of men the unknown and the unseen are full of danger, and they make every effort that foresight and insurance of life can give to eliminate the risks of chance. But wherever the spirit of gambling prevails the victim comes to realise a delight in the very venture. There is a spice in the hazard : there is in the risks involved a certain stimulus or spur to the weak will that has thrown aside caution and cast the reins upon the neck of fate.

There can be no doubt that the love of hazard is contrary to the first principles of economics, and that the centres of gambling on the Continent are plague-spots from which a most corrupting influence radiates throughout the length and breadth of Europe. Every honest mind instinctively condemns it. It contradicts the fundamental principles of Christian Ethics. It also goes against the principle of honour, and in course of time it breeds a fearful cupidity, which becomes the characteristic craving of the *habitué* of the gaming table. We do not wonder that the French and German Governments found themselves compelled, from regard to the welfare of their people, to make gambling halls illegal. Even in Britain they are kept down only by the very strictest watchfulness of the police and by the heavy fines imposed on the offenders.

In all innocent recreation we recognise a moral element. It can be made an object of moral volition. But games of chance are thoroughly immoral, since they would throw the distribution of merit into the hands of chance, where our moral freedom is lost. A life in which gains are made in this way cannot be called a moral life. It fosters a spirit that hates honest work, and delights in rewards which it has not won. The gambler's life of constant excitement, in which one's daily happiness is staked on the turn of the wheel of fortune, is not one that any Christian man could endure.

We do not speak of those parlour games where the aim is simply relaxation, and where a certain element of chance for the purpose of giving a recreation is introduced. But whenever the aim is money-making and not mere recreation, the line of exclusion must be drawn by the Christian man.

The State, if it is to aid morality, must not scruple to legislate against the forms which this gambling mania takes at horse-races and other sports. The love of sport is a characteristic of our countrymen which may safely be encouraged. But because it is so necessary to our population, which in increasing numbers is becoming an urban one and stands in need of all bracing and open-air exercise, the association of betting with games and races is all the more to be deprecated.

It were well if this element of uncertainty could be entirely dissociated by the Legislature from our Stock Exchanges. In all commerce there must be an element of risk; and in the

extended relations of business to-day, communicating with all parts of the world, this element is increasing rather than diminishing. But the line is easily drawn between the risk of genuine transactions, where real exchange is made and an article is bought and sold, and the wholly different species of risk connected with dealing on the Exchange in mere differences. In the latter there is not a genuine sale: the pretended purchase is simply gambling in the hope that stock may fall or may rise.

What should be made illegitimate is to purchase, or to pretend to purchase, shares or stocks in the expectation of a future rise without paying for them, and then to account only for the differences between two values. This, however much skill may enter as an element into the transaction, is nothing but gambling. It has a most injurious influence on prices, and the genuine dealer proportionately suffers. It is at the present moment operating to the serious detriment of trade, and encourages a species of speculation which is nothing better than an organised fraud. It has been well described in the words of one of the ablest judges of London: "A more disgraceful and discreditable system of gambling does not exist in the world. Play at Monte Carlo is respectable compared with the gambling carried on by brokers in the courts and alleys of the city of London."

These men are the hungry parasites of our industrial order; they are sucking the life-blood

of our British commerce. A system of gambling by dealing in margins is a piratical method of making profits. It has in it not one of the three elements that determine the rate of legitimate profit—neither interest on capital, nor compensation for risk, nor wages of superintendence.¹ Certainly it cannot be argued, when one pays a fire insurance and asks that part of his profits be counted as compensation for the sum thus spent in providing against risk, that his action is on a par with that of him who claims remuneration for the risks he takes in gambling on the Stock Exchange. The one is carrying through an honest transaction and is making a real sale or purchase. The other is obstructing the free distribution of wealth by tapping it at a certain point and securing a share of the profits of industry. To such a share he is not entitled, either as wages for work, or compensation for risks, or as legitimate interest for his capital.

To assert that Government cannot put down this system of economic piracy is nothing less than political treason. It may be said that although such gambling is detrimental to economic well-being, yet it is not a suitable subject for legal repression, and that the temptation to it is so strong that, if driven into secrecy, it will assume some more aggravated form. This has for long been a standing objection to all repression of betting and gambling, that when forced into private clubs they do more injury to morals than

¹ Fawcett, *Man. of Pol. Econ.*, book ii., chap. v.

when openly permitted and legitimised. But the objection has been recently overcome with regard to those clubs which are now under the supervision of Government. Besides, betting and turf-gambling are conducted apart from Stock Exchanges, in which only real trade bargains should be permitted, and whose members should be rigidly excluded from entering on their books such transactions as amount to gambling.

On the ground of Christian Ethics this vice is to be opposed for very substantial reasons. In the first place, gambling is inconsistent with the law of labour, the law which the Word of God formulates—"If any man do not work, neither shall he eat". Honest wage is the reward of honest labour. It is payment for work done. He who wins money by lottery or by betting violates the fundamental law of labour, and infringes the rights of his fellow-creatures. Such a man cannot expect the blessing of God upon his possessions. Money immorally gained, profits made by a breach of the economic laws, burn a hole in a man's pocket. To get money is not wrong; to possess money is a natural desire; to save money is to practise the virtue of thrift and to aid the development of industry by the capital thus saved. But all money must be made by honourable methods; and for it we must give an equivalent in some kind of work. If we have won our money by some contribution of hand-labour or head-labour, then we rightly possess our wealth and can ask the blessing of God upon it. It is honestly and

worthily won ; therefore it may be honestly and worthily retained.

But when one considers what gambling is, can it be said that it possesses any of these characteristics ? Does the gambler earn his money by exertion and industry ? Does he make his gains by honourable methods ? Does he furnish any equivalent to the common good for the coin which he takes ? What contribution does he make to the well-being of the Commonwealth ? Is it not a fact that wherever gambling has prevailed the State has been injured, men have been demoralised and morality has deteriorated ? Gambling, tested by experience, has universally proved a curse and not a blessing. Tested by the principles of ethics, it can still less stand the trial. The gains of gambling are made by dishonourable means. They have not been won by honest labour. We do not say that they have not cost their owner thought and trouble ; but it has been the cleverness of knavery and the skill which even a burglar may apply to his nefarious trade. The man himself has made no contribution to the production or distribution of wealth. The farmer grows his wheat which produces bread ; and he feeds his cattle which produce meat for the population. The fisherman gives us our fish, the compositor our newspaper, the engineer our machinery. The banker furthers our commerce by aiding barter and by providing the precious media of exchange. All these men are assisting the production of the world's credit ; they economise its wealth ; they increase its commodities ; they cheapen its food ; they

multiply its literature, and they promote its well-being. But what element of good is furnished by the gambler? What contribution has he made to the world's capital or to the store of human knowledge? Whom has he helped to feed or to clothe? He has produced nothing that is tangible; he has created neither a house nor a ship, neither a book nor a poem. He has simply sat down at the world's feast and sought to gorge himself by capturing the gains of others who have toiled and laboured. He has lived by fraud upon the fruits of honest work; he has traded on the simplicity and ignorance of mankind. He has managed to keep within the bounds of the civil law, in order to violate every rescript of equity and every principle of justice.

Besides all this violation of ethical and of economic laws, gambling has consequences which react upon the man himself. Every breach of ethical law is followed by a nemesis. He that wrongs others by gambling still more wrongs his own moral being. As he strives to obtain property without work, and to invoke the blind heathen Goddess of Chance upon his side, so most surely he loses the good opinion of society, and still more parts with his own self-respect.

We are told that in many circles of business such views are laughed at, and are called fantastic, priggish, purist. It is said that it is impossible to conduct modern business on such puritanic principles. That we cannot believe. All merchants of high character deny it and refute it. Betting, gambling and dealing in differences, as a rule, ruin

the man who engages in them. If they do not, it is because he is so skilled in knavery that he has utterly ruined his own moral nature, and in order to make a living has become the slave of dishonesty and cupidity. But no man should desire to live unless he can live by honest methods.

Gambling brings its own nemesis in the growing inability of the victim to bend his mind to the doing of honest work. He has learned to live in the excitement of chance; and he who has been accustomed to such dram-drinking has become unfit for the stale routine of honest work. The whole life of the gambler is one of unhealthy excitement. It is destructive of manliness and weakens the moral tissue. Employers know that the clerk who has once indulged in this vice is seldom again to be trusted. He has been bitten by the adder and the poison has entered his veins. All his best virtues have been sacrificed. A drunkard may be cured; a thief may become honest; for misery or hunger may have driven them to their sins. But gambling is the slow growth and outcome of sheer greed and laziness; and there are few vices that it is more difficult to eradicate. These seem to weave themselves through the entire warp and woof of the moral fabric; and they become so essentially a part of a man's character that to unweave them is like tearing his heart-strings asunder. The man who has once yielded to this peculiar species of temptation seems to be smitten by a kind of moral paralysis that deprives him of the will-power to do honest

work, and to make a living by the labour of his hands or the ingenuity of his brain. To the end of his days he still believes that the Goddess of Luck will be upon his side if only some one will lend him new capital with which again to play his cards.

(*b*) The same invocation of the blind Goddess of Fortune is to be found in the fondness of many for Lotteries and for Betting. On the Continent of Europe the State itself frequently permits the use of the Wheel of Fortune in order to raise money for public purposes. This is, in the sacred name of government, to exploit a human weakness, and to cultivate by immoral methods the desire to obtain money without earning it. Christian Ethics cannot countenance any custom that violates the Scriptural connection between working and eating. For a State to organise the lottery system and allow it to be a means to political ends is to undermine morality in the name of civil administration. It is a political crime; and its influence on the people is far-reaching. Every kind of lottery should be made illegal. The poor are prone to indulge in this custom, and count it a diversion and an easy means of helping a needy brother. The habit must be cured by teaching people that money can be made and poverty driven away only by frugality and industry. Christianity cannot countenance the Wheel of Fortune.

It is to be feared that the vice of Betting is upon the increase and that it has recently assumed alarming proportions. There is no doubt that it

is largely associated with horse-racing and with many other sports. Springing as it does out of the love of venture and the excitement that "stakes" bring, it is simply gambling in another form. It is a vice which seems to exercise a powerful influence over the young. Its recent introduction into many high-class boys' schools is greatly to be deplored. Every endeavour should be made to prevent the bookmaker from having access by letters or otherwise to public schools.

It is to be desired that the healthy sports of our country should be dissociated from the sin of betting. In itself horse-racing may be a most innocent amusement, and may afford healthful pleasure for the masses. When there is a strong drift of the rural population to the cities, every encouragement should be given to such national open-air sports as cricket, football and boating. Yet, according to the evidence of the recent Betting Commission, these sports are marred and shadowed by this injurious association. Hitherto prohibitive legislation has been of little avail. Probably, were the example of Belgium in this matter to be followed, and were the Newspaper Press forbidden to publish "tipster" news, one great incentive to this evil would be removed.¹ Its real root will be

¹ An action concluded before Mr. Justice Darling (March, 1905), in which an ex-Police Inspector sued a bookmaker for libel, revealed the extent to which illicit betting is carried on. The judge, in his conversation with the Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, evidently designed to elicit the facts concerning betting in the metropolis, with a view to awakening

destroyed only when the love of honest work displaces the desire to make money by hazard, and when games and sports are sought only for the healthy recreation which they afford.

(c) Another vice that may be diminished, or at least greatly curtailed, by the action of the State is the vice that lurks within houses of Ill Fame. This appears to-day in many forms, and unfortunately is hidden away under disguises that conceal its baseness and infamous cruelty. It has been found very difficult for the Legislature to deal with it without advertising it: and it has been made not less difficult by the action of military authorities in India and elsewhere who at one time condemned it and yet permitted its presence in illicit forms.¹

interest in the direction of legislation. The two following questions and answers need no comment:—

“Do you find, in your experience, that the habit of gambling leads people to the commission of many other crimes?”—“*I believe it is responsible, probably, for almost as much crime as drink.*”

“You have seen the kind of letters received at the office, of women writing to say that their homes were broken up, their money all spent in these clubs and with betting men in the streets. In your opinion, are those overdrawn?”—“*Not at all; I believe them to be true in fact.*”

¹ Mr. Lecky has some suggestive remarks on this subject in his *History of European Morals*, vol. i., p. 145: “It is probable that the observance of this form of virtue is naturally most strict in a rude and semi-civilised but not barbarous people, and that a very refined civilisation is not often favourable to its growth. Sensuality is the vice of young men and of old nations. A languid epicureanism is the normal condition of nations which have attained a high intellectual or social

But no one who considers the condition of misery to which women are doomed by this vice will hesitate to acknowledge that the State is not justified in making concessions to passion for the sake of preventing other evils. Such concessions have been urged in order to preserve and protect educated women from seduction. The end is worthy, but it does not justify the means adopted to reach it, and none but Jesuitical minds would use it. There have been those who, in a utilitarian spirit, would exploit the "barren prostitute" in order to save the "fruitful wife";¹ but no right-

civilisation, but which, through political causes, have no adequate sphere for the exertion of their energies. The temptation arising from the great wealth of some, and from the feverish longing for luxury and exciting pleasures in others, which exists in all large towns, has been peculiarly fatal to female virtue, and the whole tendency of the public amusements of civilisation is in the same direction. The rude combats which form the chief enjoyments of barbarians produce cruelty. The dramatic and artistic tastes and the social habits of refined men produce sensuality. Education raises many poor women to a stage of refinement that makes them suitable companions for men of a higher rank, and not suitable for those of their own. Industrial pursuits have, indeed, a favourable influence in promoting habits of self-restraint, and especially in checking the licence of military life; but on the other hand, they greatly increase temptation by encouraging postponement of marriage, and in communities, even more than in individuals, moral inequalities are much more due to differences of temptation than to differences of self-restraint. In large bodies of men a considerable increase of temptation always brings with it an increase, though not necessarily a proportionate increase, of vice."

¹ The phrase is Mr. Cotter Morison's. Cf. W. S. Lilly, *Right and Wrong*, p. 47.

mind Christian man can permit such an argument to have influence over him. It is contrary to the instincts of our common humanity, and it is flatly contradicted by the precepts of Christianity.

How, then, shall the State help morality here? It can help it by condemning Houses of Ill Fame. It helps it by making solicitation on the street a crime. Above all, it is rendering help in the carefulness with which it watches over the moral welfare of young women and punishes panderers to vice. But not much can be done by legislation or by the policeman. The rough-and-ready methods by which our Teutonic forefathers sought to enforce chastity would now be entirely out of date. The Church of Scotland was compelled to give up the penitent's stool in the congregation. It did more harm than good: to some extent it was found to kindle hatred of Church discipline and to stimulate a public feeling in favour of a fallen sister.

The State has it in its power to minimise the resultant evils, both moral and physical: and this is being done. But the true remedy of the evil will be found in another direction. The whole mind of the community on this matter will have to be changed, and our literature must reflect the higher point of view.

The materialistic philosophy of the last century helped to remove the stigma from the courtesan's life. The infamy of it had been formerly recognised; but a fleshly school of novelists arose who discovered in this fallen creature an object of admiration. She became the heroine of their novels and

the theme of many a romance. The French drama brought her on the stage, and held her up to the regard of the public. For a time the moral atmosphere got tainted with this foulness. Society suffered as from a festering wound.

A better tone has now come into our light literature, and a truer psychology has united itself with a higher morality in the depicting of character. But we must not forget that it is woman herself who largely determines the ethical view-point of society. And her conception of religion invariably colours her ideas of morality. If she part with belief in God and in a heaven of the holy, then nothing but the weak defence of personal attractions will protect her from the lawless life. For between the two sexes the differences are not merely physical but psychical.¹ And when her instincts and affections, which govern her far more than reason, are in favour of a materialistic conception of existence, that ideal of life which is her strength is gone. The woman of the Positivist School is a dehumanised creature. As such she is ill-assured against the vacillations of man's changing fancy or the caprice of his appetite. Yet upon her position in society depends all that gives

¹ For woman is not undevelop't man
 But diverse : could we make her as the man
 Sweet love were slain : his dearest bond is this
 Not like to like, but like in difference :
 Distinct in individualities,
 But like each other ev'n as those who love.

—TENNYSON.

worth and dignity to civilisation. All the important questions that concern the ethics of the family are bound up with the sanctity of marriage and the social elevation of woman-kind. The literature of our twentieth century must learn to set a higher value on the virtue of chastity, whether in the virginal or the married state.¹

Above all, the Christian manhood of the land must be quickened to regard the sin of seduction as a heinous crime and a hateful and mean thing. It is here that the Church must come to the help of the State, not only by erecting Homes of Refuge for Fallen Women and by active rescue work in cities, but also by creating a moral sentiment that shall denounce the Social Sin and shall frown on every infringement of the laws of virtue.²

¹ "La femme est dans toute l'histoire l'élément de fixité. Le bon sens dit assez pourquoi. Non seulement parce qu'elle est mère, qu'elle est le foyer, la maison, mais parce qu'elle met dans l'association une mise disproportionnée, énorme, en comparaison de celle de l'homme. Elle s'y met toute et sans retour. La plus simple comprend bien que tout changement est contre elle; qu'en changeant elle baisse très vite; que du premier homme au second, elle perd déjà cent pour cent. Et qu'est ce donc au troisième? que sera-ce au dixième? hélas!"—Michelet, *L'Amour*, p. 32.

² There are districts in Scotland in which the Social Sin is regarded with little detestation. These are chiefly agricultural areas in which the custom has become habituated and the moral tone of the agricultural labourer is on this point low. Probably habits of outdoor work and the difficulties in the way of early marriages in these districts have been contributory causes. With the rise in ploughmen's wages and the consequent facility in getting a house and a home, this sin is on

By all such restrictions and legislative control the State may advance its citizens in virtue. Being an ethical entity it is responsible for the highest welfare of its people, and is bound to do what it can to minimise the temptations to vice. At the same time, experience has often shown that legal repression defeats its end by leading to hypocrisy and concealment, followed by a reaction into the excesses of the sin repressed. This has been urged against the total repression of gambling, betting and prostitution, and in favour of indirect methods to stimulate the morality of citizens. But when these vices have assumed a bold front, methods of direct repression must be employed. The whole laws and institutions of the State should be constructed so as to reduce all temptations to gambling and impurity. The Government must secure for its citizens a material and intellectual environment compatible with a virtuous life. It must see that all temptations to an immoral career and all facilities in that direction are removed.

3. Positively. It is true that it is not the State's duty to act as a censor of morals. Its purpose is to dispense justice, to maintain order and liberty, and to enforce its laws by authority. Yet if the end of the State be the perfection and welfare of the whole community, and "the bringing of man to the

the decrease. The spread of education is another factor tending in the same healthy direction. And we may hope to see the agricultural community of Scotland as free from it as is the fishing community, among which early marriages have for long been an established custom.

highest degree of civilisation to which he is capable,"¹ it is clear that it cannot accomplish this end apart from moral motives. It must therefore seek to stimulate the ethical well-being of the nation, and must *positively* interfere in the interests of morality.

(a) It has, however, been questioned whether the State should aim directly by legislation at making men moral, or whether it is not better to use indirect means. Many eminent politicians have acknowledged that while the State undoubtedly has a right to intervene in all matters affecting the well-being of the community, yet the motive should be economic, or political, or spring out of sanitary reasons. They have seen how in many cases the State has interfered with individual morality, and has been proved to be in the wrong. Moreover, they believe that it is injurious to intervene between a man and his conscience, and they would be no party to any such limitation of moral freedom.

We shall not dispute these arguments. We believe it is far from good when the law of the State contradicts any man's conscience; and every Christian man must regret any instance in which the individual has suffered at the hand of the State for righteous action. But such errors may be avoided in more enlightened days and with wiser men at the helm of Government. No man liveth to himself in the sense that his life does not affect

¹ Hoffmann, *The Sphere of the State*, p. 16.

the morality of the community. It is difficult to explain the action of the State towards criminals without supposing that after justice has been satisfied in imposing a penalty the moral welfare of the citizens is a secondary motive. We not only punish these with imprisonment, but we seek by prison discipline and prison chaplains to improve their character. In sending young offenders to Reformatory Schools and Training Ships the State rightly keeps in view their moral welfare.

The distinction between law and morality is not an absolute one. We cannot keep them separate. They have their own spheres. The State may remove many obstacles to virtue, although it may not compel men to be moral. But positive law would lose its highest sanction and internal meaning if it were to be entirely divorced from moral considerations. These latter may be kept in the background, and they are never made prominent in legislation ; but more and more in recent years Government has become paternal, and has thought of the moral and physical welfare of children and of women and of those engaged in unhealthy occupations. It would be impossible to explain the passing of the Factory Acts and much recent legislation regarding sanitary matters, without supposing that ethical principles operated, not less than a regard for physical health. Moral and physical well-being are inseparable ; and the sanitary statutes that prohibit whole families from living in single rooms have improved the morals as well as the physique of the population.

At the same time, the State, wherever it is possible, should rather stimulate individual initiative in favour of moral culture than itself supply it. Its intervention with the liberties of its subjects should be reduced to the minimum of interference. Whatever it does, it should be very careful never to throw cold water on individual enterprise, nor to help those who can help themselves.

The maxim of Socialism, which would so absorb the individual in society as to sacrifice his rights to its governmental authority, is thoroughly unethical. An individual citizen, who knows that he is an end to himself and a free moral agent, is bound to resist whatever may hinder him in his efforts after self-realisation.¹ It is one of the principles of Socialism that the individual is wholly dependent on society and possesses no rights of his own apart from the latter. Such a principle strikes at the root of freedom, and is as irreligious as it is immoral. It originates in an erroneous conception of the relations of the individual to the State. We have defined the State as an organised society of citizens within a certain territory; but we were careful to point out that the figure of an animal organism used here is only an analogy, and that all we can say is that the State resembles an organic body. To go beyond this biological analogy and affirm that a citizen is related to the State as the leaf to the tree or the foot to the human body, is to forget that every citizen is a free

¹ Flint, *Socialism*, chap. x.

personality and an end to himself, while the State is only a means to the promotion of the welfare of its citizens. Organisms exclude individuality and freedom on the part of their various members. But within the State men are free and must be rationally convinced of the benefit of all positive law before they can be called upon to yield it obedience.

Modern Socialism has come to regard the liberty of the individual as veritably an evil. The man who dares to think for himself outside of its unions is a traitor to society and a "blackleg" among his fellow-tradesmen. Socialism has an eye rather for the abuse than the use of freedom. It would consequently invoke State authority to an extent that would deprive individuals of many of their fundamental rights and liberties. In its more modern form of Collectivism its purpose is to gain possession of the wealth of the country so as to control all its industrial and economic forces. But to make the State the sole proprietor by the expropriation of all landlords would end in a despotism in which the Government officials would be all-powerful and every other citizen would be little better than a puppet or a slave. Each man having no means of his own would have to accept what those officers would dictate to him as his duty, and liberty would give place to a species of militarism that would intensify the evils it seeks to cure.¹

It will be now seen that it is not easy to formu-

¹ Rae, *Contemporary Socialism*, chap. viii.

late any theory of State intervention which is not liable to be attacked either by Individualists or by Socialists. Yet these are extremes which we must avoid, and there are certain definite principles or laws which all theories of State intervention must observe. One of these is that those natural rights or fundamental liberties which have been won by the struggle of men for many ages—moral and political freedom, liberty of contract and of speech—must not be interfered with. History has shown that to attempt to repress these is to extinguish the spirit of progress and to foster the spirit of revolution. Further, no intervention by the State that hinders individual initiative, or tends to repress individual enterprise, can be wise or effective. Whatever can be done by individual energy and self-help is best when so done. “If the State assumes the management of affairs which the citizens would have been able to carry on without its aid, the effect will be that the citizens lose both the disposition and the readiness for independent initiative, that their individuality becomes stunted; and thus, as the factors of progress dwindle away, the State itself becomes enfeebled and decays.”¹

(b) In speaking of how positive law may actually help public morality, there is one important means which should not be overlooked. Whenever the State interferes with legislation, as *e.g.*, in the case of the Vaccination Acts, in which an important scientific truth was embodied in the

¹ Puloszky, *The Theory of Law*, p. 307.

Statute Law, the legislature has one great social force operating in its favour. The law compels the citizen to observe a certain line of conduct for the sake of the general health and for the prevention of the spread of disease. Now, it is a well-known fact that conduct reacts upon conviction, and that, as men go on to observe the law, a public opinion grows in favour of it. Notwithstanding that a certain number of people have persuaded themselves that public vaccination is an infraction of their liberties, the sentiment in favour of it has steadily grown. At first it was found that the people were very averse to this preventive process, and that parents were still more unwilling to have their children inoculated with the lymph. But the law, by securing general obedience to a wise sanitary regulation, has gradually created a public opinion in its favour, which is now amply sustained by the experience of almost universal freedom from the scourge of small-pox.

(c) The State may also, in aid of public morality, provide for the instruction of its citizens in morality by the appointment of professional teachers. To some extent this is done in the modern national schools, in which Government Inspectors encourage the study of books which contain the simplest elements of morality and bear upon the duty of citizens to the State.¹ Such inspectors also might greatly encourage moral sentiments by prescribing a course of study in national history, and especially

¹ Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, p. 215.

in good literature, such as would quicken the feelings of patriotism and inspire the love of the beautiful and the detestation of the coarse and the sordid. The Exchequer also pays a certain sum to the Universities in Scotland as a subsidy, and thus indirectly aids them as teachers of Ethics to a rising generation.

In England and Scotland, where the Christian Church is established and is in union with the State, it may also be said that the Government is directly aiding morality, in so far as it endows the teaching of the Christian religion. All that we here shall say, in addition to what has been said in a former chapter, is that Christianity is so intimately connected with Morality that, whatever Churches teach its doctrines they thereby co-operate with the State in the moral education of the community. The inculcation by the Church of the principles of Christian Ethics cannot fail to convince the people that the laws of a nation have a high claim on their obedience.¹ It is impossible that those who are convinced of the truths of Christianity can disregard the essential doctrines of morality.

4. How can Christian Morality aid Positive Law? This is a most important question, and concerns every patriotic citizen. As we have already said, wherever its doctrines prevail Christianity has been of great assistance to the Government in inculcating truths which guide a nation to

¹ Cf. chap. vii. and chap. ix., *supra*,

its highest destiny. It has been the mainspring of social morality and the redeeming element in politics. This has been denied by many writers of the Positive School, who regard Christianity as only a low stage in the progress of Humanity. And yet the founder of Positivism, although he excluded religion from the ethical sphere, had in the end to create a makeshift for it in the kingdom of the Positivists. He simply transferred to the worship of Humanity the religious sanctions which he had stolen from the so-called age of Theology. Naturalistic Ethics has to invent some ideal sentiment to answer the purpose of a religion for social life. The English Utilitarians admit this, and even J. S. Mill, while endeavouring to prove that morality is independent of religious sanctions, makes the frank avowal that "to call these sentiments by the name 'morality,' exclusively of any other title, is claiming too little for them. They are a real religion."¹

If that is so, they have certainly most intimate relations with life and order in the State. They touch our individual and social life on all sides. They give colour to our conception of the ideal ends of our nation's existence and of its purpose among the races of the world. Our scientific conception of social good cannot be estimated simply in terms of economic well-being. Social Ethics must have an outlook towards all the higher possibilities of the national life.

¹ Mill, *Utilitarianism*, chap. iii. Cf. Fowler's *Progressive Morality*, chaps. i. and ii.

The Christian religion will aid Positive Law by teaching all its adherents to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to pay respect to all properly constituted authority. Very frequently throughout the New Testament is the duty enforced of obedience to magistrates and subjection to the higher powers that are ordained of God. "Whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto governors as sent by Him, for vengeance on evil-doers, and for praise to them that do well; for so is the will of God, that ye should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men."¹ The spirit of insubordination is here entirely condemned. So far as possible Christians are to live at peace with all men. This is the spirit that promotes harmony and goodwill throughout a State and ensures the blessings of order and fraternity. It tends to bind fellow-citizens together in the solidarity of nationality and in the promotion of the arts of peace. The nation whose citizens continue to live together in this spirit will possess an internal strength that, if war should become necessary, will be a strong bulwark of defence against the common foe.

Yet the aid which is thus given to the State by religion has received but scanty recognition at the hands of politicians. The Benthamite School ignore it. They replace it by utilitarian principles and by the teachings of Political Economy which has practically deified selfishness. Socialism also, strange to

¹ 1 Peter ii. 13, 14.

say, is largely a generalised egoism, and is very far from being the altruistic system which it is supposed to be.¹ It is often spoken of as essentially religious, but this is done only by those who are loose thinkers. It acknowledges no superior except the State: it recognises no higher good than that which is secular. Social Democracy is not content with being indifferent to Christianity, but, on the Continent at least, is already positively hostile. If it become dominant in the State, another era of persecution will have to be endured.² Unless all the present symptoms of its tendencies are reversed, we fear that in the Socialistic State we shall not find Christianity recognised as a beneficent element.

(a) There may be some small excuse in the prevailing assumptions of the present time for politicians conducting their work without any express recognition of the moral laws of God whose instruments they are. But no wave of temporary scepticism can justify Christian statesmen in treating the principles of Christian Ethics as negligible quantities. The present times are big with important issues. Great empires are watching one another with restless jealousy, ready to be inflamed by the slightest miscarriage of justice into passionate hostility. The politicians who think that the self-regarding instincts of men will of themselves bring about harmonious adjustments, do not convince us. Past history is far from

¹ Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 250.

² Flint, *Socialism*, chap. ix.

reassuring us upon these points. We are persuaded that not only individuals but nations should include the Christian virtues of love and mercy within the category of the obligations which they owe to each other.

We hail with joy signs of this on the part of those who are most influential at present in the Government of Great Britain. And we are assured that every public example of the nation waiting upon God during great crises to confess its sins and to ask His guidance, every instance of its curbing its ambitions by the restraints of duty and of bearing some burden in the interests of humanity, will increase the solidarity of the empire and be greatly helpful to its people.

(b) Still more Christian Ethics can come to the aid of public morality in many cases where the legislature has been unable to enact laws. Circumstances frequently arise in the exigencies of party warfare that make it impossible for those in power to legislate as they could wish against certain evils. Legislation is clumsy in its action, and its sweep is often either too wide or too narrow to be effective. In such an event the Church may come to the support of the State with all the moral forces of disapprobation and of censure which it commands.

Much of what is denounced as the Sweating System is caused simply by the selfishness of traders and by the eagerness of the less skilful poor to get work. It is entirely beyond the penalties of the law. But the Christian community may

exercise a wholesome effect by expressing its censure of the system in unambiguous terms, and by appealing to the conscience of employers and employed. In the great industrial conflicts which are so frequently waged between hand-workers and capitalists, the State is powerless to intervene ; but the Christian moralist may speak with persuasive voice. One cannot forget how the late Bishop Lightfoot of Durham, in one of the largest strikes that ever took place, benefited both miners and coal-owners by his Christian tact and calm judgment. In such circumstances the sense of what is fair and just is more easily arrived at apart from legislation ; and any breach of equity is best left to the moral censure of the community. In like manner profligacy and illegitimacy are unsuitable objects for statutory repression ; but where the Christian community brings the weight of moral sentiment to bear upon these sins, they are found rapidly to diminish.

(*c*) On the other hand, civil society, with the help of Christian teaching, may develop some of the most noble virtues that can strengthen a State. Christianity has provided for the discipline of the youth of the State in all the virtues of righteous character. For the duty of the Christian man is not to forsake municipal or political life, but to carry into all his civil activity the spirit of Jesus Christ. He who does this becomes a pillar of the State and a helpful factor in support of positive law and good order.

It was when Dr. Wendell Holmes, looking at

American politicians in their contest for the spoils of office, felt overpowered by the low tone of political morality, that he wrote these words :—

God give us men ! A time like this demands
 Great hearts, strong minds, true faith and willing hands !
 Men whom the best of office does not kill :
 Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy :
 Men who possess opinions and a will :
 Men who have honour, men who will not lie.
 For while the rabble with their thumb-worn creeds,
 Their large professions and their little deeds,
 Wrangle in selfish strife, lo ! Freedom weeps,
 Wrong rules the land, and waiting Justice sleeps.

(*d*) The foundation of all true civil virtue lies in the spirit of Christian patriotism. Its distinguishing feature is justice strengthened by affection for one's own country. Christian patriotism is one of the rarest of virtues. It would write the words of the Sermon on the Mount on the walls of every legislative chamber. It would help to build up a strong State and a powerful Government by measuring all civil acts by a Divine standard, and by making clear to all citizens the eternal sanctions of morality. But true patriotism is a thing of slow growth ; and we grieve to think it is not a common virtue. It seems to us to be the very flower of Christian Ethics. It is the latest and the highest development of Christian manhood.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SOCIAL MIND AND THE PRESS.

DURING the past century there has been a great gravitation of political influence to the people. The power that once was the prerogative of rank or of culture first passed into the possession of the middle class, and now is largely the property of the working classes of Great Britain. How they will make use of it for the extension of their rights and privileges is the question that agitates all thoughtful minds at the present time.

I.

THE SOCIAL MIND.

1. It is in connection with this devolution of political power to the Demos that we recognise the importance of those opinions that gain possession of the public mind. History teaches no lesson more forcibly than this one, that, at various times and in diverse manners, currents of thought have swept through men's minds, have swayed their feelings and drawn them into closest sympathy in action towards a common end.¹

¹Bagehot, in his *Physics and Politics*, chap. v., says :
"There are periods when great ideas are 'in the air,' and
(264)

History is not a biography of great men or a record of wars, but it is an account of the movements of the Social Mind. Luther did not create the Protestant Reformation, nor Rousseau the French Revolution. They only marked the climax of one social movement and the initiation of another. Every revolution is the fruition of some social ideal which may for years have been the possession of some individual mind, but which was

when, from some cause or other, even common persons seem to partake of an unusual elevation. The age of Elizabeth in England was conspicuously such a time. The new idea of the Reformation in religion, and the enlargement of the *mænia mundi* by the discovery of new and singular lands, taken together, gave an impulse to thought which few, if any, ages can equal. The discussion, though not wholly free, was yet far freer than in the average of ages and countries. Accordingly, every pursuit seemed to start forward. Poetry, science, and architecture, different as they are, and removed as they all are at first sight from such an influence as discussion, were suddenly started onward. . . . This is, in truth, but another case of the principle of which I have had occasion to say so much as to the character of ages and countries. If any particular power is much prized in an age, those possessed of that power will be imitated; those deficient in that power will be despised. In consequence an unusual quantity of that power will be developed, and be conspicuous. Within certain limits vigorous and elevated thought was respected in Elizabeth's time, and therefore, vigorous and elevated thinkers were many; and the effect went far beyond the cause. It penetrated into physical science, for which very few men cared; and it began a reform in philosophy to which almost all were then opposed. In a word, the temper of the age encouraged originality, and in consequence original men started into prominence, went hither and thither where they liked, arrived at goals which the age never expected, and so made it ever memorable."

finally taken up and became a development of the Social Mind. Then the tide of progress is felt to be resistless and carries all before it, sucking every eddy of thought into its onward current.

In all such movements it has been found that the people moved the leaders and not the leaders the people. These merely crested the wave of the flowing tide. They were in sympathy with it and gave it guidance; but the propulsive motion came from the public opinion that sustained and strengthened them.

This public sentiment, this prevailing conviction that has taken hold of men and is striving to give itself embodiment in social institutions, has been variously spoken of. It is entirely different from that historical trend which we know as the purpose of God in history.¹ The latter is the

¹The appeal to history for guidance is made with much confidence by Dr. Edwin Hatch in his St. Giles Lecture, "From Metaphysics to History," published in *The Contemporary Review*, June, 1889. He has specially in view, however, the history of doctrine, which, treated in the light of the comparative method, is full of significance. But when he would "abandon the search for essences and look only to the operation of forces," he ignores the true spirit of history. If Christian doctrines are not in themselves valid and defensible, historical science certainly cannot vitalise them. On the other hand, one of the best contributions made by the present age to theology has been through the History of Doctrine. The Ritschlian School have honoured history by making it a revelation of God as the true guide of mankind. Ritschl's appeal to history has a much better justification than Dr. Hatch's construction of it. The Ritschlians, despite their depreciation of Metaphysics, have in their own

manifestation of the Spirit of God in the moral government of the universe, and is very frequently misunderstood and maligned by the people of the day. But this other, which is merely spoken of as the Spirit of the Age, is not so easily defined or diagnosed. The period in which we live is one which is very powerfully affected by certain tendencies which have originated in past times, and have perpetuated their influence until at the present moment they have acquired a special character and exercise an extraordinary force. They mould the people's mind, control their desires and give shape to their social institutions and legislation. Often this Spirit of the Age is a subconscious yearning for some ideal state not yet defined or brought to a clear issue. Not unfrequently it is a confused medley of inconsistent longings that breed much confusion of mind; and then it probably ends in political hypnotism in which the clever strategist blinds the public to the real issues of the movement.

2. If we are asked, What is the Spirit of the present Age? it is not easy to give an answer. There are a dozen Time-Spirits contending for the mastery. There are probably a hundred *motifs* at work in the modern state. The particular tendency

way thoroughly justified their faith in God as the Ruler of nations.

Another view of history was presented by the late Professor Seeley, who described it as "philosophy teaching by examples". But he is thinking of Political History, and considers Politics as "history in the making".

that will in after years be recognised to have been the *Zeit-geist* of the opening decade of the twentieth century may not yet have shaken itself clear of correlated forces. Some of these tendencies are very selfish: some are socialistic: some are nihilistic.¹ The best are religious and Christian, and

¹ Some excellent advice on this point was given by Mr. Disraeli to the students of Glasgow University at his installation as Lord Rector. But he misunderstood the Time-Spirit when he spoke of it as the movement of mind of some sectional party. It is rather the main drift of the minds of the time; and men who are under its power feel as if they were urged on by an irresistible force of destiny.

Carlyle speaks of the *Zeit-geist* and the *Ewigkeit-geist* as different: the distinction seems to be that which we make between the spirit of the Age and the spirit of History. He makes much of the former in his *Sartor Resartus*, speaking of it sometimes as the Earth-Spirit which describes its work in Goethe's *Faust*—

“ ’Tis thus at the roaring Loom of Time I fly

And weave for God the garment thou see'st Him by ”.

Carlyle was an interpreter of the great forces working in society, of that background of veracities and unveracities, of superstitions, shams, hopes and trusts which go to make up the healthy current or the hurtful lava-stream of national life and to set forth or symbolise the providential Power evolving in history. But Carlyle's exposure of insincerities and his contempt for the belittling life of conventionality proceeded more from his admiration of sheer force and quantity than from a correct understanding of the Spirit of the Age. He had certainly the prophet's eye for the great social forces that sway men and nations; but when we expect a description of the *Zeit-geist* we are treated to pictures, most graphic and brilliant, of social phenomena and of heroic men. With the real Spirit of the Age, expressing itself in economic and socialistic movements, Carlyle had little sympathy. He did feel for the working-man.

find their force in scientific and economic ideas, and in moral and religious convictions.

“Hardly entreated brother! for us was thy back so bent: thou wert our conscript, on whom the lot fell!” But to his mind the many were idlers and in need of “the beneficent whip” of Frederick or of the iron rule of Napoleon.

Before Carlyle’s time Cousin had in his *Cour de* 1828 expressed himself in a way somewhat similar regarding great men and great wars. He had affirmed that great men sum up the spirit of epochs and of nations, and he maintained that history is but the biography of its heroes, who are always representative of their times. He is correct in stating that their greatness never is owing to any isolating aptitude or quality, but springs from a mental and moral force that roots itself in the life of their nation. But he forgets that the most representative people of the time are the common people. Professor Flint in his *Philosophy of History* has some very wise remarks on this subject. He says (p. 477): “In a word, those who vindicate for great men a place, and even a large place in history, defend the interests of truth; but those who represent history as only their united biographies or the connected series of their actions, resuscitate an old error which died and was buried long ago,—that narrow, superficial, and false notion which caused a justly forgotten race of authors to suppose the history of nations was merely the history of their kings and nobles”.

Great men do not create the Time-Spirit: they only embody it. Their real strength lies not in what separates them from it, but in what unites them in sympathy with it. It is their insight into its aspirations that gives them their influence. This was the reason why Ben Jonson calls William Shakespeare “the Soul of the Age”. The bard of Avon summed up and expressed the tendencies and the longings of his time. So does Tennyson in *Locksley Hall* and in *Locksley Hall Sixty Years After*. In the latter he makes the Time-Spirit a protest for equality:—

“Envy wears the mask of Love, and, laughing sober fact to scorn,
Cries to Weakest as to Strongest, ‘Ye are equals, equal-born’”.

Too often the Spirit of the Age is a confused spirit, uncertain as to its purpose and fickle in its motives. For though it express the want of the age, the age may desire one thing and may in reality need a very different thing. False ideals cloud and veil the true ideal. Besides, a narrow spirit of particularism or of locality may be mistaken for the true *Zeit-geist*. In *Enid* Tennyson, speaking of the villagers, says :—

They take the rustic murmur of their bourg
For the great wave that echoes round the world.

To comprehend the tendencies of one's own time is no easier matter than it was in Christ's day. In this task the Pharisees failed and the Sadducees blundered. The traditionalists might be excused for being unable "to discern the signs of the

And he meets that Spirit with the mocking words of sarcasm :—
"Tumble Nature heel o'er head, and, yelling with the yelling street,

Set the feet above the brain and swear the brain is in the feet".

Towards the close of the poem the sane advice is given :—

"Follow you the Star that lights a desert pathway, yours or mine.
Forward, till you see the highest Human Nature is divine."

No author speaks more of the *Zeit-geist* than Matthew Arnold. Under the spell of teaching he its obeyed the voice of Science that bade him believe only what was confirmed by observation and experiment, and offered us a substitute for the religion of which the Time-Spirit had despoiled us. Speaking of Bishop Butler's immortal work, in his lecture at Edinburgh, he adds : "It seemed once to have a spell and a power : but the *Zeit-geist* breathes upon it ; we rub our eyes, and it has the spell and the power no longer". But surely the progress of science is an entirely different thing from the Spirit of the Age.

times"; but one would have expected the Sadducees to have their eyes open to them. For there were "signs" innumerable that should have appealed to their better nature, and which they ought to have discerned not less quickly than they gathered the prognostications of fair or foul weather from the face of the sky. Yet they failed to read them, and they suffered the consequences of their neglect.

The Spirit of the Age springs out of the spirit of the past; and it must be true to the genius animating a nation's past history if that nation is to be prepared to meet its future. If asked more particularly to define it, we should say that it is (1) democratic, and that it is (2) social.

(1) It is a spirit that works for the many, not the few. It is of the people and for the people. It has sought to extend their privileges and to give them a decisive voice in controlling the legislation of the State. Under its influence a great transfer of power and influence from the wealthy to the working classes has taken place. Less than a century ago the Continent of Europe was an aggregate of despotisms: to-day the nations of Europe, with few exceptions, are led by representative governments. There has been a complete displacement of the centre of power from the aristocracy to the democracy. That has been the most salient feature of the close of the nineteenth and of the opening of the twentieth century. The same spirit has pervaded a large part of the

civilised world and has had all the effects of a profound and far-reaching revolution.¹

There can be no doubt that this democratic feeling assumes one form in Britain, another in France, another in Germany, and a still different shape in America. The great undeveloped area of the Western States has opened up limitless paths to lucrative labour. The preponderance of industrialism in American political life has left its impress upon its democracy. To a large extent it has lowered politics and diverted from it the best talents; while at the same time it has furnished a safety-valve for political discontent and unregulated ambition.²

Perhaps in no way has the democratic feeling of the times shown itself more strongly than in the growing desire that all international questions that are apt to engender war should be decided by the principles of just arbitration. Men no longer re-

¹ "To-day the men of Western Europe govern themselves. Popular suffrage, more or less closely approaching universal, chooses the governing power, and by methods more or less effective dictates its policy. One hundred and eighty million Europeans have risen from a degraded and ever-dissatisfied vassalage to the rank of free and self-governing men; and one of their earliest concerns has been to provide the means of universal education. The East has not taken her place in this mighty progress. Russia—only a semi-European power—retains her despotism, and relegates to a still distant future the revolution by which she must rise to an equality with her sister states."—Mackenzie, *The Nineteenth Century*, p. 459.

² Cf. Van Buren, *Political Parties in the United States*, pp. 80, 82. See also Ford's *American Citizen's Manual*, i., p. 13.

gard the lower stratum of society as merely "food for powder". The commercial and trading classes have a large stake in the interests of peace, and this has manifested itself in the increasing peacefulness of modern governments. Even in Russia the Czar has found that the nation has never been in love with the war against Japan, and that the heart of the people is in favour of peace and fraternity.

The Spirit of the Age thinks far more of the welfare of the people than of the personal jealousies and ambitions of sovereigns. It no longer regards history as a record of wars and dynasties, but rather as a register of the life and progress of the nation. It finds its economic interest, not in "the nature and causes of the wealth of nations,"¹ still less in the sources of the wealth of mediæval princes or modern millionaires, but rather in the nature and causes of the *poverty* that still hangs to the skirts of our civilisation, and in the means whereby the condition of the great body of the people may be ameliorated. This is the social problem of to-day, and we must face it and find a solution.

(2) But the Spirit of the Age is socialistic as well as democratic. The multiplication of the functions of the State in the field of social regulation is an accompaniment of all modern democracy. The interest of the people is centred in sociological questions. Books treating of these subjects have had an astonishing circulation. Many agencies of

¹This phrase is the headline of the Introductory Chapter of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.

social reform have sprung into existence ; and the reorganisation of industry on a co-operative instead of a competitive basis is advocated by many to-day.

The military stage of civilisation has entirely passed away, and with it has gone the spirit of the age of feudalism.¹ At that time society was organised into a solid phalanx, and the rigidity of military discipline pervaded the whole. The attraction of this disciplined order led such men as Carlyle to look back to those times with longing regret as to a vanished ideal. But those outside of the chain never know the pain of the slaves who have been within its iron clasp.

The industrial age that succeeded the military, the age of *laissez-faire*, has been an age of great progress in arts and sciences. It brought individual freedom and gave full scope to inventions and new methods of work, and to division of labour.

But to-day the industrial stage seems about to vanish, as did the military stage before it. The rights of reason and criticism have been sufficiently asserted. The welfare of man is the new note that is to be sounded. The rights of liberty are to give way to the claims of solidarity. *The Zeit-geist is social : it is concerned more with the ascent of man than with the division of labour or the rights of the individual.* It speaks through such writers as Ruskin, who says : " Production does not consist in things laboriously made, but in things serviceably consumable ; and the question for the nation

¹ Cf. Schöffles, *Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers*, ii., p. 90.

is not how much labour it employs, but how much life it produces. For as consumption is the end and aim of production, so life is the end and aim of consumption. . . . *There is no Wealth but Life*; Life including all its powers of love and joy and admiration. That country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings; that man is richest who, having perfected the functions of his own life to the utmost, has also the widest helpful influence, both personal and by means of his possessions, over the lives of others.”¹

(3) The Spirit of the Age may be a good or an evil spirit. In the time of Jesus it was in direct opposition to the purpose of Providence in so far as it was voiced by the Jewish nation and their leaders. But, on the other hand, it may be argued that the true spirit of that time was good, and was voiced by the Simeons and the John Baptists who waited for the coming Messiah, and when they saw Him rejoiced and believed. In their case the Law had accomplished its end. The Old Testament Torah was to St. Paul a pedagogue to drive him to Christ. At any rate the spirit of history should have taught the Jews that the kingdom of Christ was not a destruction but rather a fulfilment of Judaism, and that the spirit of all the past ages of their nation's progress was in it.

It is necessary to point out that in many of the tendencies of the present time there is, amid some

¹ Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, chap. iv.

elements of evil, a soul of true goodness. It is an error to speak of these as being wholly antagonistic to Christianity. Narrow minds indulge in such talk. But it is more befitting a Christian mind to take up a sympathetic attitude to the deep wants of the age and to seek to find in them, however heterogeneous, that which is sincere and earnest. Many of these intellectual movements are the offspring of deeply felt needs. They are the subconscious cravings of spirits ill at ease and full of a Divine discontent. He who would be helpful to the men of his day will neither despise nor denounce them. He will meet them in a friendly and receptive spirit and will seek to understand their motive and end. It ought to be part of the education of a Christian man to understand the signs of the times. He may feel bound to further the stream of tendency or to oppose it; but in either case he should first comprehend it. He will serve his own age better if he discern "the one increasing purpose" that runs through all the ages, and recognise in it a revelation of the mind of God. And he who in this study ignores the ethical and religious factor will certainly fail to apprehend aright the spirit of the present time.

3. The strength of the prevailing democracy is found *in the force of Public Opinion*. Democracy is supported by popular sentiment and ideals. Whatever forms of government it may choose, its policy and legislation are influenced in a preponderating measure by the expression of the Social Mind. Without the support of this social senti-

ment no Parliament can legislate, and no executive can administer.

Every great movement is the outcome of this Public Opinion. Once it was the idea of some individual who first uttered it, but the seed sown took possession of many minds and fructified. When it was next spoken it called forth an echo in thousands of hearts, and the spokesman became merely the rallying-point of the sentiment. What the leader of men does is to put the popular opinion into such shape that all men understand and respond to it. The hour strikes: the time has come for men to pass judgment on rulers and institutions; and institutions and rulers must adjust themselves to it, or be submerged in the waters of the advancing tide.

Up to the fourteenth century the mind of Europe was held in bondage to the past. It looked towards the East, and was dominated by a public opinion that had grown out of the teaching of Greece. But by the middle of the sixteenth century Europe began to turn its face Westwards and to look to the future. Theology and Literature accepted new standards: they felt themselves standing before the tribunal of a new social conscience. The heart of Christendom began to vibrate with new hopes. The old wine-skins of mediæval Europe could not contain the new wine of independent thought. The sense of dependence gave place to the sense of individual responsibility. The invention of printing, the extensions of commerce, the revolt against the Papacy, all were but different

expressions of the new idea fermenting in the Social Mind. It was a painful process. Theories and governments went toppling over; but the whole moral development of Modern Europe sprung out of this change of public opinion. The most powerful psychic factors in modern civilisation were rooted in that radical quickening of the social conscience.

If in former days, when the means of circulating knowledge was more restricted, public opinion was so potent, its power has to-day been greatly increased. The growth of literature, the expansion of the newspaper press, and the spread of education, by which the mass of the people can now daily read the best thoughts of the leading minds of the nation, have marvellously augmented its force. The introduction into modern states of representative government, with the liberty of public discussion, has powerfully tended in the same direction. What commends itself to the Social Mind and what is rejected by it becomes to rulers of the highest importance. The ultimate appeal in every matter of State policy is to it. By it Cabinets retain the keys of office; by it laws are made and wars are declared, and princes sit securely or insecurely on their thrones. No one can deny its power: many already fear its sway; it threatens to become a yoke not easy to be borne.

What, however, calls itself public opinion may not always be worthy of the name. It may be wanting in the essential element of social self-consciousness, or it may not have gone through a

process of national discussion. If it signify nothing more than a number of unreasoned private opinions it may be of no value. It should express those self-conscious states that simultaneously are found to exist in many minds which are in constant touch with one another. Its peculiar force rests on the fact that each man has made his neighbour's feeling or judgment an object of thought, and, comparing them with his own, finds them to be the same. It is then that a community grows strong in its opinion and feels what otherwise it could not feel. Experiences are compared, and each one looks at the matter—perhaps some public scandal or some political blunder—with a fellow-feeling, until the trouble assumes a definite shape and the social mind comes to a clear judgment upon it. Then public opinion is like a spring-tide that carries all before it, and fills bay and river and creek with the fulness of its forceful waters.¹

As a general rule public opinion is strong in proportion to the density of the population. In the Western parts of Canada and the United States it is weak: in the Eastern States it is strong. In Great Britain it has reached a high development, owing to the dense population and its free organisation through public meetings and the press. It is also conditioned by the stage of general education which the people have reached, and by their independence of the arts of priest-craft and of the demagogue. For this reason public opinion is less

¹ De Greef, *Introduction à la Sociologie*, p. 345.

highly developed in many European countries than in England. In the United States its force has been often repulsed or misdirected by the trickery of those political caucuses that rule the larger cities by appealing to the most selfish cupidities of the citizens.¹

4. How then shall the people know the way of wisdom in matters civil, political and social? It is impossible for the masses themselves, who spend the livelong day in laborious toil, to find time for careful reflection upon the vast problems with which their representatives in Parliament have to deal. The issues are far-reaching: the decisions of the Government must be arrived at as the result of the most careful reasoning from certain general principles and in accordance with the existing laws and constitution of the country. It is exceedingly necessary to introduce clearness and consistency into the popular mind on these points. Much

¹ Lecky, in *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i., p. 21, says: "Every one who will look facts honestly in the face can convince himself that the public opinion of a nation is something quite different from the votes that can be extracted from all the individuals who compose it. There are multitudes in every nation who contribute nothing to its public opinion; who never give a serious thought to public affairs; who have no spontaneous wish to take any part in them; who, if they are induced to do so, will act under the complete direction of individuals or organisations of another class. The landlord, the clergyman or dissenting minister or priest, the local agitator, or the public-house keeper, will direct their votes, and in a pure democracy the art of winning and accumulating these votes will become one of the chief parts of practical politics."

detailed knowledge is required ; and the general bearing of the questions must be discerned by those who to-day have the voting power that determines all legislation and shapes and moulds the policy of the nation.

But who shall show the voters the path of duty ? Who shall be guide, philosopher and friend to the multitude and teach them what they believe they already know on nearly every subject ? By what means may the public conscience be quickened and made to respond to the claims of duty and the needs of mankind ?

(1) In the past the power of the pulpit was great ; but as we have said, so far as regards questions of public or political interest the formation of the opinion of citizens on these points is now outwith the limits prescribed to the modern preacher. Once the Church was the sole teacher of the people ; but that time is past. It has found duties sufficiently imperative in the sphere of religion and of ecclesiastical work ; and by the fulfilment of its function as teacher of Biblical doctrine and of Christian morals it finds the whole energies of the pulpit occupied.

(2) Nor does it properly fall to the School or the University to give such guidance to the masses. If the latter teach political science to its students, it will be careful to confine its professors to the teaching of the fundamental principles on which there is general agreement. Who, then, will take up this most important duty ? It is a most needful function, if the far-reaching issues of legislation and

the trend of social movements are to be wisely guided.

(3) To some extent literary men have become agents in this work. Thoughtful men like Carlyle, Mill and Ruskin have left their impress on the public mind. The recent multiplication of public libraries tends to aid this power imminent in all good literature. This ethical influence is one that is growing with the spread of education and the desire for cheap editions of all the classical works of English authors. It is a most healthy sign of the times. The more the taste for good literature grows, the sounder will be the conclusions at which the Social Mind arrives.

(4) The right of public meeting is also a very valuable privilege in the formation of public opinion. At many a critical moment in our British history it has been used to oppose the tyrannical power of the monarchy or the greed of the aristocracy, and to educate the people in political science. At the Reformation this right of public meeting became in Germany and in Scotland the means of expressing the *sensus communis* of the people in a manner so clear as to show that it was not the manufactured product of any party interest. In such vast popular movements an organic instinct is at work: the public conscience is kindled and speaks with an imperative tone. Neither throne nor party can ignore the authority of such common consent. When, in questions of general import that touch the interests of all, the nation arrives at this common judgment, it has the utmost claim on our

respect. For then it is *toto cœlo* removed from the insensate shoutings of a popular mob or the noisy assemblies in which demagogues play to the galleries, flatter the ears of voters and practise all the wily arts of majority-mongering.¹ Then it becomes the explicit judgment of the national mind. Seldom is the verdict of the moral sense of the whole nation wrong when it has been rightly evoked and clearly expressed. At all costs a nation must retain its right of public meeting, in order to give free expression to its mind on matters of general well-being.

¹In the *Republic*, that creation of an ideal State which should contain all the best and noblest life, it was Plato's desire that the Social Mind should be led by the philosophers. They were to be "the pilots of the Fleet". And though they might by the sailors be deemed mere "star-gazers," yet the skilled pilots should keep their eye on the stars and study the seasons. The art of guiding the State is just the skilful art of navigation. "But when the sailors are all in sedition among themselves contending for the pilotship, each imagining he ought to be pilot, though he never learned the art," then the people become the prey of the sophists who corrupt them and cater for their applause. "What youth can withstand this, so as not to be perfectly overwhelmed by such applause or blame, and, giving way, be borne along the stream wherever it carries him, and say that things are beautiful or base according as the mob says it, and pursue the things they pursue and become of the very same kind?" The whole Sixth Book of the *Republic* is a lesson on the need of the wise education of the Social Mind and the danger of sophistical demagogism.

II.

THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM.

The free expression of public opinion is always desirable. This is to-day accomplished by the right of public meeting; *but the principal instrument of publicity is the Press*. The Press has always been the terror of tyrants because it has maintained a perpetual protest against their invasion of popular rights and liberties. By autocrats it is gagged and censored, and cannot, or dare not, give expression to the national desires of the people.

1. But even where there is ample freedom accorded to it, the Press has not always made use of its liberty to speak the truth or to denounce existing abuses. There is a section of the newspaper Press which is under the tyranny of unintelligent mobs or narrow religious coteries. Among such, prejudice has stifled free opinion and has prevented the growth of a healthy individuality of mind. The influence of Trades Unions and political caucuses has largely cramped freedom of expression; and the Press has bowed to this tyranny. But a Press dominated by the bitter spirit of politics, or living on a sale that is ensured by its gambling news, is utterly insensible to the obligations of honour and veracity.

Mr. J. S. Mill in his book *On Liberty* strongly protests against this plebification of opinion.¹ It is

¹ Chap. i., pp. 2-6.

an evil that is growing with the growing power of Trades Unionism and with the continued organisation of political parties. In France it has been found needful to counteract this evil by the creation of what is known as Academies. The entrance to these is narrow. But they ensure the friendship and society of men of learning; and they secure to the aristocracy of culture that mental independence and social ascendancy which are its best prerogatives.

2. The claims of literature are expressed in the well-known phrase, "the liberty of the Press". In the interests of morality we must vindicate this right. It is through journalism that all social and political questions can be discussed in the healthy atmosphere of public criticism. By it a daily judgment is pronounced. To abridge that freedom by stern Press laws is the speediest method of promoting sedition and of compelling discontent to find out secret channels for its dissemination. It is one of the most prized privileges of the British people that every man may freely utter his mind, so long as he speaks the truth and does not speak it "to his neighbour's hurt".

It is the land that Freemen till,
That sober-suited Freedom chose,
The land, where girt with friends or foes,
A man may speak the thing he will;

Where faction seldom gathers head,
But by degrees to fulness wrought,
The strength of some diffusive thought
Hath time and space to work and spread.

Liberty of thought is the prerogative of all. It is freedom to think and also to express our thought in speech.¹ The tyrant may imprison our body, but he cannot close the chambers of the mind. Yet indirectly this privilege may be injured and even abrogated by repression of free utterance in speech or in printed form. Such coercion may be exercised by the State, and in a less severe form by custom, caste or prejudice. In some small religious bodies there is little or no freedom of thought. Every man is tied down to the expression of his belief in the most procrustean form. One cannot fail to recall the fight that F. D. Maurice had with the hostile bigotry of the religious Press both inside and outside the Church of England, a journalistic

¹Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, 3rd ed., p. 224. This has always been claimed as a right in France, Britain and the United States. The Declaration of 1789 asserts that every French citizen "may speak, write and print freely, save that he must answer for the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by the law". The Constitution of 1795 says: "No one can be hindered from saying, writing, printing and publishing his thought"; and it adds, "Liberty consists in what does not injure the rights of others". Dicey in his book, p. 232, quotes Lord Mansfield as laying down the principle in England: "The liberty of the Press consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to the consequences of law"—by which he means the law of libel, the law of copyright, and the laws against treason, blasphemy and indecency. Strange to say, one of the most staunch opponents of this liberty of the Press was found in Dr. Johnson, who in his *Life of Milton* attacks it with unusual virulence. Cf. Lord King's *Life of Locke*, pp. 202-6, to understand the important share which John Locke had in connection with the Licensing Act.

Press that represented the narrowest traditionalism of the time. Even to-day there are classes governed by a Trades Union spirit that call themselves democratic; and yet through the shackles of prejudice they have less liberty of thought than the same classes once had under a despotic or aristocratic rule. In the early Roman Empire the Christian Church actually enjoyed greater freedom of speech than its leaders have had within a Puritan Massachusetts or in some of the modern Swiss democracies.

This freedom has in the past been the dread of all tyrants who could not endure that light should be let in upon their actions. It has raised a perpetual protest against all autocracy and abuse of privilege.¹ It is freedom to denounce shams, to

¹ Hume in his *Essays* (Essay II.) says that in his day nothing more surprised a foreigner than the extreme liberty, enjoyed in this country, of openly censuring every measure entered into by the King or his ministers. Hume tries to explain how Great Britain alone enjoys this peculiar privilege, and thinks the reason is to be found in our mixed form of government, which is neither wholly monarchical nor wholly republican. He remarks on a saying of Tacitus which bears out the view that the Roman government under the Emperor was a mixture of despotism and liberty in which, however, the despotism prevailed. On the other hand, he thinks the English government is a mixture of the same kind, only in it the liberty predominates. "The spirit of the people must frequently be roused in order to curb the ambition of the Court; and the dread of rousing this spirit must be employed to prevent that ambition. Nothing is so effectual to this purpose as the liberty of the Press, by which all the learning, wit and genius of the nation may be employed on the side of freedom and every one

expose hypocrisies, to rid the land of untruths, to utter the thought that is deepest and truest in each one of us. The highest merit we can ascribe to great men is, says Emerson, that they "set at nought books and traditions, and spoke what they thought". Men must be free to give expression to themselves, to develop their individuality by uttering their deepest convictions. If Government were to prohibit such freedom on the part of the best of its citizens, it would lose the immense benefit of the initiative of the elect minds that are always few, and would itself become a tyranny. Such high-handed action turns the best friends into bitter foes and scoffing critics. Truth must have free expression. It lives only in the open. If shut up in secret dens and hiding-places it becomes perverted and runs into the falsehood of extremes. What sadder fate could overtake Russia than that which has befallen it of late owing to the lack of the liberty of the Press? Its National Assembly is called together only at great constitutional crises, and even then the representatives of the provinces are afraid to utter truths unpopular to the Czar. And so the Government plunges on to its downfall amid anarchy and assassination, to the infinite injury of the nation and the sorrow of all its best citizens.

3. The powerful influence exercised by the Press springs from the fact that it has daily access to the
 be animated to its defence. As long as the republican part of our government can maintain itself against the monarchical, it will naturally be careful to keep the Press open."

mind of the multitude, and that, too, in their moments of leisure and quiet. It speaks in a language that all can understand: it never soars into philosophical regions where only the minds of the scholar and men of culture can follow it. It possesses the great power of repeating its lesson, in every variety of form, and with continual adaptation to the comprehension of its readers. It speaks, too, about matters of universal concern. It fills its pages with popular discussions of questions of present-day interest. The mass of the people stand in the utmost need of this educative power to direct their minds to objects of universal concern and of national well-being. It is in consequence of its vast importance and influence that the public Press has been termed the Fourth Estate.¹ It is therefore of the utmost concern that it be free to criticise all public acts of the Government as well as of those who conduct the municipal and social affairs of the country. It must be free to state the whole truth and to attack every existing error and abuse.

4. A question here arises of the most vital importance to literature, whether its form be temporary or permanent. It is possible that the freedom of the Press may be used to the injury of others or to the undermining of the Government, so that the claim to publish one's thoughts without submitting them to inspection before publication

¹The Three Estates are the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons, not, as is frequently supposed, the King, Lords, and Commons.

may not always be granted. On almost every statute-book are found laws against blasphemy, against indecent publications, and against printed speeches or writings that incite to treason. All publications are subject to the law of libel. We are as much entitled to be protected against attacks upon our character in the Press as against attacks upon our person in the King's highway. And an author's manuscript is quite as easily examined as are the intentions of a highwayman. A censorship of books, therefore, is not an impossibility.

On the other hand, the irritation and the injury to authorship caused by it were such that they ultimately led to its abolition in England.¹ Men came to see that it was killing our literature, disheartening authors, and threatening to extinguish nascent ambition in thoughtful minds. They were persuaded that if, after all his toil in constructing his argument and marshalling his thoughts, an author were to be subjected to the reproof of censorship, most probably the volume would never see the light. Great thinkers must have freedom to let their mind work in its own way. Truth gains far more by one who thinks independently and rises to the height of his mental stature, than by hundreds of humdrum writers who merely accept and hold opinions.

Every good author is really a specialist in his own line. How could he with due self-respect submit his book to the inspection of a Government

¹ Macaulay, in his *History of England*, chap. xxi., gives an account of its abolition.

licenser, who in all probability knows little or nothing of the subject-matter of it? The unbounded liberty of the Press is not without serious drawbacks; but the remedy for the disease does not lie in this direction. Good books are too few to be left to the mercy of a Government censor.

“Unless wariness be used,” said the grand Puritan poet in his *Areopagitica*, “as good almost kill a man as kill a good book. Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God’s Image; but he who destroys a good book kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye. . . . A good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. . . . We should be wary, therefore, what persecution we raise against the living labours of public men, how we spill that seasoned life of man stored up in books, since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martyrdom, and, if it extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre, whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elemental life, but strikes at that ethereal and fifth essence, the breath of reason itself, and slays an immortality rather than a life.”

We cannot forget that in ancient Greece the one man who was the most virtuous citizen of Athens—who was the prototype of all subsequent teachers, and who kindled the two great minds that were the fountain-heads of philosophy and ethics in after ages—Socrates, was charged with impiety in his free speech. The Athenian judges

condemned him to drink the hemlock cup for teaching the noble doctrine that the world was governed, not by the gods of the Athenian State, but by a supreme Divine intelligence. And the Son of God Himself had to suffer as a blasphemer and as one who taught the people "things contrary to the law of Moses". It is no answer to say that the death of Socrates was lamented by all Athens, and that the sacrifice of Calvary brought infinite good out of evil. Providence can make all things work for good ultimately; yet this does not exculpate the evil actors. To banish evil by preventing the publication of what is deemed error is not the best way to forward the cause of truth. Truth must be allowed to fight her own battles, and in the end she will be sure to win. And she fights her battle best in the atmosphere of freedom.

But, in defending the liberty of the Press, we are not compelled to go to the other extreme and maintain that publicity in itself will prove the corrective of every evil. Falsehood may for a time get such a hold of the public mind that it may do infinite harm before it is exposed. "Give a lie an hour's start and you can't overtake it" is an adage that contains more than a grain of truth. Some public print will publish it and pass it on so that it can never wholly be recalled. Hence it is, under certain exceptional circumstances, necessary to enforce a censorship of the Press.

There are classes in all communities who would advocate doctrines of such a treasonable or anarchical character that society must have power to

protect itself against them. Deprived of such repressive powers, Government could not enforce civil order or assure security of life and property. But such reserved power of censorship is only one of those legal restraints on ourselves and others which in reality give every honest and patriotic man more true liberty than would be possible in their absence. The imposition, in those circumstances of danger, of this legal restraint on liberty saves us from the tyranny of the anarchist. The State enforces such a law only for the sake of furthering true freedom ; and the chief end of law is to make men fit to be free.

Every wise Government will secure to its citizens freedom to realise their true ends, to further their own development, and to forward the well-being of society ; but not freedom to butcher their neighbours, or brutalise themselves, or encourage others to do so. The true liberty of the Press is liberty to further the full life of man in all its economic, social, political and religious bearings. The Christian State is not a limitation of such liberties : in the best sense of the word it is the realisation of such freedom.¹ And its coercion of the Press in such unusual emergencies is not an evil so long as it is directed to a good end and is not employed in excess of what that end justifies. Its suppression of liberty to advocate treason or tyrannicide is really for citizens a liberation from

¹ Cf. Seeley's *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 119. Some fine passages on the meaning of liberty will be found in Dr. Hutcheson Stirling's exposition of the Hegelian System, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Law*, p. 39.

the tyranny of less rational powers. The apparent encroachment on its liberty is ultimately an extension of the freedom of the Press.¹ Its liberty must not be construed in the sense of lawlessness.

5. In his eloquent plea for individuality and originality of thought, Mr. J. S. Mill has not only set governmental order in opposition to freedom in a way which seems unjustifiable, but he also has created a contrast between originality of mind and authority. He points to the periods of the Reformation, of the close of the eighteenth century, and to the time of intellectual fermentation in Germany when Goethe and Fichte were the leading minds. And he adds: "These periods differed widely in some particular opinions which they developed, but were alike in this that during all these the yoke of authority was broken. In each an old mental despotism had been thrown off and no new one had yet taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well-nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start until we again assert our mental freedom."²

¹ Hence the familiar *dictum*, "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance". Cf. Bluntschli, *Theory of the State*, Book V., chap. iv.; Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, p. 386.

² John Stuart Mill was sensitively jealous of any restrictions whatever on a free Press. In this volume *On Liberty*, chap. ii.,

The whole chapter is one of the most forcible pleas in the English language for individual liberty, and its persuasiveness is increased by the very evident sincerity of the writer. But notwithstanding the eloquence of the appeal for the absolutely unlimited freedom of the Press, we cannot allow that originality and authority are logical opposites. Mill is here the creator of a false dualism. It may, on the other hand, be very useful and healthy for a creative mind to work under a restrictive discipline. It must first of all digest truth and make it its own according to the laws of psychology. It cannot evolve original truth out of nothing. It is a mistake to imagine that true originality can exist and flourish only when authority is broken down, and the individual mind can wander anywhere at its own sweet will. That is the method by which we reach eccentricity, not originality or individuality. These latter have their own place within the State. But they will thrive only in due subjection to the general well-being of the community as that is guarded by the common law. Coercion is not an evil if it is directed to a moral end.¹

The repression of pamphlets by the Government of 1858 that roused the anger of Mill was really the p. 32, he defends the circulation of pamphlets advocating the lawfulness of Tyrannicide in England. These publications were seized during the Government Press Persecutions in 1858 on account of their immoral tendency. Mill maintains that what is called Tyrannicide "is not of the nature of assassination but of civil war". He denies the right of the people to exercise any such coercion either by themselves or by their Government.

¹ Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, p. 64.

defence of innocent people and the protection of a beloved Queen. Individuality may at times run mad in its striving after self-expression. Let us give it ample room: let us never seek to prune men down to our prescribed pattern, as gardeners prune their apple and plum trees. But yet the words of Mr. Huxley are true: "If individuality has no play, society does not advance. If individuality breaks out of all bounds, society perishes."¹

6. If the Press is entitled in the interests of society to claim this freedom, this right has its corresponding obligations. We must not make a fetish of a free Press, nor permit liberty to run into license. Literature has many obligations; but the supreme obligation of every public writer is *veracity*. He must know the truth, and must state the truth; and the truth alone can make him free. Under the influence of political partisanship the newspaper and journalistic Press is continually pouring forth a stream of one-sided statements, which, because they are but half the truth, tend to pervert the public judgment that is formed upon them. He who seeks through the public prints to teach others their duty must be careful that he looks at facts under no false light and states them without conscious perversion. There must be neither the *suggestio falsi* nor the *suppressio veri*. As a leader of the public mind and as a member of the commonwealth of letters, he must make truthfulness the primary law of his life. It is an obligation which

¹ Huxley, *Method and Results*, p. 277.

he owes to himself not less than to his readers. Any false colouring of facts, any conscious sophistry in the plea, will injure his own character and will propagate itself throughout the community an hundredfold.

It is not a sufficient excuse to say that the work of the newspaper editor is done in extreme haste, and that all his utterances must be regarded as provisional. No doubt the Press must furnish its daily quota of news, and must echo the sentiments of public minds as these find expression in public meetings or parliamentary debates. Yet the judgment of the journalist on these matters ought to be a righteous judgment. In his public utterances he ought to be no less sensitive to the obligations of truth than he is in his private speech. Because his printed words have only an ephemeral existence, this is not a sufficient excuse for inexactness of statement or recklessness of judgment. His very calling binds him to the law of veracity. The editor who neglects this obligation is guilty of a violation of the first principles of social ethics.

The conditions under which the greater part of journalistic work is done are not of the healthiest kind. The demands of the public for information and counsel are very imperative. To be successful the newspaper writer must make use of the fleeting hours, and is tempted to disregard solid judgment, exact information, and unbiassed opinion. Just because his productions are destined so soon to be forgotten is he induced to set a low estimate on their worth. Yet he is a preacher no less than the

clergyman, and usually his congregation is a much wider one. He speaks to thousands who in their calmest moments read his words and weigh his advice. Carlyle truly says that "the true Church of England at this moment lies in the editors of its newspapers. These preach to the people daily, weekly, admonishing kings themselves, advising peace or war with an authority which only the first Reformers and a long-past class of Popes were possessed of; inflicting moral censure, imparting moral encouragement, in all ways diligently administering the discipline of the Church."¹

Such a calling is a noble vocation, and it should evoke all a man's best powers in the cause of society and of the State. Repelling its temptations, the writer for the Press must maintain his integrity and his intellectual honesty. Truthfulness is the bond of the whole social structure. No more heinous offence against this social order can be committed than the yielding of the Press to the spirit of sophistry. He who informs the public mind will find (to use Bacon's phrase) that "no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantage-ground of truth". Sir Henry Wotton pictures such a writer in his ideal knight:—

How happy is he, born and taught,
Who serveth not another's will,
Whose armour is his honest thought,
And simple truth his utmost skill.

The entire wholesomeness of the Press springs from the virtue of veracity.

¹ Carlyle, *Miscellanies*, vol. ii., p. 114.

With veracity must be conjoined independence of mind. The influence of the Fourth Estate is gone as soon as it is discovered to have become the dependent of a patron or a party. The Press needs no patronage and should seek none. The days are past when Grub Street went in rags and men of genius knocked at rich men's doors for the favour of their names as patrons of a coming volume. Possibly in the days of Fielding and Smollett an independent spirit was not easily maintained. Life was then one long Iliad of deepening poverty and shattered hopes. By humble waiting on men like Walpole a pension might be secured from the Civil List. But it involved political dependence; and its tenure was conditional on such service as no self-respecting writer could give.

But the dependence of literature on patronage came to an end with the advent of Johnson, Goldsmith and the later Essayists. "The establishment of the calling of men of letters as an irregular profession and a regular means of livelihood almost necessarily brought with it the devotion of the man of letters himself to any and every form of literature for which there was a public demand. . . . There was an ever-widening demand for those kinds of writing which may be hackwork or something more, according to the abilities and dispositions of their executants for translation, historical and miscellaneous compilation, popular science."¹ It is to the courageous men of that day that we really owe

¹ Saintsbury, *Short History of English Literature*, Book IX., chap. iii.

the liberty of the modern Press. They rescued literature from pecuniary dependence on patronage and founded for all free minds a Republic of letters. They dared to speak the truth without paying court to Dukes and Earls, and to let their work stand upon its own merits.

The Declaration of Literary Independence was made by men of the Johnson and Junius type. What has been well called "the Magna Charta of Authorship" was Dr. Johnson's famous letter to a patron of that time, the Earl of Chesterfield. This defiant note was the herald of the new power that was then entering the field. "Seven years have now passed since I waited in your outward rooms, or was repulsed from your door; the notice which you have been pleased to take of my labours, had it been early, had been kind: but it has been delayed till I am indifferent, and cannot enjoy it; till I am solitary, and cannot impart it; till I am known, and do not want it. I hope it is no very cynical asperity not to confess obligations where no benefit has been received, or to be unwilling that the public should consider me as owing to a patron that which Providence has enabled me to do for myself."

The literature of to-day is under no small obligation to men of that independent stamp. They laboured, and it has entered into their labours. But though it has freed itself from the shackles of the private patron, the chains of the public patron are still riveted on some departments of it. There is a portion of the Press which is so dependent on

the breath of popular applause that it dare not run counter to the currents of democracy.

In the United States there is a Yellow Press that pays its homage to the basest passions of the mixed multitude. In times of panic or military sentiment it becomes a menace to the peace of the world. Truth seems to be the last object it seeks to serve. These journals live by Sensationalism. It is the coloured statement, the startling episode, the concocted story that makes them sell. In the art of cajoling the people they are unrivalled. They have ceased to venerate truth: they care little for real facts, and their whole tendency is to de-ethicise public life. If the American States are to take a front place in guiding the future course of civilisation, they must make up their minds to part with "the magnificent mendacity" of their immoral journals.

It is not an easy matter for newspapers to be entirely independent of their readers, who, if displeased, can punish them by ceasing to send advertisements or to read them. That newspaper is in the best position to maintain its independence and to utter the whole truth which has attained a circulation sufficient to make it indispensable to its readers. We are thankful that in Great Britain newspapers exist whose integrity is unquestioned and above suspicion. They exercise an enormous power over the more educated minds. They help to counteract the evils of the time and to consolidate the entire social fabric.

CHAPTER XIII.

ETHICS OF WAR.

1. It is passing strange that after so many centuries of Christian teaching it should still be possible for Christian nations to go to war. War is full of horrors : it is a field of carnage and cruelty : it brings devastation and ruin in its train, and it stimulates many passions that are directly opposed to the spirit of Jesus Christ. Although it has often been the means of procuring national freedom and punishing injustice, yet it is without doubt one of the greatest plagues that infest the earth.

War is generally the outcome of malevolent passion. All the great wars of history have originated in jealousy or anger or in greed of territory or of political power. The greed of glory or the lust of empire have generally been the motives that stirred the ambition of the combatants.

War is seldom the mere passionless obedience to a stern necessity.¹ There never has been a successful campaign that did not kindle into flame

¹ Maurice, *Social Morality*, chap. xi., was so overwhelmed with the force of the Roman maxim, "Si vis pacem, para bellum," that he would have us live in constant suspicion of our Continental neighbours. His reverence for the rights of nationality was carried to extreme length.

the fiercest and most combative feelings. By its action war tends to excite the destructive energies of mankind. One of its main purposes is to cripple the enemy by the destruction of men, by the loss of territory, or by the imposition of a heavy war indemnity.

Further, as soon as the campaign has begun military skill must call to its aid every possible means of deception in order to beguile the enemy and bring about his defeat. Indeed in no way does military tactics display its zeal more enthusiastically than in the clever way in which it spreads false news of movements or lures the enemy into an ambushade. These acts must be condoned, since it is a game of destruction at which both sides play and in which every tactical trick is employed and encouraged. Where could one find a spirit so alien to the love of man which is breathed throughout the whole Bible as may be found in an army rushing into battle with loaded rifles and with hand-grenades, determined to maim or kill their opponents? The whole spirit which must move them is one as remote as possible from the feelings of ordinary life and from the virtues enjoined by Christian ethics. "Whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts which war in your members?"

It is because of these things that we have come to dread the outbreak of war. We see how it springs from national jealousies or from the evil passions of tyrannic rulers, and how it tends to foster a spirit hostile to the welfare of

humanity. Christianity has also done much to make us realise the sacred ties wider than nationality which ought to bind men together in amity. The modern horror of war is increased when we come to realise how ruinous it is to our national exchequer and how burdensome to ratepayers. We are still labouring under the debt incurred by the Napoleonic wars, which laid European nations under a load of taxation from which a century's progress has not delivered them.

The great increase of intercourse between the nations of to-day and the growing complexity of commercial interests have also helped to make war more hateful to us and to strip it of the halo of honour that is so often attached to it.¹ And the

¹ Dr. Channing of America (*Works*, p. 503), says: "The idea of honour is associated with war. But to whom does the honour belong? If to any, certainly not to the mass of the people, but to those who are particularly engaged in it. The mass of the people who stay at home, and hire others to fight—who sleep in their warm beds, and hire others to sleep on the cold and damp earth—who sit at their well-spread board, and hire others to take the chance of starving—who nurse the slightest hurt in their own bodies, and hire others to expose themselves to mortal wounds and to linger in comfortless hospitals;—certainly this mass reap little honour from war; the honour belongs to those immediately concerned in it. Let me ask, then, what is the chief business of war? It is to destroy human life; to mangle the limbs; to gash and hew the body; to plunge the sword into the heart of a fellow-creature; to strew the earth with bleeding frames, and to trample them under foot with horses' hoofs. It is to batter down and burn cities; to turn fruitful fields into deserts; to level the cottage of the peasant and the magnificent abode of opulence; to scourge

development of the machinery of destruction which we have witnessed in the South African and the Russo-Japanese wars make the imagination quail before the terrors of the siege, the battle-field, and the naval fight. The result is that while war is a necessary evil in this world, good men are seeking to discover methods by which in future it may be avoided, or at least the chances of its occurring may be diminished.

2. On the other hand, the extreme doctrine held by some that nations should never go to war has not commended itself to the Christian conscience. Every nation in these days must have soldiers. Even those who may denounce some particular campaign do not urge that we should altogether give up our army and trust implicitly to the goodwill of our neighbours. A Government is bound to defend its territory and people from external as well as internal foes. It is in this obligation that the justification of war is found. It is

nations with famine; to multiply widows and orphans. Are these honourable deeds? Were you called to name exploits worthy of demons, would you not naturally select such as these? Grant that a necessity for them may exist; it is a dreadful necessity, such as a good man must recoil from with instinctive horror; and though it may exempt them from guilt, it cannot turn them into glory. We have thought that it was honourable to heal, to save, to mitigate pain, to snatch the sick and sinking from the jaws of death. We have placed among the revered benefactors of the human race the discoverers of arts which alleviate human sufferings, which prolong, comfort, adorn and cheer human life; and if these arts be honourable, where is the glory of multiplying and aggravating tortures and death?"

as much the duty of the State to protect itself against a foreign invasion by an appeal to the sword as it is to imprison a thief or to put down a treasonable insurrection. Abraham was justified as a leader or sheyk when he gathered together his people and attacked other sheyks who had invaded his land and had carried his nephew away captive. King David was equally in the right at Ziklag in pursuing the invading horde of Amalekites and rescuing his household from slavery.

Does Providence, then, favour war? Yes and No! War may be justifiable, or it may be unjust. War may be necessary and beneficial when it is the means of a nation's progress and the only condition of its escaping a tyranny that bars the way to progress. A battle may be the combat of error with truth, and victory may be but the triumph of the truth of to-day over the error of yesterday. If evil is to be overthrown and despotisms quelled, and the oppressed and down-trodden liberated, then war may be a necessity—a last necessity, no doubt, after all the resources of civilisation have been exhausted, yet an absolute necessity in the cause of the progress of truth and righteousness.

But although nations may have to go to war for the sake of justice, or truth, or progress, it is seldom these but rather their opposites that are the real cause of war.¹ Those who argue that war

¹ "The great majority of wars during the last 1,000 years may be classified under three heads—wars produced by opposition of *religious* belief, wars resulting from erroneous *economical* notions concerning the balance of trade or the material

is just because it is necessary reason badly. War is not necessary any more than injustice, or lust, or greed is necessary. As a matter of fact, it is necessary only because of the existence of injustice on one side. And war is justified only when there is found to be no other rational means of removing this iniquity. Otherwise, if there were such, war would be simply murder, and that on a gigantic scale.

But so long as the management of States is in the hands of weak and erring men, it will be found that in our stage of civilisation war cannot be dispensed with. A nation that is ready to preserve its territory, to guard its liberties, and to prevent disaster to its people must be prepared for war. Such preparation has been found to be the best guarantee against attack. To make use of every means of increasing the efficiency of our army that we may not have to send it into battle is the aim of all wise statesmen. To encourage our citizen soldiers to volunteer in defence of our shores and to keep our regiments up to their full fighting force is simply to comply with what should be the motto of every Christian nation—"Defence; not defiance".

3. War has necessarily observances and customs of its own which are very different from those of times of peace. But the influence of Christian

advantages of conquest, and wars resulting from the collision of the two hostile doctrines of the *Divine right of Kings* and the rights of nations."—Lecky, *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. ii., p. 227, 7th ed.

civilisation has effected changes in those customs of the most marked character. In earlier times a tribe went forth to battle with the simple intention of butchering its neighbours, plundering their property and carrying off their women and children into slavery.¹

The wars of the Judges were characterised by extravagant cruelties. The imprecatory Psalms breathe this same spirit, which indeed possessed the Jewish nation through the entire pre-Christian history.² Cicero relates how in a war against the Veneti Julius Cæsar put to death in the most cruel manner the whole of the senators, whose sole crime was that they had urged their people to self-defence. In the terrible siege of Jerusalem by Titus neither age nor sex was spared. Though that general had earned a character for moderation, he did not hesitate to send hundreds of Jews of both sexes to various amphitheatres throughout Italy to be devoured by wild beasts for the amusement of the people. In the most cultured periods of Greek and Roman civilisation war against barbarous tribes was nothing better than piracy, and no excess of cruelty was deemed culpable.³

¹ Among the Latins hundreds of prisoners were condemned to death in gladiatorial shows in order to make a Roman holiday.—Lecky, *opus cit.*, vol. ii., chap. vi.

² Cf. the Author's *Ethics of the Old Testament* on the subject of the Imprecatory Psalms (T. & T. Clark).

³ Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, vol. i., p. 256 (ed. 1899).

Such treatment of an enemy has become impossible among Christian nations. The first step in advance was that prisoners were permitted to purchase their freedom by payment of a ransom price. But this has virtually ceased; and they are now simply kept in custody until they can be exchanged, or until the termination of the war; while officers are usually freed on parole. There has been a growing distinction made between combatants and the civil population of the country in which the war is carried on. In all the recent wars in France and South Africa, as well as in Manchuria, the inhabitants were protected from injury. Provisions were paid for by the invading armies; and neither the French nor the Boer population suffered otherwise than by the war-tax laid on the country and by the depreciation of property that usually follows a severe campaign. Such acts of cruelty as were perpetrated in the Low Countries under the Duke of Alva would now be universally condemned. The war between Russia and Japan has contributed not a little to raising the standard of the merciful treatment of belligerents both by land and sea. It has been a pleasure amid the terrible tale of slaughter to observe the abstinence on both sides from acts of wanton barbarity.¹

¹ Cf. Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, Book III., chap. iv.; Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, p. 268; Tovey's *Martial Law*, Part 2. The general principle as agreed on at the Brussels Conference of 1874, is that the object of war must be confined to disabling the enemy, and that all instruments designed to inflict unnecessary pain beyond this are prohibited. Explosive

4. War is justifiable, as we have said, when it is undertaken in defence of a nation's rights and liberties. If the people are convinced that another State has done a serious injury for which it will not make reparation, the dispute cannot be settled by litigation or arbitration. These are the desirable methods of settlement; but if no International Court of Arbitration exists to which they each consent to submit their claims, the only means by which they can prosecute their cause is to go to war.

Where there is no justification of war, the duty of maintaining peace is supreme. Even reparation should always be first sought in a peaceful spirit. The language of diplomacy should be such as to allay all angry feeling. And rulers should never forget that before they appeal to the arbitrament

bullets must not be used; nor must there be any deceptive use of the flag of truce or of the Red Cross of the Hospital. But it is allowable to spread false intelligence in order to deceive an enemy, and to make use of decoy signals to lure him into an ambushade. It is permissible to employ starvation and to cut off supplies of water. On the other hand, the growing Christian conscience of nations is against permitting food going into an enemy's country, and destined for the non-combatant population, to be seized by ships as contraband of war. The whole question of what is contraband as it affects neutrals will have soon to be discussed and settled by European powers. It is perfectly clear that belligerents should not injure the property of neutrals; and it is as clear that neutrals must enforce strict neutrality, and aid neither belligerent in their conduct of the war. It has been mainly in the attempts to reconcile these principles with each other and with the law of humanity that recent difficulties have arisen.

of the sword, every means must be exhausted to settle the differences by arbitration. Nothing is to be done that will violate what has been called *the Rights of Peace*.

That Christian ethics justifies us in asserting such rights there can be no doubt. Peace is essential to the well-being of a nation. The Christian Church is a great Peace Society. The love of peace is no less Christ-like than the instinct of justice or the love of self-preservation. It is for the promotion of peaceful life and loving brotherhood that we pray "Let Thy Kingdom come, and Thy will be done in earth as in Heaven".

(a) The Rights of Peace include those connected with neutrality. When others engage in war, neighbouring nations are bound to observe the laws of neutrals, and they can also insist on the rights that belong to neutrality. Their territories must not be invaded by the belligerents; and in return they must not render assistance to or in any way obstruct the operations of either belligerent. Neutral States will seek to prohibit their subjects from taking any part in the war.

(b) The Rights of Peace include every means by which a State may defend itself against the attacks of other States upon its liberties or possessions. This implies what has always been a substantial means of promoting peace, the right to conclude treaties of alliance with other nations for the purpose of mutual defence and protection. It also includes treaties which have reference to the insidious injuries that may be perpetrated against

a State by internal foes, and which provide for the extradition of criminals who have fled from their native land.

(c) Again, the interests of peace, when it has been concluded after a war, extend to such action as provides that some assurance shall be given that the aggressors shall not be guilty of a repetition of their offence. Germany insisted on such a guarantee after the Franco-Prussian war, and held some portion of French territory and several fortresses until the indemnity was paid. For the same reason the Transvaal has been deprived of its political privileges for some years; and these will be restored only when there is proof that they shall not be again abused to the damage of the surrounding territories.

5. As the ancient barriers disappear that once hindered the sympathy of nations with each other, and the sense of our solidarity increases, the feeling of a common interest in each other's welfare begins to spread. This feeling is stimulated by the sense of common justice, and by the conviction that the good of one is the good of all. The immense increase of intercourse and the growing complexity of interests between the different countries on the face of the globe make war more unnatural and injurious. Rulers and people alike are occupied with anxious thought as to the ways in which war may be superseded and its outbreak prevented.

Already the growth and reality of this feeling are traceable in the gradual rise of *International*

Law. This seems to be the most direct way to bring about a solid peace throughout the world. The continual danger of war arising from the state of nature can be obviated only by some form of international unity.

This idea has taken many forms. It has been proposed that European nations should enter into a mutual agreement to effect a proportional reduction of their armaments. A very considerable reduction of the heavy taxation under which the people are groaning would instantly follow; and in this view such reduction is eminently desirable. But in itself the proposition is only a shallow device to bring about a remedy, and it is one which may be at any moment tossed aside in a fit of national sentiment. It provides no principle on which universal action may be taken.

Hegel, in a well-known passage, argues that since there is no power to arbitrate between different States, therefore war is a perpetual necessity.¹ From this the conclusion has been drawn that there ought to be a Congress of Nations. A universal Empire (*Weltreich*) is the solution of the problem. Otherwise the Perpetual Peace, which is the ultimate goal of all Christian effort and the ideal State of a perfected humanity, is an impracticable conception.

Unfortunately in the past all historical attempts to realise this idea have ended in failure. Each age has spent its strength in the attempt, and has

¹ *Philosophie des Rechts*, III. 3, B. 333.

exhibited the Spirit of the Time struggling with the problem. Alexander the Great may be said to have been the first who had a clear conception of this ideal. He sought to mingle East and West together, to wed the manly spirit of Greece with the feminine sensitiveness of Asia. From this crossing of racial qualities he hoped a new race might come that would find its satisfaction in a universal Empire. But it was soon discovered that the humanitarian view of the State held by the Greeks could not be conjoined with the Persian conception of a Divine kingdom and of the Divine right of kings; the Hellenic culture would not unite with Oriental traditions.

The ideal came nearer to its realisation in the effort of the Roman people to attain universal dominion. By their iron will and administrative power they extended the Roman State, with its legal institutions, over the greater part of Europe and across considerable portions of Asia and Africa. It is certain that Julius Cæsar, the most soaring mind among the Roman Emperors, grasped the imperial idea and sought to base on it a power that should transcend national limitations and provide for all a *jus gentium*.

This effort was not intended, like Alexander's, to blend nations together and produce a new race. It was an attempt to force the world into the Procrustean mould of the Roman character, and to tie it down to one fixed and definite type of development. That was its error; we might even say its crime. The Germanic races burst the bubble.

They threw off the domination of Rome and asserted the national independence of the Teutons.

Further, the *jus gentium* of Cicero did not refer to any "international law" such as we to-day desire. In Cicero's use of the term it simply meant that the consent of all peoples is to be considered a law of nature.¹ It was something like the "Common Sense" of the Intuitionist philosophy of the present day. To call it "international law" or "the law of nations" was a mistranslation; although it was a fortunate mistranslation, since it allowed jurists like Grotius to introduce the humane conceptions of Roman law into modern politics.²

Next came the attempt of the Church of the Middle Ages to realise the ideal of a universal State in the Holy Roman Empire. But the centrifugal forces were stronger than the centripetal, and ultimately the mediæval Empire was disrupted by them. The State was placed in a false relation to the Church, to the injury of both the spiritual and secular power. Disturbance, not peace, was the result. The imperial idea was not furthered by the experience of the Holy Empire. Yet the

¹ Cicero, *Tusc.*, I. 13, § 30.

² Cf. Article on *Jus Gentium* by Prof. Nettleship in *Journal of Philology*, vol. xiii., pp. 169-74. Voigt, *Das Jus Naturale, etc., der Römer*, vol. i., p. 341. Grotius' famous book, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was the chief medium through which Roman ideas of a law of nature came to influence modern ethical and political theories. It passed from Grotius to Locke, from Locke to Rousseau, and thence to the fathers of the American States. As to the difference between *jus gentium* and *jus naturale* see Muirhead's *Roman Law*, p. 299.

lessons of defeat then learned were not without their value.¹

For a brief period this ideal seems to have captivated the romantic spirit of the first Napoleon. International feuds would vanish once he had overturned every throne! Europe one State and France guiding it would put an end to war! It might have been a realised ideal had Russia and England been bound to his supremacy. But Waterloo broke the spell, and the Napoleonic vision faded into the light of common day. Not by such methods as the Corsican soldier employed will that consummation be gained.

Yet it is not outside the bounds of possibility that Europe may yet realise the idea of a Federated State. We may yet hope to see a Congress of its Nations permanently sitting in order to settle national differences and dispense national laws. When it arrives, an international code of laws will have become an assured result.²

6. If the end is not yet reached, we are at least

¹ Cf. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, chap. iv.

² The idea of a Permanent Congress of Nations is much favoured by Kant. See his *Philosophy of Law*, § 61. It is criticised in a hostile spirit and with much legal knowledge by the French critic of political theories, Lauvent, in his *Histoire du droit des gens*, p. 39. He thinks a world-State would be dangerous to the development of nationality. Cf. Sir Robert Phillimore, *Commentaries*, I. 1, § 10. He says that "to secure by law, throughout the world, the maintenance of right against the aggression of the wrong-doer is the primary object of the Commonwealth of States, and the great duty of the society of societies". But he adds that States can never be the subjects of *criminal law*.

thankful that there has been of late a very strong desire to limit the range of war, to Christianise its methods, and to substitute calm reason for sheer force in the settlement of national differences. We admit that at present war is necessary because nations are unjust and selfish in the promotion of national aims. We acknowledge that war evokes many virtues and is a school of excellent discipline. But these virtues can be produced by other means than the battle-field; when nations have got past their pupilage and become civilised and Christianised, it may be no longer necessary for them to appeal to the arbitrament of the sword.

Even already minor controversies are being referred to arbitration. We have of late settled several disputes between ourselves and other States in this way. We may in course of time find that graver controversies also can be settled by some such court of judgment as the Hague tribunal, and that the appeal to arms may be dispensed with. There will have to be a preliminary definition of international rights, since with imperfect definitions of these are bound up many national interests. These rights include correlative duties, one of the most important of which is the duty of self-defence. It must not be forgotten that when a hostile State is making unmistakable preparations for aggression upon a neighbour, that adjoining State cannot be blamed for taking the initiative, since the first blow is often the best in self-protection.¹ But this right

¹The attack of the Japanese ships on the Russian fleet in Korean waters, which opened the Russo-Japanese war, is a case in point.

may be pressed so far as to become one that claims to settle what is known as the Balance of Power. It may in short be held to be a right of self-defence against the growth of another State in naval and military strength, or merely by the natural increase of population.¹ Such a claim is not morally justifiable, since a nation is entitled to freedom of self-development. But it has been the cause of many a war; and it is certain it will in future be a very active source of strife.

¹ Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, p. 123, says: "The existence of any *particular* social organism (either a political society or any other), not being of an absolute value, but simply a means towards the well-being of individuals, there can be no absolute moral right of self-preservation in a society against some higher or better type of society in which these individuals may be absorbed, or against the formation of more closely coherent and better societies out of an ill-compacted unity. Thus we do not consider that humanity lost, but the reverse, by the absorption of Tuscany in Italy or by the separation of Belgium from Holland. The right of self-preservation in a society is only valid against individuals who would break it up into mere chaos, not against any better form of society (whether previously existing, or in process of formation) which may take its place. In judging about the value for mankind of revolutions, of secessions, of unifications, of annexations, we gain nothing in clearness of thinking, but the very reverse, by talking about all nations or tribes as if their unity was of an absolute character, and as if the rights of such units as against one another had any existence except in the opinions of human beings, which opinions may change, although in regard to such matters historical prescription is one of the most important factors in keeping opinions uniform. Past history, or past traditions (belief is more important than fact in influencing popular sentiment), determine to a great extent what societies seem 'natural' units with rights worth struggling for, and what societies do not."

When a nation like Japan suddenly rises into military strength, the balance of political power in the East is greatly changed. That wonderful people must now be permitted to take their place alongside of Britain and America in the settlement of all Eastern questions. Such expansion of its power is not to be condemned as a *casus belli*. International law will have to recognise that, however difficult it may be to define these rights, it is a gain to peace that civilised nations should widen out their spheres of influence and should take into their hands the guidance and development of races lower in the ranks of civilisation and progress.¹

It is therefore much to be desired that war should give place to less barbarous methods of settlement of international controversies. The Hague Conference has once met: it may meet

¹ Cf. Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*, chap. xvi. This is the justification of our government of India. That country was brought under our domination in a very haphazard way, and the work done by Clive and Hastings was not without its blots. But were Great Britain to withdraw to-day from India because of the cry of part of its press for "national freedom" and "independence," the country would quickly relapse into anarchy. The government of India, however, and the defence of Australia and other large dependencies, involves us in heavy responsibilities which must ere long be shared by the federation of races and colonies that now constitute the Empire. Freeman, the historian, often spoke of Imperial Federation as an absurdity. But he drew his argument from considerations of past times. But without doubt federation is as much the great progressive principle of the twentieth century as representative government was the great political invention of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

again. It promoted a scheme that has already facilitated arbitration. The recent Russo-Japanese war has shown to the world the necessity for the peaceful efforts of international jurists, more especially in limiting the rights of belligerents to interfere with the mercantile marine of neutrals. There can be little doubt that the work of such experts in the past as Gentilis and Grotius has powerfully tended to lessen the economic injuries and the moral evils attributable to war.

The suppression of private and tribal wars will gradually be assured by conference of the Great Powers among themselves. The extension of areas of influence in Africa will bring about the prevention of war within these areas. The duties of the soldier will never cease: but more and more the army will be a police force, and its main purpose will be the promotion of peace and the prevention of war. The "Parliament of Men" is not merely a vision: the Federation of the World will not remain an unrealised poetic dream.

What is meantime most needed is the cessation of those national jealousies that are perpetually fomenting strife and compelling the increase of armies and navies. Christian Ethics must inculcate a threefold duty.

(1) We should endeavour to eliminate the appeal to force, and should substitute justice in its place. Among the nations to-day there is a more general admission of the principles of justice, and a greater desire to refer international differences to impartial arbitration. This practical method of settlement has already been tried with

success, a success which augurs well for the future. The very fact that nations have subdued their prejudices and have agreed to submit their claims to what they believe will be the judgment of justice, with the resolve to acquiesce in any conditions which justice imposes, cannot but exercise a healthy moral influence. It will help to end the old savage method of settling quarrels by fighting. It will restrain the free indulgence of personal passion, since the arbitration court undertakes to see the wrong righted. It does show that nations desire justice, and believe that they, as much as individuals, are under ethical laws, and are bound to suffer for wrong-doing, however large the scale on which it may be practised.

All this will have an influence on and will give a higher value to Diplomacy. Hitherto it has been difficult for us to conceive of a diplomat as a Christian man, or to associate his calling with truth and integrity. But if his vocation be necessary to the promotion of peace and the cessation of war, it is clothed with the attributes of a most Christian profession. Diplomacy unties many a knot that has increased the difficulties of friendly intercourse between States. It prevents opposing interests coming into open collision. It finds a way, honourable to both sides, out of an intricate situation. It devotes knowledge of national traditions and habits to the solving of problems that might result in war. Such action subserves the interests of the kingdom of Jesus Christ. Diplomacy may yet rid itself of sinister associations and prove that honesty is the

best national policy. Aristotle maintained that Ethics is essentially a part of Politics.¹ Kant affirms it is a condition of peace that politics should be moral.² We may therefore rest assured that honesty in dealing and truthfulness in speech lie at the root of successful diplomacy, whose moral task is a lofty and a Christian one. Christian Ethics cannot exclude from its purview the problems of moral statesmanship. Every State ought to have a moral character and ought to pursue right aims. It must seek to forward the ends of justice and to ethicise its civil institutions. This task belongs to the practical politics of the Christian faith.

(2) Christianity teaches that every nation has a ministry, and that its end is the service of humanity and not self-aggrandisement. Each nation has its genius, its own peculiar gifts and endowments. It is under a Divine law and has its place and calling in the great spiritual economy. But in the comity of nations it is not the only duty of a people to develop its own character. "Of this it is capable only when, in conscious devotion to the general tasks of history, to the great common aims of the human race, it perceives itself to be an individual member of the great family of nations. The task of history does not devolve upon one or other single nation, but it is the joint task of the whole human race, and can only be realised by the co-operation of all the nations who are qualified to participate in the historical development, that is,

¹ *Politics*, i., 2, 9. *Ethics*, i., chap. ii.

² *Rechtslehre*, § 44.

are possessed of constructive political talent. Each separate nation, even the most gifted, is affected by some limitation, some deficiency. Hence the different nations should, with respect to both their intellectual and material gifts, occupy towards each other a relation of mutual giving and taking. A nation which desires to learn nothing, to receive nothing from others, but in its self-glorification falls back upon and retires within itself, in time alienates itself more and more from what is of general human interest.”¹

We must advocate a fellowship of the nations with a view to the completeness of their separate development. In the Greater Britain of to-day we are aiming at this in a rather unintelligent way. But gradually we are getting clearer ideas of what Imperialism means ; and as its providential purpose becomes more apparent, we shall cultivate a wide federation of peoples for the sake of the realisation in the members of their special character. Properly understood, a British Empire is a union of self-governing States, the British Isles, Canada, Australia, South Africa, under one Supreme Government, and its ultimate purpose is the moral well-being and relative completeness of every one of the component parts. One Empire embodies the idea of union in order to service through the corporate fellowship of different races, each working out its own development. Within it there is not rivalry but community of help and of service. When this ultimate aim of Empire is by all the

¹ Martensen, *Christian Social Ethics*, § 42 (T. & T. Clark).

people rightly comprehended, it will be seen that the Empire works against the continuance of war, and is a make-weight for brotherhood and peace.

(3) As Christians we must ever labour for the promotion of peace. The history of Christendom from the time of the Middle Ages is a record of preparation for international goodwill. Gradually private and tribal conflicts have ceased. National differences are being adjusted by judicial settlement. The federation of the European world is drawing nearer. The powerful nation in North America, so kindred to ourselves, is more and more disposed to be a peacemaker.

What is chiefly to be desired is the cultivation among nations of a spirit of unselfishness and of magnanimity. In our dealings with one another we must exhibit honour and confidence. Neighbouring nations are entitled to our respect and friendly consideration. If in the past we gained the title of "*perfidious Albion*," we must see to it that our future diplomacy is straightforward and truthful. We should feel it to be a wrong that one power should behave unjustly to another, although there may be no human tribunal to punish the wrongdoer. Our representatives must carefully refrain from whatever is aggressive, insolent, or even vexatiously exacting, and must always make allowance for national traditions and susceptibilities. If we so act, we shall discover methods by which differences may be reconciled and war superseded, or by which at least the probability of its recurrence will be much diminished.

We are convinced that war, righteously engaged in, has been productive of many virtues, and that it has often raised nations in the moral scale. In the Counsels of Providence it has been used to further great and noble ends. Yet this must never be urged in order to induce Governments to indulge in war as a means of gaining something for themselves. Providence has other means of promoting these virtues than by force of arms. Our people may be lifted out of a frivolous life and a Mammon spirit by other methods than the discipline of military camps and the carnage of battle. The duty of doing the things that make for peace is as clear as any national duty can be. It can never be right for a State to break international goodwill, to indulge in bluff and threats, or to be hesitating, slack, perfidious, in regard to its promises. If it must be prepared to risk its honour and existence in defence of right, still it will be careful to do so in a way that shows it does not delight in war and will not be unjustly aggressive.

A Christian State will be ever mindful of the obligations of courtesy and honour, jealous of its true rights as the trustee and guardian of precious liberties, not "willing to wound," and yet not "afraid to strike". It will be the careful defender of its own interests in such a way as not to endanger needlessly the high interests of international peace and brotherhood. In this way it will advance the cause of justice, and will purify and ennoble all social and national relations.

CHAPTER XIV.

ETHICS OF ART.

THE aim of Art being to manifest the thoughts and feelings of the mind in forms of beauty, it might be supposed that it does not have any connection with Christian Ethics. But that this opinion is erroneous is evident to every one who considers that the study of Beauty is the study of what is orderly in life and what is congruous to life's end. It is because of this that Kant says, "The artist seeks the reason and essence of things, their soul". The student of science teaches us to know facts correctly; the student of art teaches us to feel and to enjoy rightly.

Such enjoyment is an intrinsic necessity to our constitution. We are sure that Art has a mission to all classes, and not least to the hard-working sons of toil. Art must be designed to meet the needs of all; for Art is essentially sacred. It is one of God's gifts to men with which to glorify labour and to ennoble life. "Happy is he," said Goethe, "who at an early age knows what Art is." A sentence, this, full of deep thought and rich experience. And all who know how wide is the sense in which Goethe uses the word will agree with him in that profound remark.

In these lectures we have dwelt on the great formative forces of ethics in the social sphere. But morality apart from culture is strength without beauty, is force without favour. There are types of goodness which are harsh and ungainly. They were reactions from opposite extremes; and having missed the golden mean, they are themselves extremes. The monastic type has a certain beauty; but ethically it is the beauty of delicacy, womanly, not manly. The Puritanic type, on the other hand, is certainly manly. But it is robustness without grace; it is truth, but not the truth in love. It has the strength of a giant, but also the harshness of a giant. Both fall behind the perfect type of the Perfect Man.

We cannot look at the world which God has made without trying to appropriate it intellectually. We thus get hold of its wonders, feel its majesty, and are filled with a sense of its power. But we must go beyond this and give our mental image visible form. The poet gives shape to his ideas of it in his ode. The musician voices it in his symphony. The painter embodies it on his canvas. The literary artist moulds it into his beautiful styles. This twofold instinct is obeyed, both by the man of science who perceives and knows, and by the man of art who feels and represents.

What then is Art? What significance has it for Social Ethics? It presents to us the reality of the ideal under some representation. Its purpose is not directly ethical: it does not concern itself with moral truth explicitly. Art occupies itself

with man and with man's world. It reaches after the human through the imagination. The artist presents to us the world of nature and of humanity as he himself sees it, giving us the inmost truth of its existence and transforming matter by the power of his artistic genius into something which is ethereally beautiful. The natural world presents us with woods, fields and rivers, and with the various colours that glow in the light. The painter takes his palette, and gives us nature back transformed, idealised, full of life and meaning. Matter thus loses its materiality and grossness and becomes the agent of the spirit. In like manner the musical artist puts together his pipes and evokes from the sonorous organ the grand symphonies of Mozart or Beethoven. Michael Angelo takes the marble of Carrara and presents us with the imposing statue of David, Shepherd, Poet and King in one. We walk along a Highland loch with undiscerning gaze : but Walter Scott walks there too, and by the aid of his poetic imagination the lake is seen in the softening light of purest emotion. It becomes an enchanted land : a new glory takes possession of it, and all that is vulgar or commonplace about it departs.

God "hath made everything beautiful in its time," but it requires the eye of the artist, the born idealist, to discern and evoke the essence of such beauty, and to give it individual embodiment. The different arts, from architecture up to painting and poetry, indicate the progressive stages in man's realisation of the ideal. But it is in poetry, through

which thought gets its finest expression, that nature and life reach their highest representation. All humanity's longings are best voiced by the poet. He knows the spirit of his age and bodies forth its instinctive desires. He holds the mirror up to human nature, and all its tragedy and all its comedy are set forth by him in concrete form of dramatic representation. Life is brought before us in its essential worth and dignity, even when that life is spent in surroundings of poverty and of meanness. We get the prophecy of what life may become through the perception of Art. Thus we see its importance with regard to the moral life as the imagination is cultivated and developed. The ideals of life get fuller possession of us; we strive after the perfection of life which alone is in keeping with Art's glorification of nature.

Since Art has become the possession of the million, it should purify the eye of the artisan and should transform him into an artist. The old industries of our forefathers were content to produce simply articles of usefulness. Nowadays the useful is clothed with the ornamental; the humblest home is furnished with some degree of taste, and its meanest utensils are sprinkled over with artistic decoration. Our peasants to-day adorn the walls of their cottages with photographs or with copies of great pictures, which bring home to them the pleasures of Art that once were the sinecure of princes. In olden times a wealthy nobleman would pay an artist to go to Italy or Spain and make for him a copy of a Tintoretto or Velasquez. But to-

day our handworkers have in our National Galleries free access to the great masterpieces of Europe, as well as of England.¹ The treasures of Art have descended to the homes of the people in a thousand ways. Art has become the apostle of the higher life; and it enforces its lessons by the powerful suggestions of beauty. Therefore we maintain that men ought to devote some spare moments to the study of the beautiful as well as of the good. Such a study will neither be enervating nor useless. It will intensify a man's love for the world in which he dwells. It will help to make life's burdens more bearable by throwing a holy light over what is harsh and ungraceful. This may be realised even by those who work at the busiest handicraft. Their few leisure moments spent in the study of poetry, painting, or music, will give such a brightening and a blessing as the Lord's Day gives to other days of the week. Art will help to hallow and sanctify the life of toil.

1. *Relation of Art to Morality.*—Art is not a product of morality but of the natural powers of the human mind. Looked at from an abstract

¹The best corrective for the one-sidedness resulting from the extreme division of labour is to be found in the cultivation of art and of science. That division of labour tends to deteriorate the worker's personality by making his life a monotonous and purely mechanical employment. But to make a workman merely an animated instrument is immoral. The whole man is of more importance than the sum of his performances. This is the reason why Galleries of Art and Schools of Science have been found so useful among the operatives of Lancashire and the Midlands.

point of view Art is not even dependent upon the morality of the artist. Sometimes the painter's art is nobler than the painter's own mind, and animates his work with a finer spirit than he is himself aware of. But practically the immoral tendency in the artist is continually working in contradiction to the spirit of his art. It operates as a stimulus that will very soon degrade his ideals, until he find his pleasure in mere sensuous beauty.¹

All true Art is in the highest sense ethical, and exerts a purifying and elevating influence. It is nothing less than the spirit of truth putting on the garments of beauty. It cannot endure what is untrue. It puts far away from it all affectation, hypocrisy and silly mannerisms. It is a direct means of culture, and has a place in all refined social life. The moral and the beautiful are so closely conjoined that apart from the latter morality can nowhere manifest itself in a perfect shape.

In this respect modern Art comes short. The Art Schools of to-day are too much dominated by

¹Suggestive remarks on Art and its relation to Ethics will be found in Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ii., p. 314, in Schelling, *Philos. der Kunst*, i., p. 576. Ruskin, in *Modern Painters*, Part III., Sect. 1, speaks of Art as "the faculty by which we perceive and appreciate ideas of beauty". But he objects to the employment of the word "æsthetic" on the ground that this word degrades the faculty to a mere operation of sense, or, perhaps worse, of custom. Ruskin shows by his language that he thinks the sense of beauty is rather ethical than merely perceptive, since it brings along with it deep moral feelings. Ruskin is right in maintaining that the highest art culture can never exist apart from true ethical culture.

realism. By its deep subjection to physical form and by its realistic presentment of the passions which move that form, Art has become so sensuous that ideality is banished and little is left for the fancy to feed on. It is to be feared that this deidealising of the world is a result of the loss of that conception of the Divine Beauty which is the fountain of all moral loveliness. When Art ceases to be the revelation of this invisible reality through the senses, it has forgotten its proper origin. The natural cannot find its truth without the moral. If the Art of the age minister only to sensuousness it is a sure proof that we live in a time of decadent morality. This is the meaning of the significant lines of Wordsworth addressed to Sir George Beaumont :—

High is our calling, friend ! Poetic Art,
 Whether the instrument of words she use,
 Or pencil, pregnant with ethereal hues,
 Hath need of mind and soul in every part
 Heroically fashioned, to infuse
 Faith in the whispers of the lonely Muse.

The relation between Ethics and Art has been the subject predominantly of what may be called the dispute about matters of indifference. These occupy the border land where pleasures and amusements chiefly lie. Being so to speak intermediate, they are by some people rejected as irreligious, while by others they are spoken of as matters of indifference. They concern such objects as Art, the Theatre, the Opera, and various kinds of culture. Many pious people denounce all these on the

principle that a life of holiness is inconsistent with amusement, and that the consecrated spirit can regard these in no other light than as of the world, and as condemned by the words, "He that loveth the world, the love of the Father is not in him". On the other hand, many Christian people regard these as being *adiaphora*—that is, things which are morally indifferent or permissible in the sense that they are not wholly ruled by the moral law. In our view both sides are wrong. The Pietists are in error when they fancy that the world which Christ condemned is the world of home and of innocent pleasures, or the world of natural beauty, of flowers and fields, and cloud and sunshine, or the world of art and science. If we were shut out of these worlds by religion we should be excluded from a great means of grace. But the world which our Lord condemned is the world of immoral principles, of immoral maxims and habits, which no godly man will enter, much less enjoy. These good people are wrong in forgetting that a holy spirit can consecrate to the ends of a holy life whatever is natural and sinless in the world. There is a use, not less than an abuse, of æsthetics and of amusements. It is an error to suppose that Art can have no mission unless it directly serves ethics and religion, and expressly bears the stamp on its face of their earnestness.

But also they are in error who imagine that there is a region of Art which is indifferent to morality. This view goes back to an old distinction which was made by moralists between determinate

and indeterminate duties, *i.e.*, duties which there is a definite obligation to perform at some particular time, such as payment of debt or the common obligations of business life, and duties which are of indefinite obligation, such as duties of beneficence, of charity, of culture, all of which are left to each one's own judgment. A man must go through his eight or ten hours of work; that is a most definite daily engagement. But in the evening there are two or three hours when he may do as he pleases, and which are spoken of as morally indifferent moments.

This distinction is false and illusory. All duty is determinate. There is no duty which has not its "must". Every moment of time is a moral moment, whether it be a morning or an evening hour. We may take a holiday from business, from study, even from thought, and may give ourselves up to music or painting, or novels. But from duty we may take no holiday. It claims universal and eternal jurisdiction. There is some duty at that time which it is befitting that we should do. It may be recreation; for that certainly is a duty that comes with many an evening after a hard day's work. And if our amusement is recreative as all Art is, we should not be ashamed to speak of it as a duty that gives tone to the mind and peace to the spirit and refreshment to all the powers.

He who thus fills up the evening hour with music, with literature, with poetry, with painting, is making a right use of Art. A Christian man will apply the canon of St. Paul to every hour of the

day and to every engagement he enters into, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin". If we can bring all these æsthetic pleasures into harmony with the great purpose of life, then they are rightly enjoyed. They help us to fulfil the end of our existence; they are part of the education of character. We are entitled to blame a man for not using them in the culture of his manhood. The line that seems to divide them from all our determinate duties is wrongly drawn. It is the old error of the ascetics, who virtually excluded social life and Art from religion. The attempt to make this distinction springs out of a perverted view of the nature of moral obligation. Whatever can be brought into the moral scheme of a man's life and can help him to realise his true self, is of faith and is not sin. Whatever has no relation to this end must be injurious to morals and should be avoided.

Here is the one sure and certain test of all artistic pleasures. Can we enter into these and come out of them refreshed for life's work? Then they are helpful to our moral life. Or do we, after enjoying them, feel that we cannot without great difficulty again take up our duties? Then they are hurtful; they are of a kind which it is not right for us to enjoy, since they detract from our energy, or cool our charity, or injure our moral fibre. This is an excellent criterion of what is morally permissible. We may enjoy and use all that is good in Art since it brings us nearer to Him who is the Source of all goodness. The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof; and in all its fulness of

beauty, and in all its power of bestowing happiness it belongs to the sons of God. There is no department of artistic pleasure that is devoid of ethical significance.¹

2. *Relation of Art to Religion.*—It has been objected that the New Testament does not recognise the function of Art, and that the sole reference to it by St. Paul on Mars Hill is rather hostile or objurgatory. Speaking to the cultured but idolatrous Athenians, the Apostle says: "We ought not to think that the Godhead is like to gold or silver or stone, graven by art and man's device". This is not a condemnation of Art: but it indicates in no uncertain tone that it may be readily introduced into the service of idolatry. If this is the only guidance which the Word of God gives, it is argued that it is practically a judgment against Art as a handmaid to religion. It means that the danger of its abuse is so great that religion should make no use of it as an aid to devotion. This was the view that the Puritans took of it; and it is a view held by many people to-day.

Yet it cannot be denied that, though Jesus Himself did not speak of Art and its high functions,

¹ Among the fine arts music is one which it has been maintained is entirely independent of ethics. But when music is mated to words and interprets our feelings, it certainly enters the domain of ethics. There is a fine passage in Plato's *Republic*, Book III., chap. x., on the three constituents of melody (sentiment, harmony and rhythm), and as to the correspondence that should exist between the harmony and the sentiment. Aristotle discusses the point also in his *Politics*, Book VIII., chaps. v.-vii.

His religion has been from early times the inspiration of Art no less than of Science. The best-known forms of the plastic and poetic arts have been allied to religion, and productivity has been in proportion to its spread among civilised nations. Architecture may be said to flourish to-day almost entirely in Christian lands; its finest triumphs in modern times have been associated with the Church. Sculpture, a plastic art, though borrowing from Greek models, is characterised by a subjectivity which allies itself to Christian feeling and ideals. Painting, which unites the objective and subjective, presents Jesus and the Virgin Mother among its masterpieces. Of the poetic arts, what epic can compare in sublimity with Dante's *Inferno* or Milton's *Paradise Lost*? And both are throughout inspired by Christian teaching. The Drama actually originated in the Miracle Plays of the Middle Ages.¹

As early as the twelfth century in France and the thirteenth century in England, Mystery Plays were enacted in public. Though no examples of them remain in English, yet we have specimens of Miracle Plays belonging to the fifteenth century, telling of wondrous acts performed by the influence of the Holy Virgin or strange deliverances wrought in the lives of saints, while others represent in a dramatic way sacred narratives from the Bible.

¹ I make this assertion notwithstanding the fact that it is contradicted by so able a litterateur as Prof. Morley in *English Plays*, p. 2. In support of my view, cf. Prof. Saintsbury on the Drama in his *Short History of English Literature*.

Those Miracle Plays gradually developed into Morality Plays, and these into the Modern Drama. The Church enlisted on the side of religion the national love of dramatic representation; and at that stage of the people's education there can be little doubt of her wisdom in so doing.¹

All the different arts appear in combination on the stage mutually supporting each other, and presenting an ideal picture of human life with a power of impression that reveals at a glance the truth which dull minds more slowly perceive. It is this principle of the dramatic art that makes stage-acting morally permissible. Were the Drama to-day thoroughly pervaded by the spirit in which it originated, it would throw off its many blemishes. It would rise from its low moral level, and would escape the charge so often made against it of being ethically injurious.

He who condemns the novel and the Drama condemns some of the noblest writers of our land. We maintain that Shakespeare and Dryden, Walter Scott and Dickens, followed a God-given vocation in devoting themselves to literature of the imagination. They did much to make the world both better and brighter. Walter Scott took up the profession of law and became a county sheriff: but his real vocation was found as a poet and romance writer. And who of those that have derived so much happiness and instruction from him

¹ Whether in the twentieth century this reason can justify such a dramatic representation of sacred history as is given in the Ober-Ammergau Passion Play is open to question.

and whose hours of sickness he has brightened, can deny the helpful services of such a literary artist? If in sorrowful hours we open our Bible to find comfort and cheer for the spirit, may we not also open our *Waverley* or our Tennyson to find pleasure for the imagination? No young person of education can forget those early days when he wandered

Cherishing a youth sublime,
With the fairy tales of science and the long results of time.

As through a fairy land of enchantment those great imaginative authors led us, taught us to see with their eyes, to feel with their pulse, and to catch the contagion of their minds. Who that remembers the stimulus to study and the love of literature that came through our acquaintance with these master-minds, can refuse to acknowledge his immense debt of gratitude to them? Such an art refines our taste, quickens our perception of whatever is beautiful, pathetic and heroic in the world. The highest literature, which alone belongs to Art, embodies the instincts by which a civilised nation differs from barbarians. We can characterise as civilised only those people who enjoy the ennobling as distinguished from the coarser pleasures. They have transcended the animal instincts and risen into an intellectual life of refinement. If this be so, it is impossible that religion can be an enemy to Art. Religion requires that the imagination be cultivated and developed. In such work Art is its best help and handmaid.

Why is it then that at the present moment Art

is frequently found in antagonism to Christianity? That the opposition exists is patent to all who study religious literature and Art journals. Some think that a reconciliation is impossible. Others would cultivate them in entire separation, but we are convinced that religion needs the aid of Art, and still more that Art must languish without the help of religion.

Possibly the explanation lies in the fact that while the ideals of Art are simply beautiful objects that satisfy taste, the religious ideals are objects in themselves of supreme worth. Hegel has pointed out how this constitutes the difference between classical and Christian Art, and that this is the reason why classical beauty is no longer the ideal.¹ The principle of classical Art was that the sensible is the manifestation of the supersensible: the eternal value is seen in the ideal material form. On the other hand, the Christian principle is that the eternal truth has a value far surpassing its most ideal form, of which Art may give us a lofty conception, but which it can never competently express. The material is the vesture of another and diviner world, which breaks through it continually, and which this world after all only faintly adumbrates. Art is in error when it claims that it is enough to represent the finite in its ideality. The heart of man will not be satisfied with such a secular conception of the mission of Art. It desires a Christian Art which will represent to it that infinite beauty

¹ Hegel, *Aesthetik* (edited by Hotho), 2nd ed., vol. ii., p. 70.

which contains the secret of the finite loveliness of this world.

Often as it has made the claim, Art cannot itself be the manifestation and realisation of the infinite. The sensible is only a parabolic illustration of the supersensible, which has its own abiding value above all ideal forms of it.

This truth becomes more apparent when we contrast the purpose of heathen temples with that of Christian churches. The former contained images of the gods and sacred vessels. The latter were built in order to be filled with worshippers who should offer their praise in heart-stirring hymn and their prayers in humble adoration and confession. In the Parthenon and Pantheon ancient Art was symbolical but dumb. In the Christian sanctuary Art has made use of music to give voice to the emotions of souls touched to finest issues by the revelation of the goodness of God.

The distinction is visible also in the wide field that has been opened by the representation of grief in ancient and in Christian Art. Who that has looked on the Laocoon does not feel the difference between the feelings it creates and those which are inspired by a fine picture of the Crucifixion? A Niobe in tears lamenting the death of her children produces an effect in strong contrast with the representation of grief presented by the Mater Dolorosa. In the ancient works of Art there is a charming beauty associated with a constant atmosphere of sadness, because the mind merely images itself in corporeal form, and so tries to effect its reconciliation

with the material. But in Christian Art the mind rises superior to this attempted reconciliation: it refuses to bow to the material. It has found a higher ideal through which it transcends the merely transitory, and it enters the realm of spiritual satisfaction and delight. Ancient Art shows us the human element in grief: Christian Art manifests the divine in the human.

Over this point much diversity of opinion exists, and doubtless will exist. The truth is that our views of Art are modified by our doctrine of the universe. If we hold that the world owes its existence to the reason and will of a moral Creator, who is both wise and good, we shall believe that Art has a moral and religious purpose in it. If we hold, on the other hand, that there is no reason in the universe higher than our own, no good which is not both earthly and perishable, no infinite or eternal purpose pervading the sum of things around us which we call the world, then our conception of Art will be in correspondence with our creed. The essence of Art will then be simply imitation of Nature. Art will to us be valuable for the higher æsthetic pleasure that it gives. We shall be content to receive its inward refreshment and be thankful for the revelation it brings of beauty in the world.

But this theory of Art involves a degradation of it. Art has then descended to simple imitation, to mere copyism. A modern School of Art has courageously occupied this standpoint and has thereby done no little harm. It has been rightly

criticised as the rigidity of literalism. "Even the severest pre-Raphaelite must make up his mind to stop *somewhere* in his copyism of natural objects."¹ In every work of Art the art is the chief thing. The soul of the artist must inspire the painting. The real art consists in omitting, selecting and inventing, as well as in following Nature. There must be passion, glorification, accentuation, if a painting or poem is to be a work of Art. In great painters the whole executive power of the artist "depends upon the skill with which he intentionally or unconsciously deviates from the literal truth of Nature. In Raphael the deviation was clearly intentional, for he plainly said that he did not paint what is, but what ought to be; and we have evidence in comparing his studies with the pictures he painted from them how much he deviated from the truth, and how masterly and right his deviations were."²

If the world is more to us than phenomena, if beneath and behind all objects we discern tokens of a Divine thought and beauty, then of them Art will seek to be the interpreter. The artist will be a prophet who finds "every common bush aflame with God". To him the world will be no blot; it will "mean intensely and mean good".

That man is the artist who reveals to us the essence and the inner beauty of things, whether they be natural objects, natural affections, or natural sounds. Sometime in the future we shall

¹ *Thoughts About Art*, P. G. Hamerton, new ed., p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 15.

know the full meaning of it all. Meantime we are thankful to him whose soul has seen it, and who by his art enables us to get a glimpse of the same glorious vision.

No one has felt this more deeply than Browning. It is the theme of his *Easter Day*, in which the wonders of earth are seen to be but the tapestry of the ante-chamber of heaven. He sees that

All partial beauty is a pledge
Of beauty in its plenitude.

In *Rabbi ben Ezra* he fights against the tendency of artists to become scientific as they feel the weakness of declining years. His right conception of Art gives him a correct and connected view of this life and of the next. Best of all in *Abt Vogler* he tells us how out of the tones of the organ emerges something which is loftier far than these tones. He feels intensely that music ennobles and spiritualises the emotions, and through them disposes the whole man to the most ardent love of God and of His will. Music in Browning solemnises her true spiritualisation and becomes a prophetic voice of hope.

It is all-triumphant Art; but Art in obedience to laws,
Painter and poet are proud in the artist-list enrolled:

All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist;
Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good, nor power
Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for the melodist,
When eternity affirms the conception of an hour.
The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard,
The passion that left the ground to lose itself in the sky,
Are music sent up to God by the lover and the bard;
Enough that he heard it once: we shall hear it by-and-by.

Sorrow is hard to bear, and doubt is slow to clear.

Each sufferer says his say in his scheme of the weal and woe :
But God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear ;

The rest may reason and welcome : 'tis we musicians know.

The fine strain which comes to Abt Vogler in the silent church is less human than it is divine. It speaks to him of ineffable beauty. If there is sorrow for the things that vanish, there is exultation because of the infinite beauty disclosed. Henceforth he finds his resting-place ; he reaches the C Major of life.

Here, then, we have the true characteristic of the Christian artist ; to him work can never be morally indifferent. It is never merely Art for Art's sake. His realism will not be mere imitation, but the representation of a beauty which lies in the reality of things, and is true however little it is discerned. He may be an Impressionist ; but if he is so, it is only because he has seen far and clear into a world which less artistic souls have but dimly conceived. In this way Art becomes a handmaid to religion, contributing to the attainment of its loftiest ideals. Art therefore requires religion, and only through it can Art give a truthful representation of a harmonious world, and so arrive at its maturity.

This is the reason why Ruskin so continually dwelt on the connection between a good man and lofty Art. In his lectures at Oxford he argues that Art has three distinct functions, of which one is the enforcing of the religious sentiments of men, and another the perfecting of their ethical state. And

when he speaks of the work of Dürer and Giotto he adds: "All such Art is wholly good and useful when it is the work of good men".¹ Ruskin held to the truth that if in a painter there be a want of inward harmony between mind and conscience, in him Art and the love of beauty must soon languish.

With more philosophic power Hegel has pointed out the same truth in his comparison of classical and of Christian Art. "The corporeal can express the inwardness of the mind only in so far as it manifests that the soul has its congruent reality not in this actual existence but in itself. On this account beauty is no longer the idealisation of the objective form but the *inward condition of the soul in itself: it becomes a beauty of inwardness.*"² The beautiful and the good therefore can never be separated. The true life alone is the beautiful life. There is the most intimate connection between beauty of soul and beauty of form. In short, Art at all times requires the aid of religion.

But if Art requires religion, no less does religion require the aid of Art. A barren Puritanism forgets the sacredness of the material and ignores the sanctity of the body. But the truly spiritual religion can see that all beauty comes from God and can therefore make use of the artist's function. In ancient Israel Bezaleel was employed to build a beautiful tabernacle for the self-manifestation of the Deity. And Christianity in its periods of

¹ *Lectures on Art*, Lect. II., p. 53.

² Hegel, *Aesthetik*, vol. ii., p. 138.

intellectual culture has never been indifferent to the softening influences of the Fine Arts. If in Scotland for nearly two centuries there was an unnatural divorce between Art and faith, during which a prosaic spiritualism regarded Art as akin to idolatry, as servant to Satan and not to Christ, yet we must grant that the puritanic bigotry was but a strong reaction against a previous misuse of Art by the Romish Church, which placed Art above spiritual religion, and by its mixture of æsthetic and religious emotions, prostituted Art and perverted Christian truth.

Rightly used, Art comes to the aid of religious worship, and completes its attractiveness and beauty. "The preacher and the painter are both commentators on infinity."¹ We cannot be too thankful that the Scottish churches of the eighteenth century, built like barns and devoid of all art and beauty, have given place to structures in which Gothic architecture aids the aspiring mind, and beauty and proportion of parts help the reverent soul. It is to be hoped that the present generation may be actuated by the spirit of those who with such tender but simple joy decorated the Catacombs, or who with loving and unselfish generosity reared those poems in stone, our fine Gothic cathedrals. We can worship God not less spiritually and truly because we offer our prayers in these living symbols of a holy faith.

It is quite true that spiritual worship may be

¹ Ruskin, *Modern Painters*, Part II., Sect. 1.

offered within the four naked walls of a Quaker meeting-house or a village hall, in which humble souls reverently meet to praise and to pray. It is a fact that pictures and sculpture have in past ages lent themselves to idolatry. If this were still, in a more educated age, to be the result, we should feel that the vandalism of the Puritans was right, and that their bitter hostility to the purifying influences of the Fine Arts was justifiable. But we are certain that no such consequence need follow. It is not necessary that, in our reaction from the church decorations of a mediæval Romanism, we should denude our Protestant churches of all traces of the refining arts. We may make use of sculpture, and yet not break in letter or in spirit the second commandment. It is not necessary that we regard painted-glass windows, covered with the faces of Apostles, either as a profanation or as a step to the worship of saints. On the other hand, the certain result of such exclusion of Art from the sanctuary will be that Art, driven out of the House of God, will all the more be welcomed into the theatre and the music-hall. The classic music of the fine composers, prevented from consecrating itself to what is sacred, will be heard only in the concert-room. Worship will wear a more grim and forbidding aspect, if indeed it be not marred by studied vulgarity and the harsh defiance of all grace and good taste in the person of its sacred messengers.¹

¹The dismal tones of the crude psalmody of some parts of the Highlands of Scotland and their opposition to instrumental

3. *Dilettantism in Art*.—The culture of Art is not unaccompanied with perils to character. Art is apt to degenerate into dilettantism. The æsthetic faculty that perceives the beautiful in form may not be attracted to the ethical loveliness of virtue. It may rest content with having entered the realm of romantic beauty and artistic satisfaction, and may forget the useful in the ornamental. Triviality and sentimentality have been so often associated with it that it has begotten in many minds the conviction that artistic genius is not to be relied on for active help in any good cause.

Dilettantism is despicable and deserves all that Carlyle said of the "gospel of Do-nothingism".¹ It undermines all solidity of character. Many artists have a continual struggle against the ethical weakness that often accompanies the idealistic temperament. But those who would dream away life in æsthetic enjoyment have misapprehended the lofty

music and hymns have removed worship to a great distance from the natural expression of joyous faith in God. Dorner makes the wise remark: "Art is also valuable in public worship, and even in the formation of *religious ideas*. For, unless the *imagination* is cultivated and developed, it is impossible for the mind to form a vivid image of Christ, of the consummation of all things, of the majesty of heaven, or of the angelic world. All Christian eschatology shows that Christianity is not hostile to Art, but that it involves the final perfection or glorification of nature. And in Art we have the beginning of this final result. In these respects, it forms an essential factor in the religious life both of the individual and of the community" (*Christian Ethics*, § 79, 3).

¹ Carlyle, *Past and Present*, chapter on "Gospel of Dilettantism".

mission of Art. To lose one's self in the enchantment of the ideal is to withdraw from the realm of duty and to forget that all Art has ethical significance.

Art must ever associate itself with work, with sincere earnest work that is more than play. Life is not given to us solely for our amusement and pleasure. The artist must be an honest fellow-worker with every student of science and of literature. He can greatly aid them by his inspiration. Painter or poet, sculptor or musician, he is here to stir them to see the beauty of the world and to realise the deep significance of life. He must labour for the elevation of the many, not for the enjoyment of the few. He must strive to imbue the hard-wrought sons of toil with the sense of the Divine beauty that lingers round every natural object, and clothes the common home-life with aspects of imperishable loveliness. For if among the masses the sense of the sublime and the worthy is not quickened, men will most probably seek their happiness in the grossness of sensual pleasure. Art should co-operate with the Christian Church in redeeming men from low tastes and in giving them a correct conception of the sacredness of the human body.

For in Christian Art the dignity of the body is accentuated and made manifest. A bald spiritualism may ignore this fact ; but Art brings to light the beauty of the material as an emblem of the spiritual, and teaches us to look on our whole bodily life, with all its capacities for enjoyment, as

a sacred thing.¹ It is prophetic of the time when the body of our humiliation shall be changed and be made like to the body of our glorified Lord. The pursuit of Art helps us to bring about the complete perfection and harmonious development of all sides of our human nature as a comprehensive and balanced whole. Art both redeems the one-sidedness of a prosaic and narrow spiritualism, and rescues us from demoralising pleasures.

4. What teaches us to glorify life, to perceive the beauty of the world and to enjoy it aright, is of the highest consequence to the welfare of all our citizens. Consequently the State should make it part of its duty to encourage national Art and to promote the means by which the mass of people may profit by it. Though the State cannot produce talent, it can encourage it where it is found and can provide the education by which it may be trained and equipped for national service.

The State exists for the sake of its citizens, and a great part of its mission is to aid in the development of their character. More and more we have come to see that the State is the medium of our ethical life and has a duty to all those born within its pale to give them the highest and best education possible. It has also a duty to itself to rear them as good citizens of the future. The nature and extent of their education will stamp their whole

¹ It is a grievous wrong that the persistent use of the old version should, at the solemn moment when mourners pay their last respect around the opened tomb, still make us speak of the "vile body". Cf. Ep. to Philipp. iii. 21 (Revised Version).

life and will materially affect the welfare of the nation. This is the justification of all State-aided academies of Art, of public libraries, and of Art collections. They help the State to discharge its true function of enlarging and fulfilling the personal life of the citizen. They connect the work of the great mass of our people with that which is suggestive and inspiring. They teach them to be not content with sensual pleasures, but to strive after the enjoyment of the purer pleasures which appeal to a trained eye and to a correct taste. The springs of universal happiness are found in the right interpretation of the beautiful in life. When France hung up in her National Galleries the paintings of Millet and of Edouard Frere, she gave her people two much-needed lessons on the intrinsic sanctity of toil, and the dignity and tender affection that adorn the humblest peasant home. If the lesson of those pictures be rightly learned, it will help to redeem France from moral decadence and false sentiment. Such an aim clearly falls within the legitimate sphere and duties of the State. Every wise civil Government will be the friend and patron of Art.

CHAPTER XV.

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION.

IF there is an artistic pursuit of the beautiful and a religious pursuit of the good, there is also an intellectual pursuit of the true. All these lift the individual out of the sphere of the particular into that of the universal, out of mere individual life into social relations. A man's horizon always widens out with the intellectual apprehension of new truth which delivers him from selfish aims and narrow views and is educative of his whole personality.

We cannot look at the world which God has made without desiring to appropriate it intellectually and scientifically. By a double instinct we are impelled to seek to know the nature of the world we live in, and to guide our life by its laws. We thus come to perceive its wonders, feel its majesty, and to be filled with a sense of its power. This two-fold instinct is obeyed both by the artist who feels and represents, and by the scientist who perceives and expounds.

I.

True science can never be an enemy to either morality or religion. God made man to think, and He gave him the world to think about. Into every-

thing which He has created He has put a Divine idea, and has made the book of Nature a volume of symbols. What we call natural laws are simply inductions of the varied methods of the Divine operation, and the man of science is the seer whose eye should pierce most clearly into their meaning.

Christianity has been a helpmate to science by presenting it with a new view of the purpose of the Creator and a clearer conception of the duty of man.¹ It has made the course of past events more intelligible to us, and has shown us that the progress of the world has an ethical purpose. We do not deny that apart from Revelation many important truths were discovered by philosophic minds. Every student of the writings of Plato and Aristotle finds in them isolated truths of great value. But it is by Divine revelation that we get these related to the totality of truth, and to the end of human life.² To those great minds of Greece the

¹ Cf. *Lux Mundi*, p. 35. The Agnosticism of to-day, flowing directly from Hume and Kant as its fountain-heads, denies the existence of this teleological evidence. The argument is based on the many instances of adaptation discernible in the world as clearly intentional as are the parts of our bodily organism to their functions. It is difficult for us, living in a *cosmos* so pervaded by order to believe in the assertion of Strauss (*Der Alte und der Neue Glaube*, p. 143) that the "world was not planned by a loftiest reason, although it has the loftiest reason for its goal". Kant depreciated the value of the teleological argument because he desired to read a lesson of moderation to the *Aufklärung* School of his time. He denies a Creator, but acknowledges a World-Architect (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*).

² Cf. Thompson's *Christian Theism*, vol. i., and Prof. Flint's *Agnosticism*, chap. x.

deepest problems of life were inexplicable, and history was without a meaning. But when Revelation made clear the purpose of grace running like a silver thread through history, then the development of the world became evident ; isolated truths were correlated. There appears an evolution going on under Divine control and working towards a worthy consummation. History is a process of continuous growth. A Divine intent lies at the root of things, and nature is full of suggestions for scientific minds.

To-day the school-boy who reads his primer knows the world better than Plato did. The Sunday school child who repeats the first question of the Shorter Catechism about man's chief end knows the ultimate aim of humanity better than Socrates knew it. The Bible has popularised the greatest moral truths, and has made them the heritage of the multitude.

This has never been better expressed than by the well-known French author Jouffroy. "The Church asks the young Christian whence he came ? he knows it. Whither he is going ? he knows it. How he is to attain his end ? he knows it. She asks this poor child, who never in all his life thought about such matters, why he is here, and what will become of him after death ? he gives a sublime answer. She asks how the world came into existence, and why God made it and the plants and animals ? how the earth was peopled, how diversity of language, how suffering originated ? he knows all. The origin of the world, the origin

of our race, the destiny of man in this life and the next, the relation of man to God and to his fellow-men, his rights over creation? nothing is strange to him. And when he comes to maturity, he knows the principles of natural rights, of national rights; for all these follow as a matter of course from the instruction he has received. Truly it is a great religion which is thus able to give an answer to every question that man asks. If Christianity is in the first place a matter of faith, yet it is also true that faith seeks its ideas; it impels to knowledge as well as to confession.”¹

These words are pointed and pertinent. Wherever the Christian religion is received it always creates a strong desire for truth and impels men to a high ideal. It builds its schools and endows its universities that knowledge may spread and that science and morality may be cultivated. For all true knowledge leads up to God. As Bacon said of philosophy, “a little inclineth men’s minds to atheism, but a depth in it brings them about to religion”: so we may affirm of all scientific knowledge. Pursuit of truth apart from pride and prejudice can never ultimately fail to bring the seeker up to the gateway that leads into the presence of God. And there he will find that science is one with Christianity in its inmost essence. The doctrines of true science will harmonise with the doctrines of theology. From God all things come; under Him they live; to Him they return. If

¹ Jouffroy, *Mélanges Philos.*, p. 424.

men are to live a true life they should know theology as well as secular science. The physical, the moral, and the spiritual are interrelated and cannot be separated without injury. They are all the expression of the mind of God ; they all lead to perfection of character ; they all culminate in the beauty of holiness.

If the mission of Art be to create a world of beautiful forms in which truth is seen in imagery, the mission of Science is to investigate nature in order to know truth as truth.¹ But the highest truth is not that which concerns the physical, but that which concerns the moral world. The most difficult problems of life are those connected with man's own nature and destiny. Christian ethics therefore cannot despise scientific knowledge, since all progress in the moral life is an education, a leading forth of that which is within, a bringing to the light of the moral and spiritual. For every man the problem of his culture must largely be one of self-education, by the assimilation of the materials of knowledge which science brings within our reach. It would be foolish, therefore, to despise knowledge even in the interests of our own self-culture.²

¹ Martensen, *Social Christian Ethics*, sect. 112.

² It has been asserted by Buckle and even by J. S. Mill that the Baconian philosophy has been exercising a very prejudicial influence on the modern student by producing an excessive dislike of the higher generalisations and of all philosophical and ethical speculations that do not directly lead to practical results. Coleridge made the same complaint. Yet in *Novum Organon* Bacon asserts the superiority of abstract truth to all the fruits of in-

Science is simply knowledge inductively ascertained and with all its facts properly correlated. It applies the Baconian method to the facts of nature and of human nature. All true progress has been a progress in knowledge, and therefore in science. In religion itself there has been a marked progress in the course of the ages in the view of life and of the world which Christian teaching has presented. There has been developed a Christian theology, which makes use of scientific method, and has, with the other branches of learning, a common scientific interest. It has been asserted by many of the Humanists that theology is not a science because it develops its knowledge through faith, and science is bound to be independent of faith and of all assumptions. But if Christianity is in the first place a matter of faith, according to the maxim "Fides praeceedit intellectum," yet it is not the less true that "faith seeks its ideas". It impels to knowledge as well as to confession. Besides, it is remarkable that none of the ancient religions of Greece or Rome could be said to have a theology. They had a mythology, but not a religious science. "Christianity alone has a theology, and has it by

vention, and seems to value it highly as an instrument of culture. He affirms that "just as we are deeply indebted to light because it enables us to enter on our way, to exercise arts, to read, to distinguish one another, and, nevertheless, the sight of light is itself more excellent and beautiful than the manifold uses of it; so, assuredly, the very contemplation of things as they are, without superstition or imposture, without error or confusion, is in itself more worthy than all the produce of discoveries".

an inward necessity as being the religion of the Word and addressed to the thoughts and will of the human personality. Thus Christianity produced theology, and theology bears the other sciences in her bosom until they set out on their independent paths. . . . Christianity is the commencement of civilisation and education of the uncivilised nations, even by the very fact that it is to them the commencement of literature.”¹

We may also in reply contend that in all sciences faith is a necessary factor. There is no branch of human learning that is not ultimately based on faith. Science runs back into metaphysics, and we have there to rely on something which is a final postulate of the mind, and is received by all of us in faith. We walk by faith: we believe in the external world of matter by faith: we conduct our commerce by faith. All modern science rests on faith and metaphysics for its ultimate postulates. And in this respect science does not differ by one iota from theology. It is equally dependent on metaphysics and psychology.

But Christianity is altogether on the side of the free investigation of truth, and therefore on the side of science. Protestantism maintains the right of every man to look at the facts of the world of nature and of consciousness with his own eyes and to form his own conclusions.² Even in respect to

¹ Jouffroy, *Mélanges Philos.*, p. 424. Cf. Nitzsch, *Die Wirkung des evang. Christenthums*, p. 2 ff.

² That there is a certain temper of mind, however, in which religious truth should be investigated is an acknowledged prin-

the Inspired Word it investigates its meaning by scientific methods, interprets it grammatically and according to the laws of historic criticism. It accepts its truth because it verifies itself to the human conscience as indeed the Word of God, and shines by its own inherent light. The Christian mind does not come to Scripture with the slavish dread with which a Greek approached a Delphic oracle. It bows to the Divine authority of the Bible only because its revealed truth has amply evidenced itself to the religious consciousness. And every scientist acts in a similar manner in his approach to the truth he investigates. He asks Nature to speak to him, to tell him her story of geology, of botany, of astronomy. He listens with open ear to her secrets, and most implicitly complies with every one of her conditions. He asks her to show him her processes; and he finds that, when he has become her servant and scholar, she speaks to him with assurance and with certainty.

Everywhere, in theology, in philosophy, and in secular science, it is only to the humble and to the pure heart that anything is revealed. That is why Christian Ethics has so intimate a bearing on science. The investigation of truth is a moral exercise, demanding judgment, justice, probity, and

ciple in the Ethics of Religious Investigation. The subject is well treated in Herder's *Letters on the Study of Theology*. It is discussed with fairness and much scholarship in Dr. Pusey's *Responsibility of the Intellect on Matters of Faith*. Some excellent suggestions will be found in Principal Shairp's *Culture and Religion*.

fairness, without which qualities truth will not be found. It is only superficial knowledge that puffs up: the man of great mind is humble and docile as a child. Genius, though far from being childish, is akin to childlikeness. Great learning is the reward of self-denial and devotion. Morality has a very intimate connection with the investigation of truth. To the vain, immoral mind no discovery is possible. A man may be a *savant* in science without being a believer in Jesus Christ; but he cannot be so without being obedient to the injunctions of scientific Ethics.¹

The Natural Sciences must therefore be considered deficient unless they are crowned by the science of Theology. The University that establishes Chairs of Arts and Science and neglects to provide a Faculty of Theology is guilty of hostility to the highest science, and in the name of science has sinned against the integrity of knowledge. The totality of the sciences includes the Science of God and of Divine things.

However wide the present divergence between Religion and Science may seem, we cannot but believe that Science is hostile only to superstition and not to true religion.² It is true that the tone of many scientific magazines is anti-religious; but the abler and more profound writers are all friendly

¹ Leitch, *Ethics of Theism*, chaps. i., ii. A pathetic instance of early prejudice may be found in J. S. Mill's *Autobiography* told of the author when he was but a mere boy.

² Cf. Lecky, *Rise and Influence of Rationalism*, vol. ii., p. 131.

to religion. Professor Huxley has said that Science prospers exactly in proportion as it is religious, and that religion flourishes in exact proportion to the scientific depth and firmness of its basis. The devotee of Science is essentially reverent inasmuch as he is an ardent admirer of that which he studies. Too many of those who are classed as religious never honour their Creator by looking into and admiring the works of His hands. Yet in so far as they neglect this means of knowing God, in so far they are the less religious. May we not then say that it is not Science but the neglect of Science that is irreligious? ¹ The reverence of the scientist may sometimes be deficiently expressed in language; but, on the other hand, it may be more clearly shown by his profound investigation into natural laws and his steady obedience to their uniformity of movement.

For the scientific explorer soon comes to learn that it is impossible to offend against these invariable methods of Divine working without incurring Nature's penalties. In another chapter on Moral Education Mr. Spencer has laid great emphasis on the value of Natural Reactions.² The child who is visited with headache because of his greed at table is being educated by the law of Nemesis, which teaches him that the nature of things is moral. So also a moral education is being given to the careless tradesman by the loss of his customers, and to the idle workman by dismissal

¹ H. Spencer, *Education*, chap. i.

² *Opus cit.*, chap. iii.

from his post. Here society is shown to be at one with Nature in enforcing by penalties the law of Morality.¹

Now, admitting that these punishments may be sometimes very disproportionate to the offence, still they are exemplary, and ought to that extent to be reformatory. They are part of life's moral discipline; and they teach us that according to the ordained order of things it is impossible to sin against physical or social laws without suffering punishment. The study of Social Science also ought to teach us the connection between wisdom and success, between obedience to law and prosperity in business. And we maintain that the man who abides by the eternal nature of things and forms his life in obedience to the moral laws of the universe is at heart essentially religious. He is at least in the position of the Roman officer, Cornelius, whose good deeds went up as a sweet savour to God, and who, when the fuller light of Revelation was presented, at once opened his heart to receive it as being in keeping with what his conscience had already taught him as truth.

If to all this we add the undoubted fact that Science has always bred humility in its foremost students, and has made them feel, as Newton did, that they are but children gathering pebbles on the shore while the unexplored ocean lies beyond, we add another proof of the ethical effect of scientific

¹ In Bentham's *Theory of Legislation* the principle underlying penalties is expounded at length. It is based on sociological relations.

culture. When we find that true science is conducive to a humble spirit, we are sure that rightly used it is a means to piety and a handmaid to religion.

The so-called rupture between Religion and Science has been brought about by various causes. One is that religion has misunderstood the purpose of science and placed a ban upon its investigations. Never was Christianity more injured than when the Romish Church condemned Galileo and put his writings into its *Index Expurgatorius*. Such a feeble condemnation of the progress of science only helped to create a distrust of religion in the minds of all who sought to read the world with their own eyes, and were convinced that what was written by the Creator on the page of Nature's Book could never be in contradiction to what was written in the volume of Revelation. With the departure of the dark ages the *Index Expurgatorius* has become an anachronism. The mind of man, liberated from the shackles of an unscientific theology, has asserted its rights to pursue its own path in philosophy and in the natural sciences. To-day the condemnation of any new discovery in Science by the College of Cardinals would only rouse the mocking laughter of the world. The Church that keeps a list of heretical books which its members are forbidden to read is a Church which shows very little confidence in the inherent power of truth. Christianity has nothing to fear from true science. Secure in the certainty of its own verities, it gives full freedom to scientific research.

II.

ETHICS OF EDUCATION.

But this view of the *Index Expurgatorius* is not to be confused with the wise care exercised by the educationist. At every stage of life there are certain truths which are adapted to the expanding intellect. It is wise to refuse to a school-boy access to scientific books which could not profit him at his years. There is a time for everything; and a wise teacher will recognise the period when the mind of the student may step up to a higher altitude and may breathe an ampler ether.

The development of the mind is always healthiest when it keeps step with the growth of the individual ideal of life. The educative influences of home, of school, of college, and of life's vocation should be both mental and moral. As the youth comes to be more conscious of the purpose for which these institutions exist, there settles down upon his mind a conception of various ends out of which he constructs his moral ideal. If the mental and moral enlightenment progress *pari passu*, there will be far less fear of those haphazard plans of life being adopted which often mar a young life with their imperfections. Mental enlightenment will go hand in hand with expanding experience.

But, on the other hand, the intellectual life may receive a disproportionate amount of culture, or a culture that is lacking in breadth. For the worth

of knowledge to a man is determined by power of mental insight into the nature of things and by the spiritual satisfaction attained through such insight. We should aim at acquiring all knowledge which can serve these ethical ends. No man can be too much educated if only the culture embraces his whole nature. But if he specialise, and choose to cultivate only one side of his being for some technical business or under the lead of some special science, then, properly speaking, he is not an educated man. True education is true development of the whole man. It is the calling forth and the culture up to its full extent of his whole personality in order that he may accomplish the work for which his aptitudes have specially designed him. The really educated man is he who makes the most of himself. Hence it is that we must speak of the dangers that spring from Over-Education and from Specialism.

1. There is no more common error in education to-day than that of *Cramming*. It consists of storing the mind with the facts of knowledge in utter forgetfulness of its conceptive power and without regard to the stage of progress which it has reached. Merely to fill the mind with facts and figures is not to educate. It will likely have two results. It will render the pupil conceited and so prove a barrier to any further progress, since humility is the only road to learning. It will also, in all probability, undermine the energy or loosen the elasticity of the mind and so enfeeble its reasoning powers. It has been generally found

that over-educated men are unfitted for the struggle of life. A mass of undigested facts lies on the mind like an undigested meal on the stomach. It obstructs the process of healthy growth and weakens that of assimilation. It is a danger from which our national schools are not yet free. Educationists who recognise the individuality of their scholars will give them such training as is adapted to their powers. They will seek out the instincts which they deem good, because they furnish the greatest opportunities. They will watch the things on which the young heart is set, because these reveal the strong native propulsions that lie behind, and lead to the study of science. These show how the young life is struggling forward with instinctive hunger to assimilate learning and to find spiritual satisfaction in it. It is upon these broad foundations that true education must proceed and self-development must take place.

2. Another danger is that of *Specialism*. This has of late been brought about by the great extension of the area which modern science covers and by the necessary division of the field of work which has resulted. It has its undoubted advantages in sharpening a man's wits and bringing them to a needle's point in the special line to which his studies have led him. In reality the man knows but little, since his investigations have been confined to a very limited field. But within that space he is thoroughly acquainted with all the phenomena, and he is the more likely to discover new facts or new relations in which they stand. Of late years

scientific progress has been greatly indebted to Specialism, and every science is being broken up into departments which are being cultivated with ever-keener analysis. To many it has brought fame, and to still more it has brought large pecuniary rewards, so that at the present time every scientist is induced to specialise.

Yet whatever may be the scientific necessity or pecuniary gain, it has clearly a deliberalising tendency. It takes from extension what it gives to intension of view. The old arguments for a liberal education have not lost their force. It is impossible to have richness and breadth of culture when so many fields of learning are excluded from the mental purview. Intensive culture always carries with it the defect of its qualities. If one faculty is sharpened to the keenness of a razor's edge, the others remain undeveloped and blunted. The necessary result is a lack of sympathy with those other sciences whose contents entirely differ from that one with which the Specialist is constantly engaged. He is apt to exhibit many of the vices of narrowness. From his lack of acquaintance with wide fields of truth, his judgment often goes astray. Goethe said that a man must either be himself a whole, or he must join himself on to a whole. He should aim at the culture of the totality of his manhood and at making use of every one of his God-given faculties. The ripe fruit of manhood is not attained by cultivating only one branch of the tree. It requires devotion to large and noble ends to lead up to the stature of Jesus

Christ. One must not only be a totality, but must for this purpose act in co-operation with others in working for a great cause. In his *Ethical Studies* Mr. Bradley quotes the above saying, and adds, "You cannot *be* a whole unless you *join* a whole".¹ Concentration on one part, and that some minute department, of a science is inimical to the wide culture that comes from contact with living men and devotion to their vital interests. A man's life, lived in the isolation of Specialism, misses that broad human interest which lifts him out of his seclusion and gives the virtues a good soil to grow in.²

This fact has a very direct connection with industrial efficiency. The elementary knowledge of machinery and of processes of manufacture may be quickly gathered by any intelligent apprentice. Yet even here a sound basis of primary education and technical instruction will very much hasten his progress in acquiring technical skill. But to the ordinary workman the indirect benefits of general education are greater than even the direct benefits.

¹ *Ethical Studies*, p. 72.

² Prof. Flint (*Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum*) says: "Science is not sectioned into entirely unconnected sciences. In all the sciences there is a certain common nature, and among them there are many ties of affinity and points of contact. There are precedence and subordination, order and harmony, among them; so that, many and diverse as they are, they form a whole, a system in which each of them has its appropriate place, and, so far from being sacrificed to any other has a new dignity imparted to it by being referred to the final unity of reason, the common centre of knowledge" (p. 7).

It increases his adaptability in the emergencies which continually arise in trade. It gives that breadth and elasticity of mind which make him wishful to know the whole secrets of his trade and to investigate its connection with the wide field of commerce. A lad without good education in general knowledge and in science is bewildered at the multiplicity of agencies and machines now required in most manufactures. He is fit for doing only a small part of the many tasks, all of which it is required that the manager of the business should know. Were he to be trained in the higher branches of education he would soon be able to grasp the intricacies of the higher as well as of the lower grades of manufacture. His inventiveness of mind would also be increased. It has been generally from among those who have risen through all the ranks of skilled artisans that inventors have come who have advanced the boundaries of art and added to the national wealth.¹

The great safeguard against the narrowness which attaches to all specialised pursuits, both in professional and in commercial life, is found in the breadth of general culture. Such culture gives an education to all the faculties, and aims at the development of the whole man in his intellect, will and conscience. Instruction in special lines should be supplemented by wider studies. It is most desirable, in these days when technical instruction has so many advocates and all Governments are

¹ Cf. Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, i., p. 313.

seeking to capture the world's markets, that in addition to technical education there should be acquaintance with the larger knowledge that gives interest in humanity and has points of connection with all modern culture.¹

Some writers would make genius an exception to this general rule. It has been found that gifted minds have received their best training in the direct pursuit of their chosen ends. They have such a gift of looking at the objects of their studies on every possible side that they thereby even receive all the benefits of the widest general culture. A very strong mind of inquisitive tendencies, like that of Hugh Miller, the stone-mason of Cromarty, could win the advantages of the most thorough education out of one particular line of study. His daily work in freestone created interest in geology, the story of which, again, led him to investigate all the cognate sciences in their bearing on this particular one. The stone quarries of the Moray Firth became his "School and School Masters," and gave him that width of human culture which lifted him up to a position of great influence in his day. In our own time we find men of business like Mr. Grote and Sir John Lubbock escaping the narrowness of commercial life by their devotion to the interests of literature, and finding in these a means of broadening the mind.

These, however, may be said to be exceptions that only prove the rule. Genius will always

¹ Cf. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, ii., p. 129.

carve out its own path, as the torrent channels its course. But as a rule, ordinary minds require to be guided and their latent treasures to be developed and made their own. Education is the development of our nature for the purpose of giving us conscious possession of it and becoming masters of our faculties. That human nature is the link which binds us with the universe of mankind and with all universal interests. It is the sounding-board on which all the interests of humanity find a voice. True education, therefore, begets a receptiveness for that manifold variety and wealth of interests which make up the world of humanity. The training that will help men to escape all the dangers of specialism is that which develops our capacities in the atmosphere of the widest human sympathies. Education is the going forth of our mind to meet all the wealth of the world around us.

3. In discussing the ethics of education it is impossible to avoid looking at one aspect of this many-sided question which has provoked much discussion. The spirit of the age, which is the spirit of liberty and equality, has greatly favoured *the principle of free competition*, not only in trade but also in schools and universities. Although derided and sneered at by Thomas Carlyle and nicknamed the principle of "Devil take the hindmost," it has established itself securely in the economy of education, and has become the recognised method through which all school and university prizes are won and nearly all Government

appointments at home and in the Colonies are made. These are the days of examinations, competitions for bursaries, exhibitions and scholarships; and woe betide the student who does not distinguish himself in them.

The principle is clearly the outcome of the individualistic spirit of former days. It is, however, a true development of democracy. Socialism is not fond of it in trade, for there it has virtually deified the disintegrating spirit of individualism, and by competition the big trusts and combines are killing out the smaller traders. But in education it has enthroned itself, and one does not easily see any way by which it can be escaped if patronage and favouritism are to be shunned and an open door held out to all.

Further, Biological Science, turning its light on human life, confirms the conviction that this is one of the laws of evolution. Darwin has shown us this very principle working under the name of "struggle for existence". Distinction and success in the biological sphere are termed "survival of the fittest". Failure is spoken of as "extinction of the unfit". Darwinism has entered into politics and morals, and Mr. Spencer is not afraid to push its conclusions to their final logical result.

Both he and Darwin believe that Natural Selection, elsewhere named Competition, has forwarded the higher types of life and has had healthy results. They desire to see this rivalry ousting the unfit and eliminating the incapable. They regard disease, starvation and poverty as needful and

useful. "These shoulderings aside of the weakly by the strong," says Spencer, "are the decrees of a large far-seeing benevolence."

It is therefore clear that the Individualistic Philosophy is in favour of competition. That principle may now be said to rule every department of education. And it becomes a very important question, How far is competition in education aiding morality? Is it consistent or inconsistent with the welfare of society? Does it not breed a spirit of rivalry that of necessity encourages Self-Esteem? Is it not militating against the rights and claims of Equality? Is it not cutting the roots of Fraternity? And, above all, can a Christian man enter into this spirit of competition without compromising his conscience and injuring his finer Christian feelings? Will not the spirit engendered in the competitions of the school and college lists undermine humility and foster that worst kind of conceit, intellectual pride? And is not this result the contradiction of that self-abnegation to which Jesus exhorts all His disciples?

Such are the questions naturally put by many minds as they contemplate the struggle for place that surrounds them, and notice how keen is the competition that everywhere meets the young in trade, in professional life, and in the schools of learning.

It must be admitted that competition is not wholly evil. There must be a side of goodness in what has persisted so far and so long. In Scripture,

life is spoken of as a race, and the Christian life holds out prizes to them that reach the goal and win the prize of their high calling in Christ Jesus. Clearly it is lawful and worthy to compete for a prize of this nature, since the effort ministers to self-suppression and aids the development of Christian character.

But besides this consecration of effort for higher moral ends, there are other spheres in which it would be difficult to condemn competition. There would be great difficulty in finding any other system of electing to scholarships and bursaries that is not chargeable with more objections than this one. For competition at least avoids the fault of favouritism ; it shuns the well-known and patent evils of patronage. Under its régime intellectual ability gets its value acknowledged. The clever but poor child rises to the rightful place for which nature endowed him and Providence intended him. There seems at present no safer method of selecting for Government offices those in whom the nation is to put confidence. Were these offices open to patronage, a thousand backdoor influences would at once be employed to place mediocrities and dullards in positions which would be treated as sinecures, and where the Government would have to endow with pensions men who had not earned a title to livelihood. Competition, therefore, appears to belong to the natural order of things from which we cannot escape, even if we choose. However socialism may complain of it, it is of the essence of trade. Any departure from it

in the shape of trusts or huge capitalised societies very soon operates to the injury of commerce.¹

Nor has it been found advantageous in education to proceed entirely on the principle of a love of learning in the training of the young. The sense of duty is no doubt the highest and best motive from which work can be done. It is a nobler stimulus than ambition or any such self-regarding passion. He that does his work from a sense of dutifulness and for the love of the work itself will be a continuous and evenly progressive worker. Yet human nature, especially among the young, is weak; and all moralists agree that it needs a spur to activity. The only question is, what spur does least harm to the moral character? What kind of stimulus may we apply that shall best overcome our inborn laziness and self-indulgence and not injure our higher life? No doubt the habit of work itself is the best security against indolence. But that habit has to be gained by many resolutions and by persistent efforts. How may we stimulate dull minds or lazy men to work? The answer given everywhere, in school, college and playground, in commerce and politics, is "Use the spur of competition". Boys need the stimulus, and so do men. Everywhere we see competition in vogue. We feel the influence of it in Church work and in Social work. It is therefore impossible unconditionally to condemn it.

4. But if it has been found of use, it has also been

¹ Cf. Froude, *Short Studies*, Address to St. Andrews University Students, p. 449.

found liable to great abuse. It has undoubtedly, within the last generation, attained a dangerous predominance in education. The true student lives in a realm of truth-seeking that ought to be free from the strife and excitement of emulation. Competition may act as a spur to the slow and the dull; but if it at all influences the stronger minds it only excites them to a feverish contest. It brought to a sudden termination the life of the gifted poet, Henry Kirke White. Or if it do not hurt the finer tissues of the brain, at least it has injured the scholar by calling him away from his vocation to the winning of prizes and the love of place. The characteristic of the true scholar's mind is determination to discover the truth and to gain it at all costs. He is one who is bound to train all his intellectual faculties to see the truth and grasp it, to discriminate between the seeming and the real and to abide by reality. That is his God-given vocation, the purpose to which his life has been dedicated. The solicitations of competition can only hinder the scholar who has understood his mission and lives under its power.

“Here,” says Prof. Peabody of Harvard University, “is the privilege of the scholar's life: here is the persuasion which draws one to the habits and ideals of the academic world. In an age and country where solicitations of commerce are so overwhelming, fortunate are those who may, as Emerson says, ‘raise themselves from private considerations and breathe and live in illustrious thoughts’. Here is the only aristocracy which our

hurrying, shifting, democratic world can permanently respect—the aristocracy of unambitious and unworldly scholars, content to live simply if they may live in the world of ideal, regarding as the true wealth of life the wealth of the true, the beautiful, and the good.”¹

The outstanding quality of the scholar is not mere intellectual acumen or vastness of memory. He is something more than an encyclopædia of learning. He is one whose character is marked by insight, wisdom, intellectual grasp, and moral discernment. We read the writings of genuine scholars; and when we open their pages, the pages of Augustine, of Calvin, of Erasmus, of Dr. Johnson, of Macaulay, it is not so much their vast learning that impresses us as their keen insight into the springs of action, their knowledge of motive, their ability to read and interpret for us human life and past history while other men can only read books. It was this quality in Jesus that constrained His critics to wonder at His insight, and to ask, “How knoweth this man these things having never learned?” It is a quality which could never be stimulated by competition, and which the emulation of the schools could not in the least degree help to impart. To win a high place in class lists or in Government service is one thing. It is altogether another thing to possess the virtue of open mindedness. He who has measured the wide horizons of truth has already found the reward of the scholar

¹ *The Religion of an Educated Man*, p. 36.

in his reverence for fact and in his docility of mind. He will thereby escape two evils. On the one hand he will shun the narrowness of vanity, and on the other he will escape the intellectual inertia to which the man is prone who has outdistanced his peers, and who fancies that he now sits on the summit of knowledge. All great scientific savants are at one in their humility and reverence when they stand in the presence of facts. Modern science has been distinguished by nothing more than by its patient and devoted search for truth; and in this it is thoroughly in harmony with the spirit of Jesus Christ.

But competition in education belongs to a lower order of things. It is a long step down from the level of truth-seeking. It has doubtless its use, but it is also sadly liable to abuse. It is of the earth, earthy, and belongs to the child-stage of education, the stage of tutors and governors. It possesses no attraction for a mature Christian mind. Whether in education or trade it has a lowering effect on the character. To be filled with the spirit of emulation, to be impelled by a continual desire for distinction, is not favourable to healthy character. Even among school-boys such influences tend rather to make a prig than a scholar, to fill the young mind with empty conceit rather than with the love of learning. The type of character produced by school and university competitions is not the loftiest or the most Christ-like.

It has also to be considered that success in life is not to be measured by college prize lists. Many

of the best minds are not of that class that shine in competitive examinations. Nor is success itself a synonym for happiness ; and while the desire for happiness is inherent in all, the craving for success is less universal. The desire for a tranquil life among really able men is frequently more persistent than the impulse of ambition. As Lecky says in his *Map of Life* : " A distaste for the competitions and contentions of life, for the increasing responsibilities of greatness, and for the envy and jealousies that seldom fail to follow in its trail, may be found among men, who, if they choose to enter the arena, seem to have every requisite for success. The strongest man is not always the most ardent climber ; and the tranquil valleys have to many a greater charm than the lofty pinnacles of life."

5. Since Science is necessary to the prosperity of every department of labour, and Education is *sine quâ non* of success in life, there must be furnished the institutions that are essential to their maintenance. Schools, academies, technical colleges and universities are all required. These must be equipped with libraries and museums, and with the pecuniary endowments needful to sustain their teaching staff. No doubt the school of the intellectual man is the sphere of his duty ; and his teachers are the people, the books, the animals, and the plants which he sees around him. The intellectual life is really within reach of every one who earnestly desires it. Yet such will find it very difficult to acquire culture of mind apart from the institutions that have been specially

equipped for that purpose. These institutions provide the conditions most favourable for mental growth. They aid science in its free development. They furnish to all students the atmosphere and the *esprit de corps* which favour study and stimulate intellectual progress.

We admit that many have reached a high stage of culture and refinement who have been destitute of these advantages.¹ We grant that it is not erudition that makes the intellectual man or the original thinker, and that many who have had a university education have made little use of their opportunities. Yet with this admission it is nevertheless a truth confirmed by the wider experience of mankind, that natural endowments are much improved by education, and that they seldom if ever come to their full blossoming and maturing apart from it. To develop the highest faculties and to refine the purest sensibilities, we require all the aid that schools and universities can give.

¹ Cf. Emerson, *Miscellanies*, chapter on the "American Scholar".

"Meek men grow up in libraries, believing it their duty to accept the views which Cicero, which Locke, which Bacon have given, forgetful that Cicero, Locke and Bacon were only young men in libraries when they wrote these books. Hence, instead of Man Thinking, we have the book-worm. Hence the book-learned class, who value books as such; not as related to Nature and the human constitution, but as making a sort of Third Estate with the world and the soul. Hence the restorers of readings, the emendators, the Bibliomaniacs of all degrees. Books are the best of things, well used: abused, among the worst. They are for nothing but to inspire. The one thing in the world of value is the active soul."

In schools for higher education the question of classical studies is still a burning one. Many would exclude the classics in favour of scientific education and modern languages. We acknowledge the great aid of Modern Science in education. But the justification of the use of the classical languages lies in the way in which they introduce the young mind to thought at its sources where it exists in its simplest forms and to writings couched in the purest literary style. On the other hand, many students nowadays acquire a power of speaking fluently in continental languages, which is incomparably more complete, in the sense of being a practical possession, than any book knowledge of the classics ever can be. And if the scholars of to-day neither write nor speak Latin but only read it, they do not really use the language. They only see how others have used it. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries scholars used that language habitually and wrote it with ease. If the classics are to remain the media of mental culture, they will have to become the living tongue of those who make use of them.¹ Otherwise the Græco-Roman literature will be only of historical importance. In that point of view, however, it is not to be despised; for it is the pre-supposition of all Christian literature, and furnishes the ground of

¹This is a sufficient reason for the growing study of modern Greek. The student of Plato and of the Greek Testament would do well to finish his education at the modern University of Athens, and should learn to converse in the Greek tongue.

contact for mutual scientific intercourse among the learned of all nations.

6. In all scientific study and higher education universities take a leading part, and have a great office to discharge. For that purpose they must maintain active intercourse between the various sciences, and must teach their students to survey each in relation to the totality of knowledge. They must show how each superior science, as it rises in the scale, includes those below it, until ascending through philosophy to the highest of all, theology is seen to be the loftiest, and religion to be the final synthesis of all knowledge.¹ It is of the highest benefit to a man that he should enter his new professional work through the avenue of the liberal disciplines which the universities offer. He will in this way come to learn the mutual relations which exist between his own professional studies and the other departments of knowledge that constitute the hierarchy of the sciences. He will be prepared by this varied course of instruction

¹ Bishop Westcott (*Religious Office of the Universities*, p. 82) speaking of the intellectual training, more particularly of the clergy, says: "It must be animated and ruled by two great principles which are included in the nature of their message. Christianity is the absolute religion; and therefore the Christian minister must apprehend clearly the relation in which Christian theology as a science stands to all other sciences. Christianity is a historical religion, and therefore he must be conversant with the laws of investigation into the past. He needs, above all men, largeness of view and critical discipline. It follows, therefore, that his training must be, if I may use the term, encyclopædic in spirit, and historical in method."

for independent research. He will not be disposed to accept facts at second-hand, but will seek by patient investigation to discover truth for himself. All this is a discipline in character and helps to give largeness of view, to chasten the mind, and to brace the intellect in the search after truth. The whole influence and atmosphere of a university are powerful elements in the training of character. They tend to impress upon the student the characteristics of a truth-seeker. He no longer cultivates the truth only in the interests of a particular calling. He acquires reverence for the truth as truth and not merely in its relation to the profits it may bring.

It is this which forms the distinction between the university and a technical college. The one prepares its students for a profession, the other trains them for a trade. It may not always be easy to distinguish between these two, since in not a few instances a profession is carried out in the spirit of a trader, and many a tradesman in his work rises superior to the temptation of the profit which it brings. But between the two there is this broad line of distinction, that a man enters trade in order to make money, while he enters a profession in order to accomplish his life-work. In the one his trade pays him for his trouble; that is his reward. In the other he is promised a maintenance while he pursues his work. It may be the healing of the sick; it may be the defence of the wronged; it may be the elevation of the degraded by the preaching of the Gospel. But in all these the profession must be pursued from no sordid

interest, but wholly in the interests of the well-being of society.¹ This purpose will prevent the professional man from degenerating into Mammonism. He will master and acquire knowledge in order that he may be enabled to rise to a higher grade of service in the intellectual and spiritual enterprises of his time.

On the other hand, the student will not forget that service is the real test of education, and that the best educated man is he who with refined taste and mind is also the most competent for the discharge of the duties which lie to his hand. To-day a university education must seek its justification in terms of social well-being. This it can well do, since without a thorough knowledge of the

¹ Each profession is guided by its own code of etiquette, consisting of special rules applicable to the work of its members. These it is necessary to observe for the sake of goodwill and harmony. They are for the most part prescribed by customs which have grown out of experience and have come to acquire the force of professional ethics. They may be said to be applications of the principle that we should do to others as we wish they should do to us. No doubt in some instances these maxims of conduct have been carried to unreasonable extremes that have proved injurious to the public interest. In such an event the interests of a class must yield to the general well-being of the social whole. The public good must suffer no detriment for the sake of the maintenance of a professional code.

But a keen appreciation of professional honour is of great value, and qualifies a man for taking an influential place among his brethren. The habitual neglect of it argues a selfish spirit and a disregard of common interests. There is no doubt that among the social utilities of the time is to be found a professional conscience.

sciences, no one can efficiently further social progress.¹

¹ Bishop Westcott (*opus cit.*, p. 65) says: "We ask that the University as a spiritual power teach the Divine destination of labour. The subdivision of study, which tends to narrow us intellectually, tends also to narrow us morally. We lose the sense of proportion and we lose the sense of fellowship. But the remedy lies near at hand. The very speciality of our operations must from time to time force us to acknowledge that we are joint-workers in a body from which we receive infinitely more than we can ever repay. And when this idea is once firmly grasped, the peril of isolation is gone. The student rises to the dignity of a minister of Christ in humanity: work becomes sacrifice: distinctions of office as great or small are lost in the transforming glory of supreme devotion.

"It is indeed presumptuous to mark out beforehand the limits of fruitful service. Experience shows us that we are poor judges of the results of patient toil. But we may claim that each worker shall be called upon to realise the social character of his work: to look habitually away from himself to the great body whose minister he truly is: to discipline his vigour by casting off all that is selfish in the choice, or in the accomplishment of his task. There is not only a tendency in the individual student to press his particular inquiries too far, but there is a general tendency to extend the sway of one science into the domain of that which borders upon it. To take only the most general examples, materialism is an invasion of theology by physics: pietism is an invasion of physics by theology. And even if there is no actual trespass, it is as perilous to study a lower subject without regard to the higher, as to study a higher subject without regard to the lower. Thus there is need, in any engrossing intellectual pursuit, of a personal discipline, and (so to speak) of a collective discipline. When once this is recognised, theology, the science of revelation, will be seen in the grandeur of its true office; and metaphysics, the science of introspection, and science, popularly so called, the science of observation, will be indefinitely elevated by the introduction of a moral element

7. Universities are apt to produce one peculiar type of character which is of little practical use in the world. With all his culture the college-bred student may become only a book-worm or a recluse, one who never attains in full measure the practical wisdom which is so valuable to men of affairs. For here, as with other virtues, culture must be conjoined with practice. No amount of learning will save a man from blunders in judgment or from errors in method. The student must cease to be a recluse; he must give himself to social service, and take the best securities he can against the penalties of mistaken judgments. Errors are often the practical price of wisdom. They teach us what we cannot do and what we can do, and a certain demand is made upon us. It is then we learn the wisdom of the saying, that the man, from whom nothing is demanded which he cannot do, never does all he can.

It is always an epoch in a student's life when the world of social duty and afterwards of political action meets him and makes demands upon his energies. The type of character produced by the

into abstract study. For if it be certain that the issues of all human action are infinite, and that man, whether he knows it or not, must work for eternity: if it be certain that differences of endowment correspond to differences of function, and that in life there is absolutely no recurrence of opportunity: if it be certain that not only all action but all thought is indissolubly connected, and that science hangs on science in a fixed and magnificent order: what dignity, what devotion, what intensity will effort gain, from the contemplation of conditions which enoble even while they alarm!"

university is here put to the test. There comes to him much disillusionment, and romantic visions give way to a growing perception of the demands of life's duties. Then it is that we discover how much an educated mind is enriched when balanced by a sound judgment. The wise ethical teacher of Greece never uttered a finer maxim than when he said that where a sound judgment was, there all the virtues existed together.¹ Such a man, placed in business, will quickly develop all the mercantile virtues. Cast among the currents of political life he will keep his feet on that slippery foothold and will be certain to choose those modes of action which lead to the civic virtues. For a wise judgment, as Aristotle says, brings a double benefit. It makes us choose the right end, and helps us to put in practice the right means. In this way it strengthens the good habits which were formed under the influence of early training; and it frees its possessor from the rigid and wooden automatism of habit which is so lacking in elasticity and so unequal to the sudden demands of life.

Besides this, a sound moral judgment should bring to the scholar an independence of mind which is only too rare amongst educated men. A bookish education in itself produces only a very partial culture. To use the Athenian's words again: "It

¹ Aristotle, *Ethics*, Book VI., chap. xiii.: "For with prudence (*φρόνησις*) which is one, all the virtues exist together". This connection of prudence and virtue is analogous to the relation which exists in Christian Ethics between faith and obedience.

has no power over wisdom nor over the superior parts of the soul". It lacks in moral insight and in spiritual tact ; it seldom knows the end which it aimed at and still less the action to be chosen in new circumstances. Consequently it never attains to the independence which belongs to sagacity and practical wisdom. Yet unless the scholar can act and think independently, he may, as Milton says, be

Deep versed in books and shallow in himself.

Many have thought that the communication of practical wisdom is beyond the art of education, and that no university training can convey it. They point to the fact that some students make shipwreck of character and succumb to the temptations of intellectual vices ; and they affirm that there is no higher education which can convey that invaluable faculty of intuitively devising the best means to desirable ends. History may teach precedents ; but it can only show experiences repeating themselves, and can point merely to accepted ways of reaching familiar objects. Yet the faculty is not so incommunicable as it may seem. Practical wisdom is a highly complex product. The best teacher of Moral Philosophy may not be able to impart soundness of judgment ; but he can aid in building up the moral character in which that judgment is rooted and of which it is the finest product. He can help to make the character responsive to all the higher appeals of duty, and can train it to deliberation, so very valuable in

forming resolutions and making a choice. He can teach the student how to organise his impulses in order to fulfil the ends of a moral life. He can exhibit to him the meaning of existence, and show him how by his own ethical activity he may build up, out of the chaos of wild desires, the cosmos of an intelligent moral life. Above all, he can communicate clear and vivid ideas of the ends of life, which are potent in overcoming a weak will and in creating strong decision of character.¹

We admit that the highest results of scholarship will not be reached by the mere communication

¹ Such a teacher was Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, who fully realised that the scholastic profession was a true form of the Christian ministry. What on its academic side is education of the mind is on its human side religious impulse. To educate is to draw out the possibilities latent in personality. It is to kindle the young spirit by communicating to it the ethical impulses which proceed from the spirit of truth. Such a teacher is an inspiration to his scholars and a true minister of Jesus Christ. We do not wonder that Matthew Arnold sang of such :—

Servants of God ! or sons
 Shall I not call you ? Because
 Not as servants ye knew
 Your Father's innermost mind.
 Yours is the praise, if mankind
 Hath not as yet in the march
 Fainted, and fallen, and died.
 Beacons of hope ye appear ;
 Ye fill up the gaps in our files,
 Strengthen the wavering line,
 Stablish, continue the march
 On to the bound of the waste,
 On to the City of God !

of knowledge at school or university. Knowledge is not wisdom. We all know the weakness of mere exhortation. But there is a more effective way. It is by the nurture of the best instincts, by the formation of good habits, by engaging in benevolent work, and not least by the force of examples, that character is built up and Christian graces are woven into its fibre. Mere intellectual teaching, the inculcation of some moral code, even though it be that of the Ten Words, is not enough. The moral code, as the history of the Hebrews shows, has a terrible tendency to stereotype itself into a cold Pharisaism, inelastic as an iron chain of armour. Precepts will soon cease to have any meaning to the scholar unless they ally themselves to virtue. A commandment accepted by the intellect must make a place for itself in both affections and will.¹ The best student is the man who *is* most, not the man who has *learned* most. The highest ideal of a university curriculum is that which secures width of intellectual view with thoroughness of moral and religious self-discipline. It is the practical combination of the mental and moral that makes up the fulness of life.

It may doubtless be difficult to distinguish between the intellectual and the moral powers.

¹ This is a psychological maxim which Pestalozzi was among the first of educationists to enforce with clearness. He always endeavoured to awaken among his pupils a love of the virtue before he spoke much about it. Having brought them into a receptive mood, he seized the opportunity of enforcing it.—De Guimp's *Pestalozzi*, p. 158.

Like the hemispheres into which geographers divide this globe of ours, the faculties into which men distribute the mind are not easily discriminated. The equatorial line is not difficult to draw upon the school map; but it cannot be made so visible in our progress from the mental to the moral regions of human nature. Yet that line must be crossed. The truths of the intellect must take possession of the heart. The forces of the mind must move the affections. Only then has culture reached its culmination when mental vigour results in moral character and the strong will is the obedient servant of the trained intellect.¹

8. Culture has its roots in the human intellect. Yet it is a universal experience that religion has always been the warm and fertilising atmosphere in which culture has flourished. Religion is not identical with culture, but it is a pre-requisite of it. Genuine education, far from counting religion superfluous, demands it for its highest completion. When culture becomes hostile to Christianity, it allies itself with immoral forces and proves itself inimical to the moral well-being of humanity.

For this reason we do not speak of religion *and* education, but we emphasise the need of religion

¹ If this be so, it may be well that, with modern psychologists, we dethrone the Three R's from their ancient position and substitute the Three H's—the education of the Head, of the Hand, and of the Heart. Education is one organic whole; and the school and university are concerned with more than the Intellect, as the Church is concerned with more than the Feelings. Cf. Dr. N. M. Butler's *Principles of Religious Education*, p. 18.

in education. In every sphere of culture, religion ought to exert a leavening influence. To allow it to be taught only as an extraneous subject in school is to misconceive its aim. It must pervade the entire teaching of every department. The university which claims to give complete scientific instruction will not be without its chair of Theology, a science that may be, and ought to be, taught on most scientific principles.

It is not science but the neglect of science that is irreligious.¹ The science of history rightly taught manifests the moral organism of the world. The natural sciences open up glimpses into the method of God's universe. Philosophy is but the struggle, intensely pathetic at times, of the finite mind with the problems of the Infinite. And theology is not only the science of Divine things; it also involves the systematic interpretation of the religious consciousness of man.

In all this education, therefore, there should be the interfusion of a paramount religious aim, which will make itself felt through the whole range of thought and knowledge. This will not be best done, as the Church of Rome would do it in Ireland, by putting religious teaching entirely into the hands of priests. That is far from a scientific solution of the problem of religious education. It will be accomplished by making the school a place where not only the Bible is taught, but in which

¹ Spencer (*Education*, p. 46) ably emphasises this fact. He speaks of devotion to science as "a tacit worship, a recognition of worth in the things studied; and by implication in their cause".

the whole atmosphere is thoroughly Christian. It is not enough to say that religion must be lived rather than taught, and that therefore it cannot form any part of a course of instruction. For Christianity is both doctrine and history; and it must nationalise itself in the Home, the School and the University if we are to remain a Christian nation. "The educational discipline of the State should have its Christian character made secure and effective by the use in all public schools of the Scriptures which all Christians acknowledge."¹

¹ Prof. Denney, of Glasgow, *Union Magazine*, August, 1902. He adds the words: "The Faculty of Theology, like that of Law or Medicine, must always, to a greater or less extent, have regard to the equipment of men for a particular profession; only those who have this profession in view attend its classes; and as their number is relatively small, it is not on the Faculty of Theology alone that we can depend to give a Christian character and quality to the work of the University as a whole. Those who are most anxious to see University education Christianised are most conscious that it is a vast and difficult process. The end will not be attained by assigning this chair or that to the members of any Church, or even by the perpetuation of the Theological Faculty, whether on its present footing or on one which should make it independent of all Church connections. We do not wish to see Christianity existing in the University side by side with the special sciences; we wish to see it as the spiritual atmosphere in which the sciences are cultivated. It is not a Christian conception of Christianity which makes it a super-added gift, an addendum or appendix to man's life; it is rather to be conceived as a regeneration, in which all things become new. There is an ideal in it for personality, to which man does not attain without becoming its debtor; there is an ethical standard and inspiration in it, away from which art and science, philosophy and history, alike fall short of the full proportions of life and truth."

But religion is not a thing that pertains only to the intellect. It concerns also the affections and the will. It expresses itself in love for all men. And it is never really understood until it practically influences the life and becomes a witnessing faith. The spark of a young faith is best fanned by the encouragement which it gets from opening the heart to the claims of charity and letting these influence it to the fullest extent. But such influences are rarely met in school or college. Where students are constantly urged to win places in prize lists and to secure remunerative posts by competition, a spirit of vanity and selfishness is laid which is most injurious to the moral life.

It is to meet and oust this spirit that our best Public Schools and our Universities are now encouraging their students to take part in the work of Settlements among the Slums of London, of Glasgow and Edinburgh. There they come into contact with the very poor, and in the service which they are able to render in night schools and in many branches of social work they find an antidote to the besetting sins of the student's life. They learn how much genuine goodness may exist in a poor man's home. They see for themselves how few things are needful to an honest life. They enter scenes that take them back to the days when to hear Abelard thirty thousand students travelled from all parts of Europe to Paris, who carried all their wardrobe on their backs and learned to live on the scholar's fare as they begged their way

along the roads.¹ The kindly help offered to the poor in teaching a week-class or a Sunday school in these Settlements will evoke a spirit of love that is very humanising and very levelling. For in all love there is something that places us on a level with those we love. Great as may be the differences separating us, love reconciles them and leads to equality. Hence it also involves self-denial, and is in virtue thereof the best antidote to the scholar's selfishness. We desire to possess nothing for ourselves alone but to share it with others. Here is salvation from the spirit of the book-worm and the cynic. Self-importance and self-satisfaction are lost in social service.

9. The Ethics of Education cannot be completed without referring to the lofty vocation of the Scholar. He has a post of greatest usefulness and should have a place of highest honour. He belongs to the true aristocracy of talent and learning, the only aristocracy which a democratic time can permanently respect. His vocation in this age of material values is to bear witness to the worth of the unseen and the true. In the words of Maurice, he is not a power of acquisition but of illumination. He is here to trace the influences of those invisible forces which are the most elevating and enduring. Let him be content to exercise this power, however poor may be his pay in the world's pelf. It is not for money that he labours. It is for a reward which is moral and spiritual.

¹ Cf. Lewes, *Biographical History of Philosophy*, Article "Abelard".

Milton gained but a few pounds by his immortal poems; yet was he not rich? Spinoza died and left no estate behind him; yet did he not shape and influence the whole philosophy of Europe? Kant lived the quiet life of the scholar in remote Königsberg; but can his humble estate cancel his claim to recognition as one of the most powerful and constructive thinkers of the world?

The scholarship that has moulded the thoughts of men has never worked for pecuniary rewards. But if it has not cared to amass wealth, it has been eager to find wisdom. It has, above all, revered the truth. The scholar is, to use the words of Fichte, the priest of the truth. The world of commerce is sceptical about the value of scholarship, and talks contemptuously of the scholar in comparison with the man of affairs. But they have each their place, and the one cannot do without the other. And scholarship to-day is justifying its claim by the best criterion, that of social serviceableness.

Here is the place which Scholarship ought to fill in the social economy of the time. It is to supply us, not with placemen and partisans, but with men of light and of leading. Where ignorance and cupidity claim the keys of office and are lusting after power, it is to be a clear voice of warning as to the dangers that threaten the State. When error blinds the moral vision, or Mammon-worship clogs the people's taste, it will point out the path of wisdom and teach the true art of life.

It will prove its right of primacy by exhibiting its capacity for service.

10. Two duties remain: duties clear, urgent and abiding. First, *we must by every means encourage Scholarship*. The men who devote themselves to the scholar's life should be set free from pecuniary cares to pursue original investigation and give themselves to profound study. Never was the demand for intelligent and cultured service more urgent than to-day. The whole social and industrial movements of our time call for higher capacity to interpret and direct these perplexing issues. For this work we need men who are on the Mount of Vision; who have the repose and tranquillity that learning needs to trace out processes of thought. Such positions must be found by multiplying the endowments which alone can maintain scholars, and by equipping universities with the needful apparatus of research.¹

Further, we must not only encourage Scholarship, *but must also learn to love and esteem the Scholar*. He is more than a mere computing machine: he is something better than a dreamer of dreams. He is one who tries to teach us the meaning of the Universe, to sketch the map of moral life, and to help us to think the thoughts of God. The trained mind seeks to live in perfect fidelity to duty, to work in transparent sincerity, and unflinchingly to

¹ In this equipment the Universities of Scotland are far behind both those of England and of the United States. Could some portion of the commercial wealth of to-day be more wisely employed than in giving them this equipment?

follow truth. The man who exhibits these noble traits of intellectual integrity is one who deserves our deepest respect and our unfailing regard.

Finally, all Scholarship should lead to reverence and faith. The Scholar's investigation of truth demands purity of motive and simplicity of character. It is the single eye that fills the body with light. The path to further insight is through constant fidelity to the light we already have from God. If this path be pursued with docility, open-mindedness and sincerity, the besetting sin of the intellectual life will be met and mastered. We shall know the truth, and the truth shall make us free.

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
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
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